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ABSTRACT 
Growing asymmetric threats, such as international terrorism, have replaced the 
hostile nation-state as the adversary of choice.  As embodied by the September 11 
attacks, the United States now faces enemies that seek to create havoc and disruption in 
non-traditional ways.  This new adversarial paradigm makes the protection of the critical 
infrastructure of the nation even more important than ever.   
Unfortunately, this is the nation’s soft underbelly.  Computer-based control 
systems form the heart of the critical infrastructure, and these control systems are riddled 
with rampant vulnerabilities.  A combination of industry apathy, physical challenges, and 
the growing reliance on the Internet by has exacerbated these vulnerabilities.   
The critical infrastructure of a Navy warship is just as vital to the operation of the 
vessel as the national infrastructure is to the operation of the nation.  Unfortunately, a 
ship’s infrastructure is similarly permeated with control systems, which have similar 
weaknesses and face similar threats as their civilian counterparts. 
This thesis examines the importance of the critical infrastructure on both the 
national and shipboard scale.  Threats and vulnerabilities are established, and corrective 
actions are explored, with the goal of developing some strategies to improve the security 
of shipboard systems.  As part of these corrective actions, a template security policy and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS SCOPE 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, generically referred 
to as control systems, are designed to provide real-time monitoring, management, and 
control of a variety of different utility or industrial systems.  These SCADA systems can 
involve hundreds or even thousands of nodes, and the sheer volume of events that are 
overseen requires the rendering of computer assistance to human operators.  The 
proliferation of these systems is enormous; SCADA systems are prevalent throughout the 
nation’s infrastructure and are used extensively throughout the Department of the Navy 
(DoN).  They are particularly numerous at U.S. Navy ports and shore, where the 
management of the utility consumption of Navy vessels is an enormous, complicated, and 
expensive problem.  The Navy also utilizes control systems to monitor and control the 
engineering systems, propulsion systems, and auxiliary systems on board some classes of 
modern warships.  As technology continues to advance, and the Navy continues to search 
for ways to reduce its manpower base and to automate the execution of shipboard routine, 
this trend is likely to continue. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the security of control systems, 
particularly those deployed on board U.S. Navy vessels, and to illustrate strategies to 
address any security weaknesses that are discovered.  The scope of the analysis would 
include, but not necessarily be limited to, establishing the proliferation of control systems 
on board a ship, in order to judge the degree to which shipboard functions are impacted 
by this equipment; determining the organization and deployment of various control 
systems, in order to observe how the systems are interconnected and how the various 
control data could be categorized; and discovering if there is a remote monitoring 
capability of control systems, and analyzing the vulnerabilities of such a case.  Additional 
security matters that would be investigated include confirming the physical security of 
the components of a control system network; determining if control systems were 
subjected to any certification and accreditation effort, verifying the degree of access to 
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shipboard control systems through open networks, such as the Internet or 
communications systems; and validating how local security policy enforces protection of 
shipboard control systems, and how this policy is enforced. 
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
In a general sense, this thesis is designed to illustrate why control system security 
is a serious issue and how security issues are addressed.  Since there is significant 
correspondence between the significance, vulnerabilities, and security mitigations of 
civilian SCADA systems and Navy control systems, substantial attention is paid to both.  
Civilian control systems, and some aspect of their importance or some statement 
concerning their security, are usually used to make a base assertion.  From there, the 
specific correlation to shipboard control systems is made. 
This thesis is organized as follows:   
Chapter I—Introduction—This chapter introduces SCADA systems and their 
importance and illustrates the organization of this work. 
Chapter II—Control System Background—This chapter provides background 
material that illustrates the basic format and development history of control systems. 
Chapter III—The Concept of Critical Infrastructure—This chapter demonstrates 
the criticality of control systems within the architecture of an over-arching infrastructure, 
as well as providing examples of their presence within both the civilian sector and the 
Department of Defense.  
Chapter IV—Shipboard Control Systems in the U.S. Navy—This chapter 
extrapolates the concepts of the previous chapter and drills down to the smaller scale of a 
Navy warship.  Specifically, the chapter illustrates the importance of Navy shipboard 
control systems and the likelihood of their increased implementation in the future, as well 
as some examples of shipboard control systems.  
Chapter V—How Control Systems are at Risk—This chapter articulates the 
vulnerabilities of, and threats to, control systems in general, and provides some examples 
of attacks against control systems. 
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Chapter VI—Shipboard Control System Security—This chapter examines the 
security of shipboard systems more closely by observing weaknesses inherent in the 
security of all federal information systems.  A high-level assessment of shipboard control 
system security in the Navy is also provided. 
Chapter VII—Improving the Security of Control Systems—This chapter provides 
recommendations for improving the security of control systems.  Many of the 
recommendations can be applied to all control systems, while one section specifically 
addresses shipboard control systems in particular.  A template security policy, as well as 
a computer security checklist, were both developed for this chapter, and are represented 
as annexes to this thesis. 
Chapter VIII—Summary and Recommendations—This chapter summarizes the 


























II. CONTROL SYSTEM BACKGROUND 
Control systems can be generally described as collections of hardware, software, 
communications media, and protocols that are used to monitor and control processes, 
services, or commodities.  The processes, services, and commodities that are managed in 
this way can either be at a concentrated site or dispersed to several different remote 
locations, and they are often critical to the functioning of our nation.  These systems 
permeate our national economy and our industrial base, to the point that our national 
infrastructure is dependent upon them.  Control systems are utilized in such disparate 
fields as utility generation and distribution, waste treatment, traffic management, 
industrial processing, and manufacturing.  Because of this widespread proliferation, there 
is virtually no aspect of daily life that is not impacted in some way by these systems.   
A. NOMENCLATURE OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Since control systems are dispersed throughout so many different industries, and 
perform so many different functions, many different terms are used to refer to them.  
These terms are usually differentiated by the specific usage of the systems, the 
geographic area monitored by the systems, and the specific hardware used remotely in the 
field.  The two most commonly used terms seem to be distributed control systems (DCS) 
and supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA), although other terms are 
used as well.   
A DCS is often characterized as a closed-loop, geographically restricted system, 
used at a single site, that utilizes a high-speed communications medium. A SCADA 
system is often described as a system that could rely on a variety of different types of 
communication links, and is responsible for a larger geographical area [1].  DCS seems to 
describe control systems that are used in manufacturing or industrial facilities, while 
SCADA almost exclusively refers to systems that control the distribution of utilities, such 
as water, electricity, and gas.  However, as control systems continue to evolve, the 
distinction between DCS and SCADA is becoming less clear, and the names appear to be 
almost interchangeable.   
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Neither term seems to be used when describing functionally unique control 
systems, such as those used on board U.S. Navy warships.  Interviews with members of 
the information technology (IT) and engineering communities in the Navy indicate that 
these terms are relatively unknown in those circles.  Shipboard systems that encompass 
some aspects of utility distribution, and thus mirror the performance of common SCADA 
systems, are usually referred to as Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical Systems (HM&E); 
however, their geographic area of responsibility is small, and they incorporate additional 
functionality that differs from that which is traditionally associated with civilian control 
systems, such as participation in shipboard weapons’ systems.  For simplicity’s sake, this 
thesis will generally use the generic term “control systems” to refer to any of these 
systems, regardless of implementation, hardware, and geographical considerations, 
although other terms may be used as deemed appropriate. 
B. CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
A control system typically consists of a master station connected in some fashion 
to at least one, but usually more than one, remote terminal unit (RTU).  These RTUs are 
in turn connected to various control equipment and sensors.  The RTU receives 
information from the sensor elements and relays that information to the master station.  
The RTU can also issue directives to the control equipment to initiate an action based 
upon the data that the sensor delivers.  These directives could either be locally 
determined by the RTU, or they could simply be relayed from the master station.  The 
entire system is connected by a communications system that provides the medium for this 




Figure 1.   Simple control system. 
1. Master Station 
The master station is typically configured at the main site.  It usually consists of a 
central management and monitoring station that has at least one, but perhaps more than 
one, human-machine interfaces (HMI) that are used to observe data as it is fed from 
remote sites, and for human-determined control commands to be issued to the remote 
sites.  Master stations will collect the data that is reported by remote stations and can 
perform data archiving, trending, and display, as well as report generation, and may 
disperse these functions across several workstations.  There may also be application 
servers present, as well as an engineering workstation that is used to perform 
maintenance and to configure the system.  Master stations may communicate with remote 
stations in a variety of ways, depending upon the operating environment and the 
communication channels available [2]. 
2. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) 
Remote terminal units are deployed in remote locations away from the central 
site.  They receive the data that is detected by the sensors and relay that information back 
to the master station.  RTUs can also issue control commands to the control equipment in 
response to a certain measured condition or set of conditions, with the intent of making a 














to-peer basis or while functioning as a relay from the master station.  The complexity of 
the RTU varies according to the complexity of the supported infrastructure, and the logic 
and computational requirements are typically industry-dependent [3].  Currently, 
computer processing unit (CPU) advances and improvements in RTU design have given 
remote units the ability to directly administer control decisions, rather than receiving the 
command input from the master station, and remote units utilizing this capability are 
typically called programmable logic converters (PLCs).  However, the differentiation 
between the two is indistinct, and these units will be referred to as “RTUs” throughout 
this thesis. 
3. Control Equipment and Sensors 
Control equipment is directly connected to the working components of the 
infrastructure—such as water pipes or voltage junction boxes—and manipulates them in 
response to directives from either the master station or the RTU.  Examples of this 
mechanical manipulation include tripping breakers, opening and closing valves, and 
toggling relays [2]. 
Like control equipment, sensors are connected directly to the working 
components of the infrastructure.  Sensors measure the data that is to be monitored, 
recorded, and, if necessary, acted upon.  This data can be in either digital or analog form.  
Examples include fluid or air flow, hydraulic pressure, fluid level, voltage or current 
output, a binary state value (such as “on-line/off-line”), temperature, and vibration level. 
In today’s modern control systems, sensors and control devices are often coupled 
into a single unit.  This configuration is commonly referred to as an intelligent electronic 
device (IED). 
4. Communications System 
The components of a control system utilize a variety of communication mediums 
to disseminate data and control information.  These methods include, but are not limited 
to, dedicated lines, public telephone lines, microwave signals, Ethernet, 802.11, radio 
links, fiber optics, and satellite communications.  Due to the extreme cost of 
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communication channels and equipment, time domain multiplexing is frequently 
employed to maximize the effectiveness of the least number of channels.  The 
configuration of the communication system is dependent upon the number of RTUs, the 
location of the RTUs, the amount of data monitored by particular RTUs, the rate at which 
information must be updated throughout the system, and the availability of 
communications equipment, facilities, and techniques.[4]  Table 1  provides more detail 
about the various methods of communications.  
Table 1. Common communication paths (After [5]). 
TYPE DESCRIPTION
VHF/UHF Radio VHF/UHF radio is a high-frequency electromagnetic 
wave transmission. Radio transmitters generate the 
signal, and a special antenna receives it.
Microwave Radio Microwave radio is a high-frequency (GHz), terrestrial 
radio transmission and reception medium that uses 
parabolic dishes as antennas. The dishes are usually 
mounted on towers or on tops of tall buildings, since 
this is a line-of-sight technology.
Geosynchronous Satellites Geosynchronous satellites use a high-frequency (GHz) 
radio transmission to route transmissions between 
sites. The satellite’s orbit is synchronous with the 
earth’s orbit so the satellite remains in the same 
position with respect to the earth. Satellites receive 
signals from and send signals to parabolic
dish antennas.
Switched Lines The dial-up network is furnished by a telephone 
company.  This telephone line is the one that we 
commonly use to carry voice and data transmissions.
Private Leased Lines (PLL) PLL is a dedicated telephone line that is a permanent 
connection between two or more locations that is used 
for analog data transmission. The line is available 24 
hours a
day. For the line to be used for voice communication, a 
voice
Digital Data Service (DDS) DDS is a special wide-bandwidth private leased line 
that uses digital techniques to transfer data at higher 
speeds and at a lower error rate than private leased 
lines. The line is available 24 hours a day.
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C. CONTROL SYSTEM FUNCTIONS 
Because there are such a wide variety of control systems throughout the nation’s 
infrastructure, the functionality of a particular system is dependent upon the environment 
in which it operates.  Therefore, compiling a definitive list of functions that embraces all 
systems is impossible.  The functions described below are typical of those found in 
electric utility SCADA systems, and serve as a good general example [3].   
1. Data Acquisition 
Information is the lifeblood of any control system.  Accordingly, the collection 
and transmission of that data is critical to the system’s successful operation.  Data 
acquisition is the monitoring of multiple individual points of interest which, when taken 
collectively, allows for a “snapshot” of the state of the system at a given point in time.  
While this process appears to be a deceptively simple concept, it is actually composed of 
several coordinated sub-tasks that form the complete procedure of data acquisition.  
These sub-tasks include: 
 Scanning the specified points of interest and storing the results within the 
RTU database 
 Transmitting the updated information periodically to the master station 
 Verification of data transmission integrity 
 Conversion of the data into measurable units, as necessary 
 Updating the state information 
Information is usually transmitted to the master station by use of a polling 
scheme, whereby the RTU sends the data in response to a request from the master.  This 
polling scheme could either be fixed-duration or round-robin.  In some cases, the RTU 
sends the relevant data for all of the points requested by the master.  However, the RTU 




specified rate of change, since the last poll request.  This method, that has the benefit of 
reducing the processing overhead at the master station, is known as report-by-exception 
[3]. 
2. Information Display 
Information display presents selected data to a human user for observation and 
analysis.  This information is often displayed in real-time, but it can also be historical 
data that has been archived.  The information is usually displayed in a graphical user 
interface (GUI) that provides a pictorial representation of the system or subsystem that is 
being monitored.  This facilitates the observation and analysis of the data, and provides a 
user-friendly method to navigate the SCADA database.  An example of a modern 
SCADA display can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Sample SCADA display (From [5]). 
3. Control 
Control refers to the process of “actuating equipment operations at remote 
locations.” [3] This process selects the device that is to be controlled and initiates the 
appropriate command to be executed, and may be done either automatically or in 
response to an input from a human user.  Previously this control was exercised almost 
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exclusively by the master station, but advancements in RTU processing power and logic-
handling capability has allowed many of these control commands to be executed by the 
RTU at the remote site.  Due to the criticality of ensuring proper command execution, a 
check-before-operate has traditionally been performed, where the selection of the desired 
command is verified before execution actually takes place. 
4. Alarms 
Whenever an unscheduled event takes place, or a measurement is detected that is 
outside of accepted operating parameters, an alarm is issued.  Typical components of 
alarm processing include identifying the sensor that detected the event or measurement, 
reporting the location of the occurrence, indicating the date and time of the alarm, and 
providing a description of the event.  
5. Information Storage 
Information storage is a vital process for all SCADA systems.  Maintaining 
accurate records is necessary to ensure that government regulations are maintained and 
proper accounting is administered, and is also useful for planning future system operation 
[3].  Historical information can be used in the maintenance of system logs as well as the 
generation of a variety of reports.  This information is also necessary for performing 
trend analysis, and is explained in the following section. 
6. Trending 
Trending is the process of collecting information about discrete events that are 
collected over a period of time and presenting them with a time reference.  This provides 
a visual report that can be analyzed to glean information about the state of the system 
within a certain time frame.  Older SCADA systems utilized oscillographic equipment to 
display this information, but modern systems almost universally use GUIs for this 
function.  An example is shown in Figure 3, where the temperature readings of three 
different sensors, taken over one month’s time, are displayed for comparative analysis. 
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Figure 3.   Sample trend analysis display (From [6]). 
7. Data Calculations 
Data calculation is the manipulation of collected data in order to present it in 
some useful form.  Single-variable calculations include the determination of averages, 
maximum or minimum values over given intervals, and integration with respect to time, 
while multiple-variable calculations include common mathematical operators such as 
sums, differences, products, quotients, squares, square roots, and exponentiation.  
Boolean operations can also be performed in order to “determine a particular state of 
some part of the …system not definable by only one status indication.” [3]  
In addition to the above functions, control systems can also incorporate more 
specific functionality that is dependent upon the particular infrastructure being 
monitored.  Examples include: 
 Automatic Pipeline Leak Detection 
 Automatic well testing 
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 Water Canal Control 
 Electrical Distribution Control 
 Remote Pump and shutdown Controls [7] 
D. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF SCADA ARCHITECTURE 
The concept of remote control and remote indication is not a new one.  Patents for 
these concepts were filed as early as the 1890s [3].  The roots of SCADA can be traced to 
the development of telemetry in the first half of the twentieth century, when advances in 
aircraft and rocket technology made it possible to gather information from the Earth’s 
atmosphere and transmit it to the ground in real time, where it was used to provide 
accurate prediction of the weather [5].  Control systems that were utilized in industry at 
this time were electromechanical, and were largely used for monitoring purposes and 
simple indication of status.  However, in the 1960s, it became apparent that there was a 
growing need to more effectively monitor and control the state of remote equipment, and 
as computer technology continued to advance, the enhanced supervisory control potential 
that these machines offered was recognized.  Consequently, computer-based SCADA 
systems soon became standard throughout the nation’s infrastructure. 
1. First Generation 
SCADA systems were initially monolithic in nature, and all processing functions 
were conducted via a single master system.  The concept of networking was relatively 
unheard of, and these were predominantly closed systems with little to no access to 
external networks.  The wide-area networks that connected the master station to the 
remote units were designed exclusively for communication with the RTUs in the field, 




Figure 4.   First-generation SCADA architecture (From [8]). 
The protocols used for these communications were typically proprietary in nature, 
and restricted the equipment that could be used on the system.  Many of them are still in 
use today.  The protocols were often created by RTU vendors and usually were not able 
to communicate with the equipment from another vendor.  This made it impractical for 
SCADA users to intermingle different types of equipment.  Additionally, these protocols 
had extremely limited functionality, and were designed solely to fulfill the minimal 
requirements necessary to initiate communications with remote equipment in the field, 
making it impractical to introduce other forms of data traffic on the SCADA network.   
Redundancy was usually accomplished by utilizing a second master station whose 
purpose was to monitor the primary and assume its function in case of failure.  Aside 
from acting as a failsafe, the secondary had no other function, and its processing and 
computational capability went largely unused [8].   
2. Second Generation 
The next generation of SCADA systems saw the growth of distributed systems.  
Advances in local area network (LAN) technologies and equipment miniaturization 
allowed system functionality to be spread across multiple stations rather than 
concentrated into a single unit.  Some stations were used to perform repeated 
calculations, while others served as communications stations, database servers, and  
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HMIs.  This provided an enormous increase in processing potential, as well as a 
considerable enhancement of redundancy from the old primary-model.  Figure 5 
illustrates this concept. 
 
Figure 5.   Second-generation SCADA architecture (From [8]). 
However, this architecture still had limitations.  The improved LANs had severe 
distance limitations, offered no enhancement for communicating with remote stations, 
and merely provided an easy method of connecting multiple stations at a single site.  
They were not suitable for facilitating long-range communications, and hence their only 
real benefit was enabling the clustering of multiple units at the master station.  The long-
range communications were still handled by the existing wide area network (WAN) 
technologies of the first generation, with the same proprietary and capability limitations.  
Additionally, the LANs themselves were also proprietary in nature, eliminating any 
possibility of utilizing equipment from multiple vendors on the same LAN.  As was the 
case with the first generation, second generation systems were “limited to hardware, 
software, and peripheral devices that were provided, or at least selected, by the vendor.” 
[8]  
3. Third Generation 
The third generation of SCADA systems, shown in Figure 6, was superficially 
similar to the previous generation.  Distributed processing still took place; functionality 
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was still separated across several platforms; and RTUs still utilized proprietary protocols.  
However, whereas previous systems were almost entirely proprietary, third-generation 
systems utilized a variety of open protocols and standards. 
 
Figure 6.   Third-generation SCADA architecture (From [8]). 
This resulted in tremendous changes for SCADA systems.  Opening the SCADA 
architecture in this fashion radically changed the face of SCADA, giving users the 
freedom to utilize almost any commercial off-the-shelf products rather than be tied to a 
specific vendor.  With the ability to select the computing platforms and peripherals that 
best suited their needs, customers were able to maximize the effectiveness of their 
system.  A side-effect of this was the elimination of SCADA vendors as hardware 
developers, which allowed them to “concentrate their development in an area where they 
can add specific value to the system—that of SCADA master station software.” [8] 
Another change in this generation of SCADA from previous versions—and 
perhaps the most significant one—was the development of modern WAN protocols such 
as TCP/IP.  Previous SCADA systems utilized LAN protocols for distributed processing 
within the master station.  WAN protocols incorporated this same principal, but they 
enabled SCADA functionality to be distributed across any part of the SCADA network.  
This significantly increased the “survivability” of the system, since the network could 
then withstand the loss of a single location and still continue to function.  In addition, 
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WAN protocols allowed communications stations to be placed in direct proximity to 
remote field equipment, and offered a variety of communications media that were not 
available before, thereby enhancing overall communications capability at a significantly 
lower cost.  Additional communications benefits were accrued when RTUs were 
equipped with network devices that connected them to a remote LAN, since this enabled 
direct communications with the master site.  
The development of WAN technologies radically altered the landscape of the 
SCADA network.  Robert McClanahan noted in the March/April 2003 issue of IEEE 
Industry and Applications Magazine that utilities might find it beneficial to develop IP-
based SCADA networks and take advantage of IP-based applications that “reach beyond 
the utility’s main campus and out into the service area.” [8]  This concept would have a 
sizable impact on the maintenance of SCADA systems, since linking remote sites with 
the corporate network would significantly enhance the information available to field 
personnel, while the utilization of IP could drastically improve voice communications 
between stations as well as facilitating automated and remote-control maintenance tasks 
such as automated meter reading.  Another potential benefit is the development of a 
robust command and control capability, since the flow of SCADA information along an 
IP-based network could be remotely accessible by corporate decision-makers.    
4. Modern SCADA Architecture 
The continuing evolution of SCADA systems can be seen in Figure 7, which 
illustrates a simplified modern architecture.  Supervision of the SCADA system is 
accomplished by the master station, referred to in the figure as the supervisory control 
and monitoring station.  Application servers provide distributed capability and 
operational redundancy at the central site.  System maintenance and configuration 
changes are accomplished at the engineering workstation, while the HMI allows human-
directed monitoring, control, and analysis.  Communications to remote stations, which 
are dispersed as required throughout the infrastructure, are handled by a variety of 
possible methods, including leased lines, the public switched telephone service, the 
Internet, or wireless devices.  Remote stations handle the direct monitoring and control 
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capabilities in the field, utilizing SCADA-specific bus protocols to allow the RTUs and 
IEDs to communicate.  Additional connectivity to the RTUs can be achieved via modem 
access, as well as through portable hand-held devices, and RTUs may have console 
access as well to facilitate field maintenance and diagnostic evaluation.   
 
Figure 7.   Modern SCADA architecture (From [1]). 
E. COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS 
There are numerous—somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 or so—
communications protocols implemented by control systems.  Traditionally, legacy control 
systems networks were highly proprietary and hence utilized closed protocols that were 
specific to particular vendors.  These early networks were designed for slow-speed 
communications that consumed a very small amount of bandwidth.  Recently, control 
system networks began to shift away from proprietary protocols and migrate to open 
protocols, in the interests of increasing messaging capability.  Today, general-purpose 
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protocols, such as TCP/IP, are used in control system networks in conjunction with open 
protocols and industry standards, although they possess time-delay capabilities that can 
introduce unwanted latency into the system. 
The reason there are so many different protocols is because each control system 
network has different requirements, ranging from polling scheme to message size to 
transmission speed.  The various protocols have different uses and limitations, depending 
on the protocol and the system.  A few of these are briefly described below in Table 2.   
Table 2. Some Control System Communications Protocols (After [9]). 
PROTOCOL NAME DESCRIPTION
Modbus RTU/ASCII Most popular serial protocol in control systems.  Excellent 
compatability with gateways.  Encapsulates well with 
TCP/IP.  Relatively unsophisticated.  Slow tramission speed.  
Controller Area Network (CAN) Initially developed to connect urimary control components of 
automobiles.  Resistant to noise interferenc.  Rigorously fault-
resistant.
Profibus Most-widely accepted international standard.  Can handle 
large amounts of data at high speed.  Unsuitable for use 
when data transfer is small.  
Foundation Fieldbus May soon become the preffered standard of the future.  Safe 
and flexible protocol.  Often used in oil refineries and 
chemcal processing plants.  However, proliferation is 
currently limited by lack of compatible devices and the slow 
process of standardization.
DNP3 Widely used in Europe, South America, and the United 
States.
 
Figure 7 illustrates an important difference between third-generation systems, and 
what this thesis considers as a “modern” system: the connectivity between the SCADA 
system itself and the business network of the enterprise.  More companies are allowing 
their SCADA systems to interconnect to their corporate LAN, which can in turn lead to 
connection to the external Internet.  As a result, once-closed SCADA systems are now 
more widely connected to external networks than ever before. While this practice allows 
system engineers to monitor the state of the system remotely, and provides important 
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information instantly to high-level decision-makers, it is also fraught with dangers and 
makes control systems vulnerable in ways they never were before [10].  This will be 
examined in more detail later in the thesis.  Chapter III, however, will discuss why 
control system security is so important by illustrating the environment that control 
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III. THE CONCEPT OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. A DEFINITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CI) 
One cannot truly grasp the importance of control system security without 
attempting to understand the notion of critical infrastructure (CI).  The components of our 
nation’s daily activities make up a patchwork tapestry, which the fabric of our daily 
existence depends on.  The critical infrastructure consists of those components that are 
vital for sustaining the basic facilities, services, and installations that ensure the proper 
functioning of our society, such as electric power, natural gas and petroleum production 
and distribution, telecommunications, transportation, water supply, banking, finance, 
emergency and government services, and agriculture. These systems are the lifeblood of 
the nation’s logistic, economic, and functional health and are critical for the security and 
prosperity of the nation.  Thus, the preservation of this critical infrastructure, and the 
protection of the systems that control it, is vital to maintaining the nation’s pattern of life. 
A military unit is, in many ways, a microcosm of the nation, and is governed by 
the same infrastructure necessities that govern the country.  Therefore, the preservation of 
the infrastructure of this military unit—a Navy ship, for example—is no less critical than 
it is for a country.  The concept of CI security easily scales down from the national 
perspective to a ship perspective.  A ship maintains its own water supply, creates its own 
electricity, eliminates its own waste product, and utilizes its own internal 
telecommunications.  A ship generates its own propulsion, possesses its own emergency 
services, and preserves its own financial solvency.  In short, a Navy warship replicates 
the same critical infrastructure as the nation it defends.  It is therefore necessary to 
become aware of the importance of critical infrastructure on a national level in order to 
truly appreciate its importance at the shipboard level.   
B. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCE 
The vast interdependence among CI components significantly complicates the 
problem of securing those components.  None of the CI industries exists in a vacuum. 
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They are linked by an intricate lattice of support from one infrastructure component to the 
other, and any adjustment to one of these components has a profound affect on the other 
pieces of the puzzle.   
This concept is not merely theoretical in concept.  In 1998, the case of the Galaxy 
4 telecommunications satellite led to an outage of nearly 90% of all pagers nationwide, 
disrupted credit card purchases and automated teller machine transactions, and interfered 
with the communications of emergency services. Another example is electric power 
disruptions that occurred in California in early 2001, which affected oil and natural gas 
production, refinery operations, pipeline transport of gasoline and jet fuel within 
California and to its neighboring states, the movement of water from northern to central 
and southern regions of the state for crop irrigation. This led to billions of dollars of lost 
productivity, and stressed the entire Western power grid [11].  As these examples show, 
the disruption of one CI industry can have significant (and often unforeseen) impacts on 
others.  Figure 8 illustrates just how intimately these industries are dependent upon each 
other. 
 
Figure 8.   Critical infrastructure interdependencies (From [12]). 
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Critical infrastructure components have varying degrees of interdependence.  
Physical interdependency means that one of the components relies on the output of 
another in order to properly function.  Cyber interdependency means that an 
infrastructure component depends on information that flows through some type of 
information medium from another infrastructure component.  A third type of 
interdependency is geographic, when multiple infrastructure components are collocated, 
and changes in the environment of one component can affect all of the components in 
geographic proximity.  Yet another type of interdependency is logical, where the state of 
one component depends on the state of another via a mechanism that is not a physical, 
cyber, or geographic connection [11].  These levels of interdependency make it difficult 
to predict all of the perturbations of consequences that could occur should one of the 
components be disrupted, because a single incident could create a ripple effect that can 
spread to numerous other components, as depicted in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.   Cascading effect of critical infrastructure disruption (From [12]). 
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This lattice of interdependence is present on board a ship as well as on the 
national level.  For example, the launching of aircraft onboard an aircraft carrier, 
accomplished in part by the use of catapults, that fling the aircraft from the deck.  These 
catapults are powered by steam.  A failure in the ship’s internal water distribution can 
shut down the catapults, which in turn eliminates the ship’s capability to launch aircraft, 
which results in a significantly degraded mission capability for the vessel.  
It seems evident that critical infrastructures will become even more 
interconnected as information technology evolves.  Identifying, understanding, and 
analyzing the interdependencies among infrastructures is a complex problem that shows 
no sign of simplification in the future.  However, given the impact that these 
interdependencies can have on infrastructure operations in the event of some sort of 
catastrophic event, it is vital that this issue is addressed. 
C. IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Because CI components are so thoroughly enmeshed with each other, and because 
the critical infrastructure as a whole is so vital to daily existence, the importance of 
protecting it has risen to unprecedented levels.  The terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, and the events that have transpired as a direct result of those attacks, have only 
served to bring this subject into even sharper relief.   
A measure of the current importance of this topic is the degree of effort that is 
now being spent to specifically address it.  Critical infrastructure protection has been a 
subject of Presidential Decision Directives, Executive Orders, and National Strategies, as 
well as numerous white papers, reports, and initiatives.  It has spawned new government 
agencies whose purpose is to investigate vulnerabilities, devise appropriate solutions, and 
implement corrective measures.  Critical infrastructure security is now a subject that is a 
matter of concern for countless agencies that span all facets of the government [13].  
Some of this exhaustive documentation and agency involvement is described in brief 
below. 
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1. Executive Order 13010 (Critical Infrastructure Protection) 
This Executive Order established the Presidential Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP).  It was the first national attempt to recognize the 
importance of critical infrastructures in the Information Age, and distinguished the threats 
to these infrastructures as being either physical or cyber-related.   
2. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63 
This directive, entitled “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” (CPP) was issued on 
May 18, 1998, and was based on the recommendations of the PCCIP.  It defines critical 
infrastructure as physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations 
of the economy and government, such as telecommunications, energy, banking and 
finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services [14].  This directive is a 
call for government and civilian joint cooperation in assessing the vulnerabilities of the 
national infrastructure, developing strategies to combat these vulnerabilities, and 
implementing the necessary protections.   
3. Executive Order 13228 (Office of Homeland Security) 
This order was signed on October 8, 2001, and it designated an Office of 
Homeland Security whose purpose is to coordinate and direct the national strategy to 
detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks 
within the United States.  This order authorizes the Office to coordinate the effort to 
protect the critical infrastructure of the United States against terrorist attacks.  Specific 
industries are identified as part of the critical infrastructure, all of which typically utilize 
SCADA or similar control systems.  This order also established the Homeland Security 
Council, consisting of many high-level government officials, whose purpose was to 
advise the President on matters pertaining to Homeland Security [15].  
4. Patriot Act of 2001 
Initiated in direct response to the September 11 attacks, the United States Patriot 
Act of 2001 was designed specifically to exhaustively define the scope of the term 
“terrorist,” direct the security of the nation’s borders from terrorists, and expand the 
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means of identifying, tracking, and prosecuting terrorists.  The Patriot Act is divided into 
ten titles, each addressing a particular aspect of the struggle against terrorism.  Title VII, 
Section 701 specifically directs increased information-sharing relating to critical 
infrastructure protection.  Title X, Section 1016 is completely devoted to critical 
infrastructure protection, and was self-referred to as the “Critical Infrastructures 
Protection Act of 2001.”  This section recognizes the importance of various 
infrastructures in the functioning of the nation, and further illustrated the growing 
importance of information systems in these infrastructures [16]. 
5. National Strategy for Homeland Security 
This document, released in July 2002 by the Office of Homeland Security, was 
the first national strategy aimed at specifically articulating the national effort to ensure 
the security of the nation from terrorism.  The strategy outlines six critical mission areas 
relevant to homeland security, and recognizes eight major initiatives that are necessary in 
the protection of critical infrastructure.  This document eventually led to Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, which established the Department of Homeland Security from the 
already-existing Office of Homeland Security [17]. 
6. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
This document enforces one of the eight major critical infrastructure initiatives 
mentioned in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  Released in February 2003, it 
is an initiative designed to unite the federal, state, and local governments, private sector, 
and the American people in an effort to have everyone secure the cyberspace they 
control, operate, or interact with.  It provides a framework to organize and prioritize these 
efforts, with the stated goals of preventing cyber attack on our infrastructure, reducing the 
national vulnerability to cyber attacks, and minimizing recovery time from cyber attacks 
that do occur.  Lead agencies responsible for specific critical infrastructures are defined.  
In addition, this strategy specifically discusses the interweaving of SCADA systems 
throughout the national infrastructure, and classifies securing SCADA systems as a 
national priority.  One of the important precepts behind this document is the concept of a 
collaborative cyberspace security effort by all interested parties, such as government 
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agencies, private sector organizations, and individuals.  This cooperative strategy is 
important since the costs associated with a successful cyber attack are likely to be greater 
than the investment in a cyber security program to prevent it, regardless of who the 
security investor is [18].  
7. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Originally formed as the Office for Homeland Security, DHS was formed by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.  As authorized by this act, DHS integrates and 
coordinates the efforts of a broad range of government agencies in their efforts to protect 
the nation against terrorism.  Of particular relevance to this thesis is Title II, which 
establishes the Office for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP).  
IAIP merges the capability to identify and assess a broad range of intelligence 
information concerning threats to the homeland under one roof, issue timely warnings, 
and take appropriate preventive and protective action. Among its other responsibilities, 
the IAIP has the responsibility for critical infrastructure protection and cyber security.   
8. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
NIST's mission is to develop and promote measurement, standards, and 
technology to enhance productivity, facilitate trade, and improve the quality of life. NIST 
has joined in collaboration with the National Security Agency (NSA) to form the 
National Infrastructure Protection Partnership (NIAP), whose goal is to improve the 
information technology security posture of the systems and supporting operations that 
comprise the U.S. national critical information infrastructure. An important component of 
this effort addresses control systems used in support of industrial operations [17].  
9. The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society (ISA) 
ISA directly impacts the SCADA field by directing advancements in the theory, 
design, manufacture, and use of sensors, instruments, and computers used in 
measurement and control systems.  It has established a standards committee called SP-99, 
whose purpose is to establish standards, recommended practices, technical reports, and 
related information that will define procedures for implementing electronically secure 
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manufacturing and control systems and security practices and assessing electronic 
security performance [13].  This committee is concerned with control systems whose 
compromise (either by faulty design, human error, or deliberate cyber attack) could result 
in the endangerment of public safety; the loss of public confidence; the loss of proprietary 
or confidential information; economic loss; or a negative impact on national security. 
10. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) Council 
Presidential Unit Directive 63 recognized the need for information to flow 
throughout the entire infrastructure industry and called for the various infrastructure 
sectors to share information about threats and vulnerabilities among themselves.  This 
requirement is fulfilled by Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).  Each 
ISAC provides a 24/7 operating center that monitors the health of its sector, performs 
analysis of incidents, and disseminates alerts and reports as necessary.  In addition, each 
ISAC articulates impacts for its sector, enables mutual information-sharing on all threats 
to their particular CI sector, and facilitates cross-sector assistance during potential sector 
disruptions.  The fourteen ISACs encompass roughly 85% of the United States’ critical 
infrastructure, and confer among themselves regularly through the ISAC Council.  The 
ISACs have established an excellent collaborative reputation and have jointly responded 
to numerous situations ranging from national-level exercises to national disasters [19]. 
11. Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)—the first 
government entity to join the ISAC Council—is a key example of the ISAC concept.  The 
MS-ISAC is designed to increase cyber security awareness and response at the state and 
local government level, acting as a central resource for gathering, and disseminating, 
information about critical infrastructure cyber threats.  Participation is gleaned from all 
50 States, the District of Columbia, local governments, and U.S. Territories.  The MS-
ISAC objectives include the generation of security planning analysis, the distribution of 
current proven security practices and recommendations, the dissemination of cyber threat 
early warnings, the sharing of security incident information, and the promotion of 
awareness of CI interdependencies [20].  The MS-ISAC is also involved in the SCADA 
  31
Procurement Project, which is a joint public and private sector effort designed to lead 
federal, state and local entities in the development of standardized common procurement 
language to encourage the integration of security into SCADA systems.  MS-ISAC is 
significant because it is illustrates true critical infrastructure security collaboration across 
several different levels of government and throughout several very dissimilar industries.  
The magnitude of critical infrastructure protection is self-evident in light of the 
spate of governmental regulation that has been written on the subject over the last decade.  
The government clearly sees the importance of protecting itself from the potentially 
disastrous consequences of a disruption in these basic services and commodities.  As 
much of the above documentation suggests, protecting the critical infrastructure from the 
cyber threat is a major facet of an effective security effort. 
D. CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The components of our nation’s infrastructure require a considerable degree of 
automation, monitoring, and control.  Many of these components are tremendously vast 
and complex, and the volume of data to be collected and the number of decisions to be 
made is beyond the capability of human assimilation.  Other components are simply too 
critical, or require too much precision, to allow for human error.  In all of these instances, 
it is necessary to introduce the computer into the control systems environment in order to 
provide this depth of monitoring and control.   
1. Civilian Sector 
Control systems are intricately interwoven into numerous ordinary activities and 
services that are so common-place that we typically take them for granted.  SCADA-
controlled activities stretch across a wide range of subjects and which are critical to the 
function of our nation.  The magnitude of their influence is so great that any attempt to 
categorically illustrate their prevalence is almost ridiculous and is, beyond a few words of 
description, patently unnecessary.  Control systems provide monitoring and control of 
utility services such as oil and natural gas pipelines, water treatment and distribution, 
wind power, and electric power generation.  Additionally, they are used heavily in public 
highway transportation systems as well as mass rapid transit.  They are also vital to 
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chemical production and processing, nuclear facilities, and modern manufacturing and 
industrial sites [13].  Virtually no aspect of daily life is untouched by their presence.  
Therefore, one cannot secure the critical infrastructure without also securing the control 
systems that manipulate the infrastructure. 
2. Department of Defense (DoD) 
Control systems are just as prevalent in the DoD as they are in the private sector.  
The armed forces are an enormous sub-section of our society divided into many smaller 
units that are spread throughout the world in a variety of environments.  Each of these 
environments has the same requirements as any other population center in civilian life—
sanitization, electrical power, communication networks, and mechanization of industry.  
The examples below are provided to demonstrate the depth that control systems have 
penetrated military critical infrastructures. 
a. United States Air Force 
(1) In 1996, Black & Veatch Special Project Corporation, Overland Park, 
Kansas, was awarded a $6,478,022 contract for the complete design and construction of 
the water storage and distribution CONTROL system on Kirtland Air Force Base in New 
Mexico [21]. 
(2) The electrical service and distribution facilities at Edwards Air Force 
Base are monitored by a control system that was installed in 1990. This system controls 
“motorized circuit switching for automatic remote switching of the circuits and loop 
feeds, as well as recording consumption and demand readings [22]. 
b. United States Army 
(1) In 2003, AQUIS modeling software was incorporated with the existing 
water distribution system used at Fort Drum, Washington.  This provides improved 
capability to “monitor the distribution system at all times, detect problems or changes in 
operation, model and simulate solutions to problems, improve water system performance 
and efficiency, compute travel times of simulated contaminants, and predict future 
distribution system operation.” [23] 
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(2) After numerous violations in its wastewater treatment facility, Fort 
Bragg installed a new control system to monitor 26 remote sites.  This improved system 
eliminates the need to have a full-time human observer at each remote location and 
provides remote site control for all remote sites, generating an estimated sixty percent 
labor reduction [24]. 
(3) SCADAWare designed control systems for deployable power plants 
and delivered these products to the Army and the Air Force.  These systems have been 
utilized in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Qatar [25]. 
c.  United States Marine Corps 
(1) In the face of a growing need to reduce electrical power consumption 
despite a rising demand in load requirements, Pacific Northwest Laboratory installed 
Decision Support for Operations and Maintenance (DSOM) control systems at the 
Marine Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms in 1994 and at the Marine Corps 
Recruit Depot at Parris Island in 2000.  Since these installations occurred, Twentynine 
Palms has had no critical outages, and Parris Island is becoming one of the most energy-
efficient military installations in the country [26]. 
(2) Following this installation, new control systems were installed for the 
Parris Island wastewater management plant and the remote Weapons Area Steam Plant.  
Upon the completion of this installation, a third project was implemented for energy-
intensive buildings at the Depot [27]. 
d.  United States Navy 
(1) The U.S. Navy Trident Submarine Base at Kings Bay, Georgia, utilizes 
three different control systems for electrical power distribution.  One system integrates 
the purchased power from the local utility company with the master control module of the 
station, while the two other systems control the Submarine Base Traffic Control and 
Water Utility Distribution [28]. 
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(2) The Naval Surface Warfare Center utilized over fifty years of process 
control experience by upgrading the burner and management control system at the Naval 
Air Engineering Station in Lakehurst, NJ.  The resulting combination of PC-software-
based SCADA, single-loop digital controllers (SLDCs), and relay-ladder logic burner 
management components has resulted in a safer system, increased operator 
comprehension of the processes they are controlling, and enhanced data acquisition [29]. 
(3) The Naval Public Works Center in San Diego incorporated a web-
based profiling software interface with its existing electrical distribution control system, 
allowing users to view energy consumption and to highlight potential problems [30]. 
Clearly, a military unit possesses the same types of critical infrastructure 
as a nation, and both types of infrastructure are heavily dependent upon computerized 
control systems.  The growing interest in protecting national CI security should be 
mirrored by a similar interest in protecting military critical infrastructures, and 
implications about the security of national control systems are just as applicable to the 
military control systems. 
Understanding the value the government places on protecting the nation’s 
critical infrastructure, and appreciating the degree to which control systems have 
infiltrated so many facets of our existence, is necessary to truly grasp the seriousness of 
the control systems security problem.  The proper functioning of our country is intimately 
dependent upon the health of the critical infrastructure, and protecting this infrastructure 
is of paramount concern.  On a smaller scale, the proper functioning of a military unit, 
such as a naval vessel, is equally dependent upon the protection of its own critical 
infrastructure.  Chapter IV will demonstrate that the critical infrastructure of a ship is 
analogous to the critical infrastructure of a nation, and that importance of secure control 





IV. SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE U.S. NAVY 
Much of the discussion to this point has focused on the security of control systems 
in a general sense.  The purpose of this was to place the idea of shipboard control systems 
in the proper context, in order to clearly define the relevance of their security.  The 
importance of control systems has been established, their vulnerabilities have been 
demonstrated, and a framework that describes the current direction of mitigating those 
weaknesses has been articulated.  Although they may operate behind the scenes and 
beyond our everyday thought, control systems are a vital and integral part of our daily 
lives, and the security of these significantly vulnerable systems is crucial to maintaining 
the daily rhythm of the nation.  These broad principles can in turn be applied on a lesser 
scale to the environment of a U.S. Navy warship.  
A. IMPORTANCE OF SECURING SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Protecting the critical infrastructure is vitally necessary in order to ensure that the 
daily processes of the country continue to function, but the protection of the critical 
infrastructure of the Navy is no less important.  The National Security Agency’s 
simulated exploitation of the national electric grid in 1997 not only demonstrated the 
vulnerabilities of U.S. Navy command-and-control systems, it showed how the disruption 
of SCADA systems could impact military capability at the strategic and operational level.  
Disruption of control systems, specifically shipboard control systems, could also impact 
military capability at the tactical level as well. 
U.S. Navy warships are mobile and self-contained battle vehicles with 
extraordinarily sophisticated offensive weaponry, but many of the vital systems on board 
these vessels—such as electrical routing and shipboard propulsion—are governed by 
control systems.  Therefore, the protection of these systems is an important consideration 
in preserving the military capabilities of these vessels.  This importance is likely to 
become even more profound when viewed in light of the Navy’s current approach to 
using computer-based technology to enhance the conduct of shipboard operations. 
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1. The Navy’s Evolving Mission Focus 
The United States Navy has been undergoing a metamorphosis for the last fifteen 
years into a sleeker, more efficient fighting force.  The cost for maintaining a defense 
structure that is configured to meet an outdated adversarial model is a luxury that cannot 
be afforded.  Several rounds of base closures have eliminated dozens of Navy facilities 
throughout the world, while a fleet that once possessed almost 600 ships in the mid-1980s 
has since been reduced to less than 300.  Repeated reductions in manpower over this 
time, seeking to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort, have left the Navy at its 
current level of roughly 364,000 active duty personnel. 
Despite these changes, there has been little, if any, lessening of the importance 
placed upon the Navy for national defense.  In addition to traditional tasks such as 
maritime dominance and sea control, the Navy is now tasked with new requirements as a 
result of the Global War on Terror.  This concept is embodied by “Sea Power 21,” the 
documented vision of Admiral Vern Clark designed to provide top-level guidance as the 
Navy evolves from its traditional maritime force structure to one which is more readily 
incorporated into a joint, flexible, and global military capability.   
In order to seamlessly integrate into a fused national military environment, the 
Navy has decided to “reduce overhead, streamline processes, substitute technology for 
manpower, and create incentives for positive change,” and to eliminate non-essential 
legacy systems and platforms in order to achieve enhanced war-fighting effectiveness in 
the most cost-effective manner [31].  Thus, the mantra throughout this transformation is 
“do more with less.”  This goal of obtaining maximum effectiveness is demonstrated in 
the Navy’s utilization of technology to design destroyers, cruisers, and littoral combat 
ships that significantly reduce crew manpower requirements of current Navy vessels [32].  
Clearly, the Navy is attempting to build a force that can increase its combat capabilities 
while maximizing its available manpower and resources.  An obvious means of achieving 
this end is automation. 
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2. The Trend towards Automation 
Technology is considered a force multiplier, so that the combat power of the 
available fleet is, because of its sophistication, far in advance of what would normally be 
expected of a conventional fleet of comparative size, and this concept plays a key role in 
Admiral Clark’s vision.  According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the vast 
majority of the total costs of a ship—about 65 percent—consist of operating and support 
costs incurred over the lifetime of the ship, and roughly half of these operating and 
support costs is due to personnel costs.  In order to reduce these costs, while maintaining 
operational effectiveness, the Navy is implementing what it calls Human Systems 
Integration (HSI) in order to more perfectly categorize which tasks must be performed 
directly by Navy personnel and which can be delegated to machinery, resulting in the 
“minimization of personnel requirements while maximizing gains from technological 
applications.”[32] 
By automating the management of whatever utility or service they control and 
minimizing the number of human operators, SCADA systems in the critical infrastructure 
industries perform precisely this function.  Ship-based control systems can perform this 
same task on a smaller scale.  Therefore, it seems obvious that the utilization of control 
systems will be an important part of any attempt to automate shipboard operations.  As 
control systems become more involved in the execution of a ship’s operations, the 
importance of protecting these systems becomes more acute. 
3. Remote-control Capability in the DoD 
Remote-control capability within the Department of Defense has already become 
a fact of life, and this capability is likely to become more commonplace as technology 
advances.  The use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the Middle East (such as 
the Predator and its more capable cousin, the Reaper) for remote-controlled airborne 
reconnaissance and ground support attack missions is expected to increase as U.S. troop 
reductions in the Middle east begins [33].  Another remote-control example is the 
unarmed Global Hawk UAV for remote-control surveillance and intelligence collection, 
which is used extensively to supplement the activities of manned reconnaissance aircraft 
  38
such as the Air Force RC-135 and the Navy EP-3E.  Not only are sophisticated unmanned 
surveillance platforms seeing more and more use, but their utility is now appreciated by 
an ever-growing audience, since ground combat troops are now able to view high-quality 
surveillance images that previously were available only for higher-echelon commanders 
thanks to the distribution of hand-held devices called Rovers [33].  Clearly, remote 
control is a developing trend within the DoD. 
The Navy does not utilize UAVs as extensively as the Army and Air Force, and 
has no plans to operate them as combat aircraft from aircraft carriers, but the 
development of the Navy Fire Scout unmanned helicopter indicates that it is still a 
participant in the remote control trend.  However, automation within the Navy will 
almost certainly be centered on control systems and their manipulation of the critical 
infrastructure of Navy warships. This capability is partially embodied by U.S.S. Paul F. 
Foster (DD 964).    
The Foster is a decommissioned Spruance-class destroyer that was designated as 
the Navy’s Self-Defense Test Ship in March 2003.  This ship’s mission is to provide the 
Navy with information about self-defense systems by participating in live-fire exercises 
and using its defense systems to in response to attacks.  During these exercises, the ship is 
unmanned in order to provide a testing environment that provides no danger to personnel, 
and shipboard navigation and weapons control are done remotely from shore. While this 
capability is not standard throughout the fleet, it is not hard to imagine this concept being 
examined for possible operational employment.  The advantages enjoyed by the UAVs, 
the paradigm of current Navy ship design, the Sea Power 21 vision to minimize 
manpower and maximize effectiveness, and the operational direction of the Navy’s 
current mission all seem to make this an almost certain development in near future. 
Even if the remote-control concept does not develop, it seems certain that the 
Navy will carefully examine the practicality of conducting shore-based monitoring and 
control of vital systems, in the interests of further reducing shipboard manpower 
requirements.  Shipboard mission areas that are not critical to the actual operation of the 
ship are already candidates for this type of remote capability.  For example, the Navy has 
been investigating the feasibility of conducting cryptologic intelligence collection by 
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shore-based personnel utilizing ship-installed sensors and equipment, thereby reducing or 
eliminating the presence of permanent cryptologic personnel on board ship.  In light of 
this, it seems evident that providing critical ship’s systems some measure of remote-
control capability is destined to become reality. 
Utilization of control systems within a ship’s critical infrastructure is an inevitable 
consequence of technological advancement and an altered mission focus by the Navy.  
There are an extraordinary number of activities on board a ship, such as calendar-based 
maintenance, that need to be conducted on a regular basis that are manpower-intensive 
and repetitive in nature, and while these activities may be curtailed for the duration of an 
exercise on the Foster, they cannot be ignored for longer periods of time.  Other 
evolutions, such as emergency response or underway replenishment, require precise 
harmonization among different watch sections of the ship in order to achieve the desired 
outcome.  Any serious attempt to cut shipboard manpower of operational vessels must 
address the efficiency and effectiveness of these activities.  Likewise, any attempt to 
operationally utilize remote-control vessels requires the implementation of some means 
of constantly monitoring and controlling navigation, propulsion, engineering, and 
weapons systems.  Both these conditions would necessitate extensive use of shipboard 
control systems on the ship.  The inclusion of control systems within the ship’s critical 
infrastructure necessitates that proper attention is paid to the security of these systems, 
some of which will be discussed in the following sections.   
B. NAVAL SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEMS IN BRIEF 
The Navy has had some form of control systems on its vessels for many years.  
The very nature of a warship, which must be able to respond to many different types of 
casualty situations with no expectation of outside assistance, demands some means of 
monitoring the status of vital equipment and of quickly exerting control in order to 
maintain maximum combat capability.  The status of the different parts of the ship is 
constantly monitored from a few centralized watch stations.  Should a casualty event 
occur, such as flooding or a fire, there are actions that can be keyed from these watch 
stations—for example, the release of fire-fighting agents, or the securing of electrical 
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power—that can either prevent further damage to the ship or eliminate the dangerous 
situation itself.  This activity mimics, in a crude way, the operation of a SCADA system.  
Navy shipboard control systems differ considerably from SCADA systems found 
in regular utility and industrial applications.  One of the characteristics of regular 
SCADA systems is that they usually follow the basic architecture described in Chapter II, 
where at least one, and possibly several, master stations receive input from, and issue 
control commands to, remote elements, generally dispersed across a large geographical 
area.  Another characteristic is that they are designed to produce a particular service or 
commodity, such as electrical power to a city, and distribute it under carefully designed 
conditions.  These services and commodities are so large and complex that the SCADA 
systems that control them are generally specialized for that particular function.   
Yet a third characteristic is that, while there are generally specific vendors for 
various parts of the SCADA architecture (RTUs, sensors and actuators, and software 
applications, for example), there is usually unity within the broad subdivisions of the 
SCADA system.  For example, the analysis and monitoring software is generally the 
same, regardless of the specific computer terminal it is run on.  Similarly, RTUs are often 
from the same manufacturer, and HMI stations themselves are many times hosted on the 
same operating system.  This unity within these subdivisions is breaking down as the 
industry is trending towards components that are interoperable, but it is not quite the 
norm yet, and in cases such as the software applications that house the monitoring, 
control, and analysis software, it may never occur.   
Control system networks on naval warships, however, do not share these 
characteristics.  Shipboard systems monitor a considerably smaller geographical area, and 
because of this, it is tempting to suggest that they are less complex than their civilian 
counterparts.  However, a ship parallels the functionality of a floating city, as has been 
mentioned previously, and so it possesses utility functions—electrical power generation, 
conditioned air distribution, fuel dissemination, and water treatment facilities—that 
would be expected in a city.  Additionally, naval vessels also have other concerns that are 
not found in a city, such as monitoring and control of propulsion systems and the routing 
of firefighting agents.  Thus, whereas a normal SCADA system only needs to handle one 
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particular category of service, a shipboard control system must often need to be able to 
accommodate several.  In addition, the Navy will utilize several different systems to 
perform these tasks, often in such a way that it appears as if functionality is duplicated by 
these disparate systems, and this differs markedly from the trend discussed in civilian 
SCADA systems.  Perhaps because of this, there does not seem to be a strict master-
substation relationship anywhere within the various convolutions of the Navy control 
system, at least not to the level of rigidity that is found in normal SCADA systems.  Yet 
despite these differences, the Navy does utilize control systems that mimic the function, 
if not the form, of civilian SCADA systems, and these systems will be discussed in the 
following section.   
C. HULL, MECHANICAL, AND ELECTRICAL (HM&E) SYSTEMS 
The combination of shipboard systems that is conceptually most comparable to 
industrial SCADA systems are defined in general as Hull, Mechanical & Electrical 
(HM&E) systems.  These systems, and their associated networks, are designed to support 
event-based or interactive-based machinery control and information with established real 
time constraints of propulsion, auxiliary and other mission critical and mission essential 
ship system equipment. An HM&E system collects data from a variety of sources 
throughout the ship and is used to constantly evaluate the health of ship systems.  The 
information that is monitored and distributed includes data from the engines and electric 
plant, as well as shipboard machinery data.  Information is typically collected in real-time 
context, but can often be generated from historical sources as well, and is usually 
supported by some method of visualization aid which is often graphical in nature. 
Computerized control systems have, in large part, been born as part of a shift in 
the way the Navy conducts the maintenance of its equipment.  Until the mid-twentieth 
century machinery was run until it literally failed to function, at which point it was 
simply repaired or replaced.  This method of maintenance is accurately known as run-to-
failure.  Since World War II, as machinery became more complicated, the Navy began 
conducting preventative maintenance, which was periodic maintenance performed at 
regular intervals in the hopes that this would stretch the operational service life of the 
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equipment by effectively restoring it to a state commensurate with an earlier point in 
time.  This method has given way to a new means of maintenance known as condition-
based maintenance.  This means that structural characteristics and vibration patterns pf 
machinery can be analyzed, compared against known parameters, and a probable 
degradation can be detected and responded to prior to actual system failure [34].  Because 
of this level of sensitivity, the employment of control systems on board ships can often 
serve the purpose of predicative maintenance just as much as automatic system 
manipulation.  
Research for this thesis uncovered many different shipboard systems that perform 
some type of function that is analogous to those that are performed by a typical SCADA 
system.  These systems often perform different functions, have varying levels of 
proliferation, and exert different levels of control upon their monitored systems; however, 
some of the functionality of particular systems appears to be duplicated by other systems, 
and many of these systems actually act in concert to conduct the coordinated HM&E 
effort.  There is a fairly bewildering variety of configurations that are installed on Navy 
ships, with variations existing that could be dependent on ship class, or even on 
individual ships themselves.  Some of these systems will be discussed briefly in the 
following sections. 
1. Machinery Control System (MCS) 
The Machinery Control System (MCS) is designed to provide centralized remote 
monitoring and remote control of propulsion, auxiliary, fuel, fuel fill and transfer, 
damage control, and ballast systems.  Since equipment and system configuration can 
often be ship-specific, or at least class-specific, “MCS” appears to be a generic term that 
is used to describe the consolidation of interior ship circuits and equipment that are 
associated with basic ship alarms, monitoring and control systems, and specific 
software/hardware applications.  Functionality of the MCS seems to vary depending on 
the vessel it is deployed on.   
 
  43
MCS used to be an older console-driven system that made use of 
electromechanical displays and indicators, but this trend has been replaced by a 
networked PC open architecture that provides graphical representation of monitored 
systems.  HMI stations utilizing the Windows operating system (apparently either XP or 
2000) are typically provided to provide monitoring and control of selected ship’s 
systems, while data servers are usually used for storage of historical data.  Information 
flow between the MCS and its components and associated applications takes place along 
an Ethernet LAN which is typically fiber-optic, and which is commonly referred to as 
Fiber Optic Data Multiplexing System (FODMS).  On the Arleigh Burke class destroyers, 
the fiber optic network interconnects the above-mentioned systems with Aegis combat 
systems.   
The MCS interface is a graphical representation of the system, or sub-system 
being operated, providing the operator visual reinforcement of the operation of the basic 
system and the functionality of subsystem components [35].  This type of graphical user 
interface provides a rapid training transition from older interfaces and is much more 
intuitive for the user.  The display can present the operator with monitoring data, control 
interfaces for equipment operation, or both. This type of interface is fairly common for 
this modern breed of shipboard control systems. 
There is no standard description for MCS because the configuration is not 
consistent throughout the fleet, but some of the basic alarms and systems it encompasses 
are as follows: 
 Standard Ship Alarm System, which includes many of the ship’s auxiliary 
systems.  Depending upon the ship type, these systems include the bilge alarm system, 
ship’s draft alarm system, emergency eyewash system, ordinance intrusion alarm system, 
various firefighting activity status systems, and several chilled water and chilled air 
systems. 
 List Control System, which allows for the draining and filling of ballast 
tanks to compensate for the ship’s list. 
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 Fuel Control System, which controls and monitors the pumps, valves, and 
storage tanks that make up a ship’s fuel dispersal system.  For aviation-capable ships, this 
includes JP-5 fuel. 
 Damage Control System, which is the subsection of MCS that deals with 
monitoring and controlling the ship’s effort to recover from damage resulting from 
combat, fires, breached hull, and flooding. 
In addition to these aforementioned systems, the MCS also interfaces with other 
control systems, such as the Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS), the 
Automatic Common Diagrams System (ACD), and the Integrated Bridge System (IBS).  
MCS gathers information from these, and other, systems to manipulate the control 
systems that effect changes in ship’s machinery. 
2. Automated Common Diagrams (ACD) 
ACD was developed as a result of a line of programs aimed at improving the 
damage control capabilities of Arleigh Burke destroyers.  This process began simply by 
creating a set of tabbed “common diagrams” of system schematics that outlined all 
critical systems of a ship, identified interfaces, and described dependencies so that 
decision-makers would immediately know the impact of isolating one system and 
restoring another.  While this was useful, these hard-copy diagrams were voluminous and 
the process of selecting the correct diagram was laborious and time-consuming.  The 
natural solution to this was to present these diagrams across a computer network, and this 
led to the birth of ACD.  The system incorporated several merging technologies and 
developed into the product that is in use today.  Although its functionality strays beyond 
the bounds of HM&E (since it has connectivity to combat systems as well), it may still be 
considered as an HM&E system.  
ACD is designed to provide standardized damage control information throughout 
all necessary spaces in the ship in order to coordinate the vessel’s effort to recover from 
damage incurred from battle damage, fires, and flooding.  The system carries out several 
specific functions in order to fulfill this overarching directive.  The first function is to 
provide detailed diagrams of the ship’s piping, ventilation, and electrical systems.  
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Examination of these diagrams can allow personnel to determine exactly where steps can 
be taken to prevent the escalation of a casualty event (for example, which electrical 
systems to secure in the event of a flood, or which ventilation systems to shut down to 
prevent the spread of a fire).  This allows for the event to be isolated and combated as 
quickly as possible.  Another function of ACD is to provide a variety of consistently 
updated status reports on all monitored equipment and spaces.  These status reports 
include HM&E equipment such as propulsion, chilled water, and electrical power 
distribution; combat systems such as the SPY radar; and damage control information such 
as status level of the fireman and readiness level of damage control repair stations.  
Updates to these status reports are provided via manual insertion by a human operator or 
by signals received from the MCS.  The third function of ACD is to allow for control of 
selective systems and equipment via the MCS interface.  Operators at the ACD 
workstation that is the designated Station in Control can initiate a control request to the 
MCS, which will then automatically perform the desired mechanical manipulation.  
Systems that can be controlled in this fashion include manipulation of remote-control 
valves on the fire main and the emergency wash-down countermeasure system.  
Propulsion, electrical, and auxiliary equipment is probably controlled in the same manner 
[34].  Work has been done to allow ACD to exercise direct control over chilled water 
return and flow, but it is not known whether this capability has been incorporated in the 
fleet. 
ACD consists of a collection of UNIX-based damage control workstations that 
comprise a damage control network. Each of these workstations has the ACD program 
loaded and they are capable of sharing information on a peer-to-peer basis.  FODMS 
provides the medium for this information transfer.  The workstations are located in 
Damage Control Central (DCC), which is the central hub of the ship’s damage control 
effort; key command and control spaces such as the bridge and the Combat Information 
Center; and the Damage Control Repair Stations.  The system has been demonstrated to 
be portable to Windows and Linux operating systems as well.  ACD information is 
presented in a graphical user interface that allows the user to get a pictorial representation 
of the status of ship’s systems and soft-copy replications of the ship’s diagrams. 
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3. Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS) 
ICAS is the Navy’s Program of Record (POR) for automated machinery condition 
monitoring and assessment, and is installed on 14 different classes of ships and 97 
different individual vessels.  Developed by the IDAX Corporation, it is a Windows-based 
predictive maintenance program that combines performance-monitoring techniques with 
computerized maintenance management.  ICAS displays machines, systems, and sensors 
via graphical diagrams, and is able to monitor and predict machinery failure by 
comparing sensor data from a variety of sources to established performance criteria. In 
addition, it automatically logs performance data, stores it for future evaluations in a 
database folder, and alerts the operator with a visual or audible message whenever a 
material condition beyond allowable tolerances is detected [36]. 
ICAS performs several functions.  First and foremost, it is a detailed monitoring 
tool, gathering input on a number of critical ship systems in order to constantly evaluate 
their health and status.  Depending on the input mechanism, these inputs are sampled 
several times a minute in order to provide real-time information with a high degree of 
accuracy.  This information is presented to human users via a graphical user interface on 
an ICAS workstation, which presents a pictorial representation of the system being 
monitored as well as the empirical results of that monitoring.  The range of systems that 
ICAS monitors can include main propulsion, controllable pitch propeller, ship service gas 
turbine generator, air conditioning, refrigeration, fuel oil service, main propulsion lube 




Figure 10.   Gas Turbine Engine Status Display (From [37]). 
In addition to this monitoring function, ICAS can also alert the user whenever a 
measured value is not within a specified tolerance.  Whenever such an alarm state occurs, 
ICAS will gather information about the associated state and display it to the user, 
allowing maintenance personnel to not only quickly isolate the possible fault but to 
perform validation actions.  This rather simple diagnostic capability is enhanced by the 
systems capability to combine several different inputs and utilize logic rules defined 
within the particular ICAS configuration to determine situations requiring maintenance.  
ICAS also serves as a troubleshooting tool, maintaining links to Navy maintenance 
publications and scanning these publications whenever a faulty condition occurs; should 
this search discover maintenance procedures that match the measured conditions of the 
fault the user will be provided a link to the appropriate maintenance publication.   
Yet another function of ICAS is to provide for extensive fault analysis, by 
allowing users to define events which, when triggered, write data to the disk at an 
enormous accelerated rate and which can later be studied in order to determine the cause 
of equipment failure.  ICAS also serves as a computerized maintenance log, 
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automatically entering received inputs into a pre-designed log sheet and eliminating the 
need for hand-written logbooks.  Finally, ICAS can be used to perform trend analysis on 
data stored within its database over time, allowing personnel to detect degradation of 
equipment in advance and perform repair or removal prior to actual system failure.  
ICAS usually consists of four to five 5 HMI computers, each installed in one of 
the major machinery rooms on board a ship, all connected in some fashion by an ICAS 
LAN.  The method of interconnection varies depending upon the ship class and, 
presumably, individual vessels.  On many operational warships, this is a hardwired LAN; 
however, the Navy’s Self-Defense Test Ship is utilizing wireless technology and it seems 
likely that this method has been deployed throughout the active fleet to some degree.  
HMI computers are referred to as workstations if they are enabled for direct monitoring 
and analysis of data, and these machines are connected in a peer-to-peer configuration 
that allows for information sharing among the workstations.  HMI computers known as 
clients may also be used simply to view data that other stations are gathering, or to gather 
information from a data store, but these computers are not directly connected to any 
machinery and do not perform any data processing or acquisition of data.  
Each ICAS workstation has a particular area of responsibility where it monitors 
its assigned machinery and stores that information locally in a Borland Database Engine 
5.1.  Workstations are customized according to the particular ship they are installed on, 
and the particular space they are monitoring, by the application of Configuration Data 
Sets (CDS) that define the environment the ICAS operates in, determines what 
algorithms will be used in processing data, and what measures will be taken in processing 
the data  that is collected.  The flexibility of CDS means that ICAS is a highly adaptable 
monitoring tool that can be used for a wide variety of inputs in a wide range of 
environments. 
Research has revealed contradictory data regarding information flow in ICAS.  
Interviews with NAVSEA personnel indicate that ICAS only monitors machines and 
equipment, and does not exert any control over those systems.  However, ICAS is 
installed with connections to external PLCs, which are used in SCADA systems to direct 
the movement of control equipment that performs actual manipulation of field devices; it 
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seems unlikely that ICAS would allow connection to such devices unless it were capable 
of exerting some form of control over the monitored systems.  The ICAS operator’s 
manual does not explicitly discuss control signals in depth; however, it clearly defines a 
control output as “the predefined action ICAS takes when sensors reach certain 
parameters.” [37]  Additionally, the manual explicitly states that control outputs can only 
be initiated by ICAS itself, and cannot be instigated manually by a user through the HMI.  
Additionally, ICAS interfaces with the MCS, which definitely does possess control 
capability.  These facts seem to indicate that ICAS does probably perform both 
monitoring and control of systems, although it is not clear if it merely passes along 
control signals from the MCS or if, as seems most likely, it generates and disseminates 
those control signals itself. 
Following the dictates of “Sea Power 21” and mirroring examples throughout the 
rest of the DoD, Navy shipboard control systems are becoming more involved in ship 
operations than ever before, just as civilian control systems are becoming more integrated 
into the nation’s critical infrastructure.  In both instances, the incorporation of computer-
based technology has made these operations more productive and less manpower-
intensive.  But is there a price to be paid for this efficiency?  Chapter V will answer this 
question by examining the threats to, and vulnerabilities of, the critical infrastructure and 
its control systems on a national scale. 
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V. HOW CONTROL SYSTEMS ARE AT RISK 
The previous two sections demonstrated how pervasively control systems are 
coiled around the reality of everyday life.  Recent years have seen a greater awareness to 
the importance of the critical infrastructure these control systems represent, as well as a 
heightened interest in protecting it.  However, this activity does not necessarily mean that 
the critical infrastructure is really at risk, or that its control systems are really vulnerable 
to cyber attack.  This chapter will examine these topics in order to establish the degree of 
risk that the critical infrastructure faces, particularly from the cyber threat, and the extent 
that control systems inherently contribute to that risk.  
A. CYBER THREATS AGAINST CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The escalating rise in interconnectivity has dramatically changed the way the 
international community conducts political, economic, and personal business.  Yet this 
connectivity comes with a price, and poses considerable danger to our nation’s computer 
systems.  The growing reliance on computers, and computer networks, within the CI 
industry makes those infrastructures vulnerable to eavesdropping, manipulation, and 
disruption by malicious individuals and organizations.  This reality is not lost on the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has classified seven major threats to our 
infrastructures.  These threats could be considered singly or in any number of 
combinations, and are listed in Table 3. 
The infrastructure of a Navy vessel is just as vulnerable to these threats as the 
national infrastructure.  Naval warships are an important part of the American diplomatic 
and military presence abroad, and their mobility and capability for self-sustained 
operations make them ideal for global utilization.  However, this also marks them as 
targets for a number of the adversaries listed in Table 3.  For example, deployment to 
foreign waters places them into the sphere of influence of foreign intelligence services, 
making the exploitation of these vessels a top priority.  Naval forces engaged in combat 
operations can fall prey to the enemy’s information warfare attacks and find its capability 
to receive and process information degraded.  Additionally, foreign and domestic 
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activists that are driven by environmental, pacifistic, or political motivations can view the 
presence of a U.S. warship as a symbol that represents the antithesis of their own 
ideology, and take steps accordingly to strike a blow in support of their beliefs.  Naval 
vessels are not only vulnerable to hostile outsiders but can also carry their threats within 
their own hulls, as extreme conscientious objectors may seek to hinder the ship’s 
participation in a mission that runs counter to their own personal convictions. 
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Table 3. Threats to Critical Infrastructures (From [1]). 
THREAT DESCRIPTION
Criminal Groups There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by 
criminal groups who attack systems for purposes of 
monetary gain.
Foreign Intelligence Services Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of 
their information gathering and espionage activities.
Hackers Hackers sometimes crack into networks for the thrill 
of the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker 
community. While remote cracking once required a 
fair amount of skill or computer knowledge, hackers 
can now download attack scripts and protocols from 
the Internet and launch them against victim sites. 
Thus, while attack tools have become more 
sophisticated, they have also become easier to use.
Hacktivists Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on 
publicly accessible Web pages or e-mail servers. 
These groups and individuals overload e-mail servers 
and hack into Web sites to send a political message.
Information Warfare Several nations are aggressively working to develop 
information warfare doctrine, programs, and 
capabilities. Such capabilities enable a single entity to 
have a significant and serious impact by disrupting 
the supply, communications, and economic 
infrastructures that support military power—impacts 
that, according to the Director of Central 
Intelligence,a can affect the daily lives of Americans 
across the country.
Insider Threat The disgruntled organization insider is a principal 
source of computer crimes. Insiders may not need a 
great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions 
because their knowledge of a victim system often 
allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause 
damage to the system or to steal system data. The 
insider threat also includes outsourcing vendors.
Virus Writers Virus writers are posing an increasingly serious 
threat. Several destructive computer viruses and 
“worms” have harmed files and hard drives, including 
the Melissa Macro Virus, the Explore.Zip worm, the 
CIH (Chernobyl) Virus, Nimda, and Code Red.
. 
 
In all these instances, a ship can share the same threats, and the same 
vulnerabilities, as the nation at large.  Since the processes of the national infrastructure 
are often replicated within a U.S. Navy ship, and the proper functioning of that ship is in 
the national in the national interest, then the critical infrastructure of that ship must be 
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considered a subset of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  Any examination of national 
critical infrastructure security must therefore intuitively include the ships of the Navy 
within its scope. 
B. TRENDS IN COMPUTER ATTACKS 
Since the critical infrastructure is permeated with computerized control systems, 
and since the protection of these infrastructures is gaining increasing attention, it seems 
germane to note recent trends in computer attacks.  The Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) Coordination Center at Carnegie Melon University has been investigating 
computer vulnerabilities and intrusions since 1988.  Examination of the statistics 
compiled by the CERT indicates that concern about the safety of critical infrastructure 
control systems is not misplaced.  The CERT reported a total of 38,016 known computer 
vulnerabilities due to software flaws during the period between 1995 and 2007, with over 
6,000 more reported through the first three quarters of 2008.  Additionally, the rates of 
these vulnerabilities have typically either been steadily rising or maintaining the same 
level during recent years [38].  Figure 11 provides the per-year breakdown of these 
reported vulnerabilities.  Even though there was a drop in vulnerabilities between 2006 
and 2007, the first two quarters from 2008 suggests that the upward will resume. 




























































Figure 11.   Reported computer vulnerabilities, 1995-2008 (After [38]). 
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The increase in computer vulnerabilities is significant because these flaws provide 
avenues that can be exploited to attack a system.  Intrusion methods can be crafted to 
target particular system vulnerabilities, and the steady rise of vulnerabilities indicates a 
similar rise in potential attacks.  Not surprisingly, computer incidents reported to CERT 
over the same period have risen dramatically in recent years.  There were 315,749 
reported computer incidents between 1995 and 2003, and the widespread use of attack 
tools has made these attacks so common that CERT no longer bothered to maintain a 
count after 2003.  Figure 12 demonstrates the significant increase of reported incidents in 
recent years.   


























Figure 12.   Reported computer incidents, 1995-2003 (After [38]). 
The cost of these incidents is considerable.  The 2007 Computer Crime and 
Security survey, conducted by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and containing 
polling data obtained from 494 participating companies, reported that over 66 million 
dollars were lost as a result of some form of computer intrusion.  The average financial 
loss for each of the respondents equaled $345,000, which more than doubled the average 
losses reported in 2006.  In spite of this, the corporate world has not taken appropriate 
steps to combat this profligate monetary drain, with roughly 61 percent of the 
respondents reporting that their companies allocated 5 percent or less of the total IT 
budget to information security.  Additionally, almost half of the companies spend less 
than one percent of their IT budget on security awareness, and while 46 percent of the 
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participating companies reported suffering a computer attack, only 29 percent filed a 
report with law enforcement agencies.  Clearly, while computer intrusion is a costly 
problem, any attempt to combat this trend is hampered by the lack of cooperation by the 
corporate victims [39].  
In the course of monitoring computer vulnerabilities and incidents, the CERT has 
noted six trends that indicate the likely direction computer attacks are heading.  The sixth 
trend is particularly noteworthy with regards to this thesis, but all are applicable.  These 
trends are discussed below. 
1. Automation of Attack Tools 
All of the techniques that hackers use in their efforts are becoming faster and 
more efficient, allowing the attack to occur with maximum impact.  Reconnaissance of a 
target is typically conducted using social engineering or dumpster diving, but can be 
aided enormously if the attacker manages to insert surveillance software on a host.  
Automated scanning tools use more advanced scan patterns to spot potential 
vulnerabilities in target systems more quickly, and the vulnerabilities are often exploited 
as part of the scan itself, further increasing the speed of the attack.  These vulnerabilities 
are largely due to “poor security practices and procedures, inadequate training in 
computer security, and poor quality in software products,” and there is a preponderance 
of software that enables high-speed exploitation of flaws in order to gain illicit access 
[40].  Gaining access has been aided by the introduction of fast-spreading, self-
propagating viruses like Code Red and Nimda, that can reach a point of global saturation 
in under 18 hours, at which point there is no longer any need for human intervention in 
the initiation of the attack [41].  Maintenance of illegal access and elimination of 
evidence of the attack are also automated though the use of backdoors or rootkits.  These 
are software programs that allow intruders unfettered entry into the machine at will and 
grant the ability to manipulate the subverted machine so that detection of the presence of 
the attacker is much more difficult. 
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2. Increasing Sophistication of Attack Tools 
The tools that hackers use to gain access are becoming increasingly sophisticated.  
Many of these tools are easily available for download on the Internet and do not require a 
great deal of expertise to use, resulting in instantaneous global proliferation and 
expanding utilization.  Many hackers use tools that are resistant to computer forensics, 
making analysis difficult, and the attack patterns themselves are often random, defying 
attempts at signature-based recognition [41].  Additionally, these tools are becoming 
highly modular, so that attacks which used to implement only one type of attack are now 
polymorphic and capable of executing several different types of attacks.  A further 
benefit of this modularity is the capability of an attacker to execute an attack across 
distributed systems, increasing the capability for saturating a target or widening the scope 
of an attack. 
3. Faster Discovery of Vulnerabilities 
As indicated in Figure 8, the number of computer vulnerabilities is increasing.  
Even in years when the rate of increase is the same or less than the previous year, the fact 
remains that there are still thousands of new vulnerabilities being discovered on an 
annual basis.  Examination of software source code for a particular class of vulnerability 
often reveals instances of the vulnerabilities in hundreds of different software products, 
providing hackers with a ready-made target-of-opportunity list. Automated discovery of 
these vulnerabilities means that hackers are able to exploit them before vendors can 
correct them, and system administrators are usually unable to install software patches 
quickly enough to protect their systems from attack [41].  Even if they receive the patches 
in a timely fashion, administrators are often unwilling to apply them to their systems for 
fear of disrupting existing operations, and testing is conducted on a comparable system to 
observe the effects of the patch; this delay merely opens the window of opportunity wider 
for potential attackers [40]. 
4. Increasing Permeability of Firewalls 
Firewalls are not as robust a defense mechanism as many people believe.  
According to the CERT, “technologies are being designed to bypass typical firewall 
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configurations; for example, IPP (the Internet Printing Protocol) and WebDAV (Web-
based Distributed Authoring and Versioning).” [41]  To make matters worse, many users 
and administrators believe their firewalls provide adequate security and allow themselves 
to be lulled into a false sense of assurance, providing even more opportunities for 
exploitation.   
5. Increasingly Asymmetric Threat 
By definition, the Internet is a network of networks.  Because of this high degree 
of inter-connectivity, the basis of a system’s security depends at least in part on the 
security of the other systems it interfaces with.  This interdependency, and the 
development of distributed attack techniques, makes it easy for a single hacker to utilize 
many different machines to coordinate a highly effective attack.  As trends in automation 
develop, and inter-connectivity continues to advance, the asymmetric nature of this threat 
will only increase [41]. 
6. Increasing Threat from Infrastructure Attacks 
The CERT determines that there is a growing vulnerability for computer attacks 
to be directed against critical infrastructure targets.  These attacks can take the form of 
distributed denial of service attacks, malicious introductions of worms into systems, 
attacks on the Domain Name Service (DNS), and attacks that specifically target routers 
[41].  As more and more people become more dependent on the Internet for the conduct 
of their daily lives, and as infrastructures become more and more dependent on 
computers for the execution of their function, the impact of these sorts of attacks 
becomes even greater.   
These attack trends assume ominous significance when considered in conjunction 
with the SANS Institute placing improper user behavior on its annual list of top security 
vulnerabilities in 2006 and 2007.  When coupled with human faults, the CERT attack 
trends indicate a potentially rich atmosphere of computer exploitation, and defending 
against such exploitation should be a matter of utmost importance.   
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C.  THE THREAT OF CYBER TERRORISM 
These attack trends are alarming once the dynamic new adversaries facing the 
country are taken into consideration.  Potential enemies are no longer large nation-states 
but are smaller, more numerous, and infinitely harder to find.  Their inability to muster a 
direct military resistance to the United States makes it necessary for them to implement 
alternate strategies to counter the American advantage in military power and technology.  
The events of recent years, including the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, the 
World Trade Center attack in 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the numerous 
terror incidents inspired by the heavy U.S. presence in the Middle East makes it highly 
likely that this concept of asymmetric warfare will continue.  Attacks against critical 
infrastructures, and the computers that control those infrastructures, are just a few of the 
weapons that could be used in this type of warfare. 
1. The Debate about Cyber Terrorism 
There have been no confirmed accounts of terrorists either targeting computers 
for attack or directly utilizing them for an attack, and this has led to a considerable 
splintering of opinion regarding the likelihood of an effective terrorist cyber attack.  
Many critics believe that the terrorist threat against computer control systems is 
overstated.  The considerable resources required to mount an effective cyber attack 
against critical infrastructures, that could take anywhere from two years to ten years to 
plan and execute, form a significant technological barrier against a catastrophic cyber 
strike [42].  Additionally, some people argue that the proprietary nature of many existing 
control systems will form another level of protection against exploitation, since a 
successful attack against one infrastructure would not necessarily provide any useful 
assistance to a second successful attack [43].  Furthermore, the very nature of terrorist 
attacks, that tend to focus on achieving maximum bloodshed and physical destruction in 
order to receive maximum publicity, may not translate well to a cyber attack that would 
probably be less spectacular in comparison.  All of these arguments seem to indicate that 
terrorists are more likely to engage in a conventional physical attack rather than a 
computerized one. 
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However, the danger of a terrorist cyber attack cannot be overlooked.  Although it 
is tempting to categorize terrorists as technically unsophisticated, the fact that computers 
were used to facilitate the planning of the September 11 attacks, and that there have been 
instances of using strong encryption to protect computer files, are indicators that they are 
no strangers to higher technology.  Terrorist groups have demonstrated the capacity to 
make effective use of the Internet, which is ideal to utilize as a method of connecting 
affiliated groups who are geographically separated, since it supports operational 
redundancy and allows detailed information flow between the dispersed entities [42].  In 
addition, there is evidence that terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda are definitely 
interested in the vulnerabilities of the U.S. critical infrastructure.  A computer seized in 
Afghanistan contained structural analysis programs for dams, and there were indications 
that there was an increase in recent Web traffic relating to SCADA systems.  Analysis of 
cyber attack data indicates that U.S. energy utilities are targeted far more frequently than 
other industries, and while these are mostly nuisance attacks, many of them emanate from 
the Middle East [42].  Compounding this problem is the fact that the power industry 
ranks near the bottom of all industries in providing funding for research and development 
compared to sales.  Additionally, there are increasing load demands on electrical utilities, 
and the centralization and complexity of the power infrastructure as a whole leads to an 
infrastructure that appears to be a perilously ripe target [43].  All of these factors are 
potent indicators that the threat of terrorist action is a real one, and this must be taken into 
consideration when measuring the risk of an attack against critical infrastructures. 
Military units in the Middle East are a constant target for terrorist operations.  
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks against U.S. convoys, facilities, and 
personnel have been responsible for the greatest percentage, by far, of American military 
lives lost since the U.S. initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  American military 
personnel also face a significant kidnapping threat, as evidenced by the abduction of a 
U.S. Army sergeant of Iraqi descent in 2005.  As the Cole incident demonstrates, the 
Navy is just as vulnerable to terror attacks as U.S. ground forces, and given the wide 
range of terrorist actions that U.S. forces are subjected to, it is hardly beyond reason to 
think that electronic attack is beyond the realm of possibility. 
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2. Similarities between Hackers and Terrorists 
Clay Wilson of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division notes that there 
appear to be many similarities between the tactics used to plan and execute a terrorist 
operation and those that are utilized to carry out a cyber crime [40].  This similarity of 
methodology may merely be coincidental, but the parallelism between the two groups is 
certainly striking.  At a minimum, the comparison may provide insight into organization 
and techniques that are commonly used by radical groups, regardless of the nature of 
their extremism and the medium of their actions.  However, the similarities may also 
indicate that the transition from physical to cyber terrorism is inevitable.  
a. Organizational Structure 
The structure of terrorist groups is not clearly understood, but what seems 
certain is that smaller groups are favored, organized in a non-hierarchal style.  This 
allows concealment of the inner workings of the group, and also allows for quick 
mobilization for attacks, followed by a rapid dispersal to make detection and 
apprehension difficult.  Similarly, hackers are usually individuals or small groups that 
meet anonymously in chat rooms to pass information about computer vulnerabilities and 
to plan ways to exploit them, and this means of gathering allows them to instantly 
disappear whenever authorities attempt to locate them [40]. 
b. Coordination of Strikes 
One characteristic of many terrorist groups, Al Qaeda in particular, is the 
organization and execution of coordinated attacks.  The hijacking of four planes at 
roughly the same time for the September 11 attacks, and the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh, 
are graphic illustrations of this tactic.  Hackers have also made use of this tactic, crafting 
computer exploits that launch simultaneously from hundreds or thousands of infected 
hosts to produce calculated waves of disruption [40]. 
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c. Pre-operational Surveillance 
Terrorists typically conduct exhaustive preparatory planning prior to 
executing an attack.  Hackers, as described previously, follow this same methodology 
when they footprint a target. 
d. Motivated by Ideology 
Terrorists are typically driven by some sort of ideological purpose, usually 
political in nature.  Hackers share this trait, although the ideology may not be political.  
There are indications that more cyber intrusions are motivated by profit, but even this 
trend is ideological in nature. 
e. Preference of Soft Targets 
Hackers are opportunistic by nature, preferring to bypass hardened targets 
that are well defended and whose exploitation may not create the desired sensational 
effect [40].  Similarly, a growing hacking trend is to create a self-replicating Trojan horse 
or worm that can utilize known computer vulnerabilities, search the Internet for hosts 
with similar vulnerabilities, and then attack these soft targets where it can then be used in 
further exploitation. 
D. CONTROL SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES  
The threat posed by malicious individuals, whether ordinary hackers or cyber-
terrorists, would merely be academic if the critical infrastructure was proof against 
exploitation. The determination of a control system’s risk is a function of the 
determination of both threat and vulnerability.  The presence of only one of these 
conditions means nothing.  A fundamentally insecure system is in no danger if there are 
no threats poised to take advantage of its flaws, and a plethora of threats are powerless 
against a system that is proof against every attack levied against it.  The statistical 
evidence of rising attacks against control systems demonstrates that the threat to the 
critical infrastructures is a significant one.  Unfortunately, control systems are also rife 
with numerous vulnerabilities, making them susceptible to these attack vectors in a 
variety of ways.   
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As mentioned previously, some SCADA industry professionals focus their efforts 
on physical protection.  This attitude is an exercise in tunnel vision.  Physical protective 
measures are a necessary component of protecting control systems, because this defends 
against an attack that is easy to conceptualize, with a consequence of failure that is trivial 
to articulate.  However, focusing exclusively on physical protection is woefully limited. 
The critical infrastructure’s heavy dependence on computerized control systems renders it 
vulnerable to cyber exploitation, and failure to address this security shortfall could have 
potentially severe repercussions.  A control system can be subjected to a Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks, cyber-eavesdropping, or unauthorized access into the system.  
They can also be the victims of viruses, Trojans and Worms.  All of these attacks can 
impact the principles of integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, and controlled access that 
a control system must possess in order to function in the face of a hostile environment. 
Nevertheless, despite a decade’s worth of recognition of these vulnerabilities, the 
problems of control system security persist.  Investigations into these vulnerabilities have 
not led to significant progress in making these control systems more secure. The very 
properties that make these systems useful in administering the infrastructures that are so 
vital to the economic and social fabric of the nation are also the very reasons they are so 
vulnerable, and this contributes to the difficulty of the security problem.   
1. Network-related Challenges 
As mentioned in Chapter II, historical SCADA systems were part of standalone 
networks.  However, the current trend is for these systems to become increasingly more 
interconnected with other networks.  Many companies that utilize control systems are 
integrating these networks with their enterprise networks in order to increase the 
efficiency of operations and to allow for rapid transmission of real-time data to high-level 
personnel.  Many of these enterprise networks offer connections to other networks, or to 
the Internet itself.  This offers significant advantages for improved business operations, 




threats.  Connection to external networks often leads to the assumption that the external 
networks can be trusted, making the security of the control system dependent on multiple 
organizations [44].  Thus, the control system is only as secure as the weakest network it is 
connected to.   
Since SCADA networks typically monitor an infrastructure that impacts large 
geographical area, remote components of these networks, such as RTUs and field 
devices, are generally widely dispersed.  This necessitates the use of communications 
links that are either cabled or wireless.  Sometimes these links are exclusively owned, but 
cost considerations make shared links more feasible.  Information on these shared links 
could be extremely vulnerable to monitoring or manipulation, and users of the network 
may have an inflated degree of confidence in the security of the network links. 
Additionally, these remote components are often left untended for long periods of time, 
and a continual human presence is impossible to maintain, making them extremely 
vulnerable to physical attack.  Physical security for these units is difficult to implement, 
and it has to be assumed that unauthorized personnel can gain access with relatively little 
difficulty [45]. 
The very nature of control system communications also contributes to the 
networking vulnerabilities.  Control system communications are typically very small and 
very repetitive, and must be capable of real-time processing in order to effectively affect 
control over the network.  Since these communications are often transmitted in the clear, 
they are ripe for exploitation.  Traditional IT communications can be secured by 
encrypting the messages, but employing encryption in control systems poses a variety of 
challenges.  These challenges include the difficulty of encrypting repetitive messages that 
are interspersed with occasional different messages, the necessity to support broadcast 
messages, the delay inherent in incorporating cryptographic operations, and key 
management. Because of the difficulty in finding solutions to these challenges without 
impinging upon stringent communications requirements, control system communications 




well-defined security perimeter for the SCADA network, which results in spotty logging 
and auditing of control system communications traffic and the interleaving of non-
SCADA traffic over the SCADA network.  
Yet another problem with SCADA networks is their vulnerability to unauthorized 
remote access.  These networks can contain many dispersed devices with access points 
that permit remote system diagnosis.  The security for these access points is typically 
abysmal.  Passwords are often poorly constructed and are usually transmitted in the clear.  
The network security policy may allow multiple devices to share the same password 
instead of establishing unique passwords for each device, thereby increasing the potential 
magnitude of network compromise.  Passwords may be stored on the devices themselves 
for an indefinite period of time, and in some cases may not even be used at all [44].  This 
apathy to proper network security provides hostile intruders a golden opportunity to gain 
access into the system. 
SCADA networks, that previously were almost completely dependent on 
proprietary protocols, have been recently migrating to utilizing standardized ones, and 
this has led to numerous additional vulnerabilities. Control systems are increasingly 
incorporating common protocols (like TCP/IP) and common transmission mediums (such 
as Ethernet, routers, and bridges), and the widespread publication of the vulnerabilities of 
these modern technologies makes security even more problematic for the SCADA system 
as a whole [44].  Additionally, many of these protocols are unsuitable for use in SCADA 
systems.  TCP, for example, is a connectionless service that routes information packets 
based on determinations made by the individual routers, making it impossible to 
guarantee a dedicated, specified route.  Network congestion can result in packet loss, and 
since TCP guarantees delivery of the packet, the attendant delay in having duplicate 
packets sent could introduce latency into a control system that must provide precision 
responses and cannot tolerate delay.  The 802.11 wireless protocol is another widely-used 
common protocol that is not ideal for control systems, based on susceptibility of the 
protocol to denial-of-service attacks and the ease with which wireless packets can be 
captured. 
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2. Platform Vulnerabilities 
Most SCADA systems are shifting from proprietary computer platforms to 
standardized commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) platforms, such as Microsoft Windows 
and Linux, and this practice is contributing to the erosion of SCADA security.  Like the 
open network protocols, many of these operating systems have well-known 
vulnerabilities, and the proliferation of readily available hacking tools provide a fairly 
easy way to exploit these vulnerabilities.  To further complicate this matter, patches for 
these operating systems are not applied because of the uncertainty of disrupting control 
systems that are required to maintain continual operations [1].  Many of these operating 
systems are improperly configured for control system use and are installed with default 
settings, exacerbating the security problem by opening even more holes that potential 
attackers can exploit. 
Since these platforms are often set up with default configurations that are rarely 
updated, they introduce security flaws throughout the SCADA system.  Back-ups are 
often not stored for important platform configurations, so the devices are susceptible to 
critical information loss if a catastrophic service disruption occurs.  Passwords are often 
poorly constructed and easily cracked, with no character length and character type 
requirements, and regular password aging is not enforced.  Screensaver passwords are 
often not utilized, and many users may share a single password.  In addition, normal users 
often have super-user or administrator privileges that provide them capability far in 
excess of what is required for the performance of their duties.   
Systems often possess insufficient tools to detect and prevent unauthorized and 
malicious activity.  Intrusion-detection and intrusion-prevention software is usually either 
underutilized, immature, or non-existent.  Auditing and monitoring of system logs may 
not be done on a regular basis, and “malware” programs such as virus scanners may be 
out-of-date, unused, or completely uninstalled [44].  Additionally, the SCADA industries 
may fail to properly leverage the tools that they do have available.  The vast amounts of 
data from security devices may overwhelm SCADA information security personnel and 
make monitoring attempts futile, and they “may only recognize individual attacks, rather 
than organized patterns of attacks over time.” [10] 
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3.  Administration Flaws 
There is a tendency to treat control system security purely as a computer network 
problem; in reality, there are significant differences between normal computer networks 
and control systems.  For example, control systems tend to be largely dispersed over a 
much larger geographic region than a regular network.  The terminations of the SCADA 
network are usually fairly simple (and limited) sensors rather than general-purpose 
workstations. Communication among control system components, or to the master 
station, is usually on a report-by-exception basis, or a polled basis, whereas components 
of a normal network communicate as peers. Data packets tend to be small compared to 
regular networks.  Unlike a normal network, SCADA networks are constrained by the 
requirement that it must function as specified under maximum load, and that system 
performance may not be impeded by security in any way.  These differences mean that it 
is imperative that control system administration be developed separately from network 
administration, specifically tailored for the particular environment in which it operates 
[45].  Unfortunately, this does not often happen in practice. 
Security administration for control systems is sadly underdeveloped.  Few control 
systems are governed by identifiable security policies, and of those that are, even fewer 
include security administration that is specific to control systems [44].  Security 
procedures are few and far between.  Control systems often have no security plans, 
security audits are rarely, if ever, conducted, and control system-specific security training 
is hardly ever performed.  Another consequence of this somewhat haphazard 
administrative atmosphere is the fact that data within the control system is not usually 
assigned any sort of security level, making identification and classification of similar data 
types, and the enabling of appropriate areas to apply security precautions, impossible.  
This overall lack of security administration is fostered by the historical security-free 
environment of legacy systems, and perpetuates an atmosphere where security 
enforcement is disdained and security awareness is atrophied [44]. 
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4. Public Availability of SCADA Information  
Information about critical infrastructures and their control systems, as well as 
their associated vulnerabilities, is widely available via many open sources.  This provides 
a mother lode of data that can be put to good use by potential attackers.  The availability 
of this infrastructure and vulnerability data was demonstrated in 2005 by a George Mason 
University graduate student, who used unclassified material that was available publicly 
on the Internet while preparing his dissertation, which reportedly mapped every business 
and industrial sector in the American economy to the fiber-optic network that connects 
them [1]. 
This public information can be gleaned in a variety of ways, many of which are 
perpetrated by the SCADA industry itself.  Many SCADA companies contribute to this 
gold mine by posting employee names, email addresses, corporate network names, and 
company organizational structure on the company’s public web site, which provides an 
attacker a useful starting point.  An intruder can obtain a reasonably thorough 
understanding of the power grid by utilizing a variety of publicly available documents 
and training aids, such as Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders 888 
and 889, which mandates increased public access to electric power transmission system 
data [10].  Other public documents can allow an investigator to deduce load transmissions 
and identify critical nodes in the power grids.  Data that is specific to control systems is 
easily available to anyone who is interested in it, and detailed information can be 
gathered about RTUs, system design documents, and technical standards for the 
interconnection of systems.  Ordinary Internet processes can also assist the potential 
intruder in his preparation, since improperly configured DNS servers can provide IP 
addresses, server names, and email information as a result of zone transfers.    All of this 
information could allow hackers to understand how the systems are constructed and to 
devise strategies to attack the weakest points of the systems.   
Unfortunately, there is a larger pool of people poised to exploit this public 
information than ever before.  The spread of publicly available exploitation tools, which 
CERT documented as one of the growing trends of computer attacks, has combined with 
a progressively computer-literate global population to greatly increase the number of 
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people capable of causing disruption to SCADA networks.  Beyond the already-
mentioned threat of hackers and cyber-terrorists, motivation to cause disruption to 
SCADA systems can range from disgruntled employees and ex-employees who are the 
victims of job cuts and downsizing, to disgruntled customers seeking reprisal as the result 
of inconvenient power blackouts and utility price increases.  The wide availability of 
SCADA system operational network designs makes it easier for malicious entities to find 
network vulnerabilities, and since many leading SCADA systems are manufactured by 
global suppliers that market systems and distribute system documentation around the 
world, SCADA system information is now available to an even larger audience of 
potential troublemakers [10]. 
E. INCIDENTS AND ATTACKS AGAINST CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Despite exhaustive government documentation, CERT’s observations of 
increasing cyber attacks and growing ease of cyber exploitation mentioned in Chapter V, 
and the emergence of cyber-terrorism as a new potential “bad actor,” there has been a 
mixed level of enthusiasm in the critical infrastructure industry to address control system 
security.  A positive example is the SANS Institute, which is well known for conducting 
extensive information security training, certification and research, and frequently 
discusses CI security at classes, seminars, and conferences. However, the added cost of 
implementing layered security and conducting research into the development of SCADA-
specific security has often reduced motivation for these pursuits with other 
representatives of the industry.  Additionally, some industry representatives point out that 
there has been no single identifiable highly damaging cyber attack, and they believe that 
current industry procedures to recover from normal equipment outages and performance 
fluctuations would suffice to minimize damage from an intentional attack that they claim 
would be relatively localized and manageable.  These representatives believe that the 
cyber threat to the national infrastructure is overstated, and prefer to focus their 
attention—and their limited resources—on physical protection [42]. 
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However, this view is by no means universal.  Other industry experts view this 
approach as short sighted, and they believe that corrective measures should be 
implemented before a catastrophic attack is launched.  For example, interviews and 
discussions with representatives throughout the electric power industry caused the 
Information Assurance Task Force of the National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee to conclude that “an organization with sufficient resources…could 
conduct a structured attack on the electric power grid electronically, with a high degree of 
anonymity and without having to set foot in the target nation.” [1]  
Clearly, there is great division within the critical infrastructure industry regarding 
the correct path to take.  However, there are examples of control system incidents that 
clearly demonstrate that the potential for SCADA disruption certainly exists.  It is 
important to note that this disruption does not need to be the result of calculated hostile 
action—an environmental disaster, improperly configured server, or poorly written 
program can have much the same effect as a planned attack.  This makes the debate over 
the existence or capability of an adversary almost moot.  The historical examples given 
below, from both the DoD and civilian sector, encompass both accidental and 
premeditated disruptions.  They transcend theoretical studies and government directives 
because they provide cold, empirical evidence that the cyber threat to control systems is 
genuine, and demonstrate that failing to address control systems security shortfalls will 
surely result in more frequent incidents, with more calamitous results.   
1. Simulated Exploitation of U.S. Electrical Power Grids 
Illustration of the vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical infrastructures occurred as 
early as 1997 during a military exercise called Eligible Receiver.  During this exercise, 
personnel from the National Security Agency (NSA) demonstrated how easily they could 
have subverted the nation’s electrical power complex using tools that were easily 
obtainable from the Internet.  The group of 50 to 75 hackers demonstrated that they could 
have shut down electrical power throughout the nation, as well as disrupting command-
and-control elements of the U.S. Pacific Command, leaving the nation in the dark and 
severely crippling a sizable portion of American military capability [47]. 
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2. USS YORKTOWN Calibration Flaw 
The USS YORKTOWN suffered an engineering LAN casualty that caused the 
entire LAN to crash, leaving the Aegis cruiser dead in the water for three hours near Cape 
Charles, Virginia.  This casualty was the result of a maintenance petty officer entering a 
faulty data value of “zero” in the ship’s database.  Although the incident was accidental, 
without malicious intent, and was the result of manually inserted data rather than a cyber-
related attack, it demonstrates the potential opportunity for misuse that these systems 
possess [48]. 
3. Arizona Roosevelt Dam Incident 
A twelve-year-old boy, for no other reason than curiosity, successfully penetrated 
the computer systems that control the Roosevelt Dam in 1998.  The hacker had no ill 
intent and was not interested in manipulating the dam once he had completed his 
intrusion, but he had complete command of the control system controlling the dam's 
massive floodgates, which hold back as much as 1.5 million acre-feet of water, or 489 
trillion gallons. That volume could theoretically cover the city of Phoenix, down river, to 
a height of five feet. This would not have happened in actual practice, since the water 
would spend most of itself in a flood plain before it reached the Arizona capital.  
However, the flood plain does encompass the cities of Mesa and Tempe—with a 
combined population of nearly a million.  Physically destroying a dam would require 
literally tons of explosives, but it is obviously possible to perform a similar breach 
through cyberspace [49]. 
4. Washington Gas Pipeline Rupture 
A 16-inch-diameter steel pipeline owned by Olympic Pipe Line Company 
ruptured and released 237,000 gallons of Gasoline into a creek in Bellingham, 
Washington.  The gasoline ignited, severely damaging the city’s water treatment plant, 
destroying a single-family home, causing approximately $45 million dollars in property 
damages, and killing three people.  Among the many factors that contributed to the 
rupture was the company’s practice of conducting database development work on the 
SCADA database while the system was being used to operate the pipeline, resulting in a 
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critical period of non-responsiveness during the time of the rupture.  As with the case of 
the USS YORKTOWN, this was not a case of sabotage, or even a case of control system 
failure, but it is easy to surmise how a cyber attack that rendered the control system 
inoperative, coupled with a coordinated deliberate physical rupture of the pipeline, could 
replicate this incident and inflict significant havoc [50]. 
5. Australian Sewage Release 
In Queensland, Australia, on April 23, 2000, Vitek Boden was arrested by police 
in his vehicle as he prepared to conduct a cyber attack against the control systems for the 
Maroochy Shire wastewater system.  Boden, a former employee of the firm who supplied 
Maroochy Shire with its remote control and telemetry equipment, had perpetrated 46 
successful attacks against the system before his arrest, releasing considerable amounts of 
sewage into parks, rivers, and a hotel, causing severe environmental harm.  His goal was 
apparently to be hired as a consultant to correct the problem he had created. During his 
intrusions, Boden was in complete command of over 300 nodes that governed both fresh 
water and wastewater, and could have created considerably greater calamity than he 
chose to exert [49]. 
6. Slammer Penetration of Nuclear Power Facility 
Ohio’s Davis-Beese nuclear power facility was penetrated by the Slammer worm 
in January of 2003, disabling the safety monitor system for a period of 5 hours.  The 
worm entered the system through the unsecured network of an unnamed Davis-Besse 
contractor, which was bridged to the Davis-Besse corporate network. This connection 
was one of multiple ingresses into Davis-Besse's business network that completely 
bypassed the plant's firewall, which was programmed to block the port Slammer used to 
spread.  Once inside the business network, the worm entered the electrical plant network 
through an unpatched MS-SQL vulnerability, and the congestion caused by its activities 
caused the plant network to crash.  The facility had a redundant analog system that 
ensured that power delivery was uninterrupted during the time the monitoring system was 
disabled, but this incident illustrates the capability that even an undirected attack can 
possess [51]. 
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7. August 2003 Blackout 
Parts of the northeastern United States, as well as eastern Canada, suffered the 
largest blackout in North American history on August 14, 2003, when electrical power 
was disrupted for approximately 50 million people.  The cascading effect of the blackout 
has been attributed to the spread of the Blaster worm, which broke out approximately 
three days prior to the blackout, and which may have inhibited communications on 
computers that are used to monitor the power grid.  Economic impact of the blackout has 
been estimated to range from $6 billion to $50 billion [1].    
8. 2008 CIA Assertion of Multi-City Attack 
On January 16, 2008, a senior CIA analyst claimed that there had been multiple 
instances of cyber intrusion into utilities systems outside the United States.  The analyst 
made these claims at the SANS Institute Process Control Security Summit in New 
Orleans, while speaking to an audience consisting of national government officials from 
four countries, engineers and security managers from many North American utilities, and 
other critical industry asset owners from all across North America.  Extortion 
accompanied the intrusions, and on at least one occasion, a disruption was initiated which 
caused a power outage affecting multiple cities [52].  Although the cities were not 
identified and no further information was forthcoming, the claim does substantiate the 
vulnerabilities of utility SCADA systems.    
The multitude of attack vectors, coupled with significant vulnerabilities and 
historical examples of control system disruption, demonstrate that the risk to control 
systems is very real.  The vulnerabilities of control systems are a cause of growing 
concern and pose a serious problem to the critical infrastructure.  Most of the problems 
are technical in nature, but some, such as the resistance to apply proper security 
administration and the prevalence of open-source information, are based on the culture of 
the SCADA industry.  Control systems are fraught with significant vulnerabilities and 




less at risk, and no less vital, than their counterparts in the national critical infrastructure.  
Chapter VI will examine some of these security concerns and determine if those systems 























VI. A LOOK AT SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEM SECURITY  
Despite some obvious similarities, shipboard control systems differ considerably 
from their civilian counterparts, as mentioned previously.  Control systems can vary from 
ship to ship, with a variety of different systems and applications being utilized perform 
similar tasks.  Shipboard systems also combine the “traditional” monitoring and control 
of utility functions with the monitoring and control of ship combat systems, which has no 
analogue in the civilian SCADA industry.  In general, national CI control systems seem 
to be specialty systems, while shipboard control systems appear to be more general-
purpose.   
In addition to these functional differences, it must be noted that the very mission 
of a warship routinely places it in situations where it may be subject to physical damage, 
either from rough seas, inclement weather, or enemy combat action.  Hence, its control 
systems are indirectly placed in harm’s way far more frequently than a civilian CI 
system.  Shipboard control systems also tend to operate in environments of significant 
physical stress and are subject to physical challenges that civilian CI control systems do 
not usually encounter.  A prime example of this threat is the occurrence of fire within the 
tightly-confined compartments of a board ship.  Shipboard control systems can also be at 
risk for intense water damage due to the possibility of flooding, either from their 
compartments becoming open to the sea or from firefighting efforts in their area.  
Additionally, the proximity of shipboard control systems to salt water and other corrosive 
agents can make them easier targets for physical degradation.  In all cases, shipboard 
control systems face a much more diverse physical challenge then their civilian 
counterparts. 
However, despite these differences, both critical infrastructure and shipboard 
control systems share similar attributes.  Both are at risk to be targeted for exploitation by 
hostiles, and exploitation against both is facilitated by similar circumstances.  Both types 
of control systems can have similar susceptibility to the automation and sophistication of 
attack tools, the rapid discovery of vulnerabilities, the permeability of intrusion-detection 
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systems, and the emergence of the asymmetric threat of terrorism.  Finally, both exert 
considerable influence on the critical infrastructure they manipulate, and the criticality of 
protecting both is self-evident.   
A. WEAKNESSES IN FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY 
However, it has proven impossible to determine whether shipboard control 
systems are secure, or to even make a qualitative expression of their security.  The scope 
of this issue, and the variety of equipment configurations within the Navy, make such a 
statement impossible.  It would be necessary to examine every ship in the Navy to make 
an accurate determination.  However, inference can be made by examining how federal 
government information systems fare in several of the typical categories applied during 
vulnerability assessments. 
1. Certification and Accreditation 
The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) mandates 
that all federal agencies, including the DoD, must enact measures to buttress the security 
of the information systems used by those agencies.  FISMA also establishes a framework 
that ensures the effectiveness of the information security controls that are implemented 
over federal information assets.  These regulations apply to control systems as well as 
normal IT systems.  The criteria that will be used in conducting this high-level 
assessment are based loosely on the guidelines promulgated in NIST Special Publication 
800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems,” which 
satisfies the requirements laid out in the FISMA.  Detailed IA controls for control 
systems can be found in Appendix I of this publication. 
One of the methods that the DoD Information Assurance Program articulates to 
implement the FISMA mandate is to require product specification and evaluation in 
accordance with the Common Criteria [53].  In order to determine the security of a 
control system, there must be a way of expressing the level of security that the control 




ship.  Certification and accreditation (C&A) is a way of formulating this expression, and 
any notion of securing shipboard control systems must begin with a strong C&A 
program. 
The initial steps of this specification and evaluation process is to determine the 
system boundaries, information types, responsible individuals, interconnections with 
other systems, and implementation details for various security controls. Once a system is 
properly defined and thoroughly documented, the next step is to perform certification and 
accreditation of that system.  Certification is a thorough security evaluation that 
encompasses all aspects of an information system’s physical, personnel, administrative, 
information, and communications security, in order to determine the degree that a 
specific design and implementation meets a specified set of security requirements.  
Accreditation is a formal decision by a designated third-party approving authority that the 
information system being examined is authorized to operate in a specific operating 
environment.   
C&A is mandatory to determine those DoD systems that may be allowed to 
operate, and thus is vital for providing a reasonable level of assurance that the security 
functions of a product performs as the designers of the product claim.  Two processes are 
currently used within the DoD to accomplish certification and accreditation, and both will 
be examined in brief.  
a.  DITSCAP 
Until recently, certification and accreditation within the DoD was 
conducted according to the DoD Information Technology Certification and Accreditation 
Process (DITSCAP).  Designed to secure and protect all of the entities within the Defense 
Information Infrastructure (DII), the DITSCAP was designed to provide standardized 
activities that, when completed, will lead to a successful certification and accreditation of 
an IT system.  It was applicable to the acquisition, operation and maintenance of any 
DoD IT system that collects, stores, transmits, or processes unclassified or classified 
information.  These systems could be newly developed systems, prototype systems, IT 
systems that were already incorporated into an infrastructure, reconfigured or upgraded 
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systems, and legacy systems [54].  Although the DITSCAP contained mandatory 
activities, it was designed to be tailored in order to adapt to various types of system, 
computing environments, and missions.   
Changes in the utilization of DoD information systems, as well as 
requirements articulated in the DoD Information Assurance policy, demanded a revision 
in the DoD C&A process.  The DoD Information Assurance (IA) policy is designed to 
embrace a net-centric information architecture through the enforcement of IA controls 
that establishes baseline requirements for information availability, integrity, and 
confidentiality.  The DITSCAP was incapable of meeting the requirements of the new 
information system architecture and did not address concepts and specifications that were 
articulated in DoD IA policy.  Hence, DoD C&A is in the process of transitioning from 
the DITSCAP to the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DIACAP).    
b. DIACAP 
The concept of a Global Information Grid, commonly referred to as the 
GIG, completely altered the way the DoD utilized information technology.  The GIG is a 
globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, 
and personnel that is used for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing 
information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. It supports 
all DoD, national security, and related Intelligence Community missions and functions 
and provides capabilities from all operating locations, as well as interfaces to coalition, 
allied, and non-DoD users [55].  The GIG concept eliminates the notion of individual 
systems with the concept of a net-centric information-sharing environment, which 
requires that information is not only visible, accessible, and understandable, but also 
posted to shared spaces and tagged for easy discovery.  The net-centric concept also 
mandates that information must also be organized within dynamic Communities of 
Interest that may require the transmission of data across traditional system and 
classification boundaries in support of operational necessity [56].  While this sort of 
architecture vastly enhances the sharing of information, it is also inherently vulnerable to 
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exploitation and denial of service.  It therefore requires a dynamic and flexible C&A 
process that could not be fulfilled by the DITSCAP. 
The DIACAP overcomes many of the characteristics of the DITSCAP that 
rendered it unsuitable for utilization within the new DoD IA policy.  The DITSCAP 
generated security requirements and metric data that was system-unique, and was a 
manual, time-consuming process that often lacked current and complete information on 
the system.  In addition, it did not apply the principles articulated by FISMA and did not 
evaluate the baseline IA controls described in DoD IA policy.  In contrast, the DIACAP 
implements required IA controls across all DoD systems in compliance with FISMA, 
while at the same time providing improved support to certification personnel and 
enhancing the usability and reusability of C&A products.  It supports the transition to the 
GIG architecture by ensuring a uniform C&A approach that is able to accommodate 
different systems and operate in a dynamic environment.  A brief comparison of the 
DITSCAP and DIACAP is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. DITSCAP & DIACAP Compared (After [56]). 
DITSCAP DIACAP 
Security requirements and standards 
uniquely determined by each system 
All systems inherit enterprise standards 
and requirements 
Policy advocated tailoring, but 
process was hard-coded to phases 
No pre-defined phases.  Each system 
works to a plan that aligns to the system 
life cycle 
Accreditation status communicated 
via letter and status code (ATO, 
IATO) in SSAA 
Accreditation status communicated by 
assigned IA Controls’ compliance 
ratings, and letter and status code 
(ATO, IATO, IATT, DATO) in 
DIACAP Scorecard 
No process improvement Automated tools, enterprise-managed 
knowledge base, requirements tied to 
architecture 
Inaccurate association of ATO with 
perfect and unchanging security 
ATO means security risk is at an 
acceptable level to support mission and 
live data 
“Fire and forget” accreditation; 3 year 
“white glove inspection” re-
accreditation 
Continuous, asynchronous monitoring; 




The DIACAP embraces the net-centric concept by utilization of online 
applications such as the DIACAP Knowledge Service (KS) and Enterprise Mission 
Assurance Support Services (eMass), which are used to support the C&A effort.  The 
Knowledge Service is a web-based repository of C&A information.  It contains C&A 
guidelines, diagrams, and documents that can be utilized as an aid to DIACAP execution.  
It also serves as a C&A collaboration community where DIACAP users can be exposed 
to lessons learned and best practices, implementation guidance, expected results of IA 
controls, and the latest information assurance news.  eMass is a scalable, flexible online 
suite of information assurance management tools that is used to create a C&A package 
for registering all systems undergoing C&A and to monitor the progress of the each 
system as it moves through the C&A process.  An important part of eMass is the 
DIACAP ScoreCard, which is a summary report that shows the implementation and 
validation status of an information system’s IA controls and which communicates the 
accreditation decision. 
c. Questions Regarding the Application of C&A  
Although statistical data may indicate otherwise, certification and 
accreditation throughout the federal government—including the DoD—lacks cohesion 
and uniformity.  The average percentage of federal IT systems authorized after 
certification and accreditation, as reported by 24 federal agencies, was 62 percent at the 
end of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 and 77 percent at the end of Fiscal Year 2004, which 
marked the beginning of a substantial upward trend [57].  This percentage has risen each 
year, culminating with a federal accreditation rate of 92 percent for all federal systems 
following Fiscal year 2007, which would seem to indicate an impressive rate 
improvement in the C&A of federal systems [58].  However, this percentage still falls 
short of the universal compliance mandated by both the DITSCAP and the DIACAP, and 




Examination of the polling data over the past four years shows that this 
reporting is highly suspect for a variety of reasons.  One such reason is the lack of a 
clearly-defined statistical population from which to generate accurate statistical data.  
Some agencies include both non-national security and national security systems in their 
reported performance data, while others do not.  Additionally, some agencies—
specifically DoD—include systems with interim authorization to operate among those 
systems reported as certified and accredited, while other agencies only report systems 
with complete and final accreditation [59].  Further complicating this picture is the 
inability of some federal agencies, namely DoD, to compile a complete and accurate 
inventory of their major information systems.  The DoD’s failure in this regard is due in 
part to the lack of a uniform definition of what precisely constitutes an information 
system, and the subsequent necessity for each Defense component to “make independent 
interpretations of whether the asset under evaluation should be reported as a system for 
FISMA purposes.” [60]  Such variance in statistical populations across federal agencies 
makes it impossible to accept the accuracy of reported C&A rates at face value and 
brings the validity of the data into question. 
Aside from the uncertainty of the populations used to gage C&A 
completion, there are other C&A concerns.  Compliance information for FY 2004 was 
gleaned directly from the agencies, with no third-party verification of the facts, which 
clearly introduces uncertainty with the accuracy of the data for that year.  Additionally, 
inspector generals (IG) of the federal agencies have historically noted problems with the 
quality of the C&A process itself, with the percentage of agencies that were evaluated to 
have unsatisfactory certification processes, ranging from a high of 40 percent in FY 2004 
to a low of 25 percent in FY 2008.  Complicating this issue, is the lack of a common 
approach for FISMA evaluations, resulting in considerable differences in the scope and 
methodology of the evaluations across federal agencies [58].  Clearly, these discrepancies 
skew the data in the reports, and demonstrate that the C&A process is still a work in 
progress. 
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2. Access Controls  
Access controls are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to 
computing resources, programs, information, and facilities.  One method of access 
control is user identification and authentication, which enables a computer system to 
uniquely identify users and to validate a user’s claimed identity.  Assigning users the 
proper access rights and file permissions, which enforces the principle of granting a user 
the minimum privileges necessary to perform his or her job, is another type of access 
control.  Yet another form of access control is to establish individual accountability, 
monitor compliance with security policies, and investigate security violations, all of 
which are accomplished through the use of auditing software.  Other forms of access 
controls include controlling who can implement software changes, ensuring proper 
segregation of duties, and protecting computer facilities and resources from espionage, 
sabotage, damage, and theft.  It is critical to utilize proper access controls in order to 
ensure the proper operation and availability of an information system, as well as to 
protect the integrity of the data stored on, and transmitted by, the information system.  
Failure to do so places federal information systems at considerable risk of fraud, misuse, 
and disruption [61]. 
Unfortunately, most major federal departments have had significant difficulties 
addressing deficiencies with their information system’s implementation of access 
controls.  According to GAO reporting, 23 of 24 major agencies had major access control 
weaknesses in FY 2004.  These weaknesses included problems with mismanagement of 
user accounts, improper structure of passwords, and inappropriate access rights, with 22 
of the major agencies demonstrating weak software change controls, while 14 agencies 
failed to properly segregate information security duties [61].  This unfortunate trend 
carried over into FY 2005, with 14 federal agencies reporting significant deficiencies in 
the design or operation of internal controls, and 6 agencies reporting material weaknesses 
in their information systems, that prohibited them from providing reasonable assurance 
that data inaccuracies, or even complete loss, could be prevented or detected on a timely 
basis [62].  The following years were not much better, as FY 2006 and FY 2007 showed 
access control non-compliance rates of 92 percent and 96 percent respectively.   
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These weaknesses spanned the entire spectrum of access control.  For example, 
users were often not compelled to create strong passwords that had a minimum length 
greater than zero, and instead created passwords that were common words, increasing the 
possibility that an attacker could guess the password and gain access to the account.  In 
some cases, passwords were vender-default, or were shared among users.  Flaws in 
software change control included failure to ensure approved and correct software updates 
with appropriate documentation.  Several agencies improperly managed user accounts by 
imprudently granting users excessive access permissions, that allowed them to create or 
change sensitive system files, while unused accounts were not always deactivated when 
personnel transferred, or no longer required access.  Segregation of duties was another 
area where agencies failed to separate duties and responsibilities, such as those performed 
by system administrators and security administrators, in a manner that ensured the 
isolation of incompatible functions.  Fictitious users at one agency could be added to a 
system with enhanced access permissions, and would be empowered to perform 
unauthorized activities undetected, while another agency allowed financial transactions to 
be both initiated and approved by the same individual.  Agencies also struggled with 
configuring remote access, allowing simultaneous connection to both the Internet and the 
internal network, and failing to restrict external communication traffic, which could result 
in an attacker remotely controlling the Internet sessions of legitimate users, or launching 
attacks against sensitive network devices.  Finally, agencies had several failures 
regarding the monitoring of security events, including the lack of automated preparation 
of security reports in response to security-related events such as failed login attempt 
reports.  All of these failures indicate that the federal government as a whole lacks the 
ability to ensure that access to, and manipulation of, its information systems is restricted 
only to legitimate individuals. 
3. Physical and Environmental Protection  
In addition to other forms of access control, physical protection of information 
resources was a problem with many federal agencies.  Many agencies had virtually no 
effective physical barriers to access, with visitor screening procedures that were either 
inconsistently implemented, or entirely absent.  For example, the Federal Deposit 
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Insurance Corporation (FDIC) did not always apply physical security controls for some 
instances, allowing an unauthorized visitor to enter a key FDIC facility “without 
providing proof of identity, signing a visitor log, obtaining a visitor’s badge, or being 
escorted.” [63]  Departments also struggled with controlling access among its own 
personnel.  One agency allowed several individuals access to sensitive areas without 
properly justifying a need based job duties, and did not remove physical access 
authorizations into sensitive areas in a timely manner for employees who no longer 
needed it to perform their jobs. This paled in comparison to another department, which 
granted “over 400 individuals unrestricted access to an entire data center—including a 
sensitive area within the data center—although their job functions did not require them to 
have such access.” [64]  In FY 2006 in particular, federal agencies noted a rash of 
security incidents that resulted in the theft, loss, or improper disclosure of personally 
identifiable information on millions of Americans, mostly as the result of physical thefts 
or improper safeguarding of systems.  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Federal 
Aviation Agency (FAA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were among the 
departments to suffer weaknesses in their ability to physically protect their information 
systems. 
The federal government has attempted to correct at least part of this problem.  In 
recognition of the variations in the forms of federal identification, and in an effort to 
increase the quality and security of identification practices across the federal government, 
President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) in August 
2004 to establish a mandatory, government-wide identification standard.  In response, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued the Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 201, designed to provide improved 
identification and authentication of all federal employees and contractors in the form of 
“smart cards.”  However, as noted by GAO in 2006, many federal departments have 
encountered challenges in implementing this standard.  These challenges include 
uncertain program costs that preclude proper budgeting; an inability to test and obtain 
compliant smart cards and card readers within mandated deadlines; confusing guidance 
promulgated by NIST that has led to multiple approaches which could may delay smart 
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card interoperability throughout the government; and incomplete guidance regarding 
precisely which facilities, people, and information systems fall under the mandate of 
FIPS 201 [65].  These problems stretched into 2008, with agencies making only limited 
progress in implementing and using smart cards. None of the agencies examined by GAO 
met established deadlines for issuing smart cards, and of those agencies that had issued 
smart cards, most had not been using the electronic authentication capabilities on the 
cards and had not developed implementation plans for those authentication mechanisms 
[66].  These problems are only a small part of the physical protection issue of shipboard 
control systems, but given the automated nature of today’s military, it seems correct to 
note that the difficulties with personal identification and verification underscore the 
difficulties with physical security as a whole.   
4. Security Assessments, Awareness, and Training  
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that all federal agencies 
must conduct a periodic security assessment of the overall security controls that are 
employed by that organization’s information system.  This security assessment is 
designed to determine the extent to which the management, operational, and technical   
controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired 
outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the system [67]  The 
periodicity of this assessment can vary, but should not be less than annually.   
As is the case with certification and accreditation, data gleaned from annual 
federal reports to the OMB paints a rosier picture of the state of periodic testing than the 
raw data would indicate.  The percentage of federal systems that underwent annual 
testing has oscillated wildly from 2003, with major gains being made in 2004 followed 
by alternating ebbs and increases every year since.  FY 2007 reports a robust assessment 
rate of 95 percent, but this number conceals problems lurking beneath the surface.  For 
example, “11 IGs reported that their agency did not always ensure that information 




NIST guidelines, national security policy, and agency policy. In addition, two IGs 
reported that agencies did not conduct their annual assessments using current NIST 
guidance.” [68] 
These findings corroborate a comprehensive GAO examination that was 
conducted to determine whether federal agencies adequately designed and effectively 
implemented policies for the periodic testing and evaluation of information security 
controls.  GAO surveyed 24 federal agencies to determine if effective policies had been 
designed, by analyzing their policies to verify if they included elements important for 
conducting effective tests and evaluations.  GAO also examined how well six of these 
agencies implemented their policies, by inspecting the methods and practices that were 
used to test and evaluate controls for 30 of their systems.   
This investigation revealed substantial problems with all 24 agencies.  Every 
agency failed multiple criteria that GAO used to judge the design of their policies.  Every 
agency had inadequately designed testing and evaluation policies.  All 24 agencies that 
were surveyed failed multiple criteria that were used to evaluate their policies.  For 
example, many agencies did not properly identify and test security controls common to 
multiple systems.  Others did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of personnel 
performing tests, or the frequency of their periodic testing.  None of the agencies’ 
policies addressed how to determine the depth and breadth of testing according to risk, 
and one agency had no policy whatsoever.  Additionally, GAO’s review of the 30 
information systems revealed that the methods and practices for testing and evaluating 
controls at the six case study agencies were inadequate in providing reasonable assurance 
that consistent assessments of similar quality could be achieved by repeated evaluations. 
These agencies suffered from insufficient documentation to support testing methods and 
results, undefined assessment methods that were to be used when evaluating security 
controls, and failure to include remedial actions in testing plans [69]. 
The DoD has been specifically cited as a department that had particular 
challenges in this regard, despite achieving a gaudy testing and evaluation rate of almost 
88 percent between 2003 and 2006.  The DoD did not clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities of personnel performing tests, and also failed to specify the identification 
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and testing of common security controls.  The DoD also lacked instructions for selecting 
minimum security controls evaluated during periodic testing, as well as determining the 
depth and breath of testing.  Finally, security control testing was not performed 
consistently across all DoD components [68]. 
All personnel within the Department of the Navy (DON) are required to meet 
certain minimum-security training requirements.  These are documented in DoD 
Directive 8570.1 and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5239.3A.  Both 
documents indicate that all personnel using DoD or DoN information systems, as 
applicable, are required to have basic security awareness training.  Additionally, those 
personnel whose duties require privileged access to the systems must have specialized 
training commensurate with their duties.   
Annual reports to OMB indicate that federal security awareness training is not as 
robust as one might hope.  The overall percentage of federal employees who received 
basic security awareness training has fluctuated up and down since 2003, and although 
agencies reported a training percentage rate of 84 percent in FY 2007, “eight agency IGs 
disagree(d) with the percentage of individuals that their agency reported as having 
received security awareness training,” including six agencies that reported training rates 
between 96 and 100 percent [68].  The DoD in particular has difficulty with accurate 
verification of who among their widely dispersed user base has received the required 
awareness training, as well as monitoring those individuals who perform security-related 
duties, and are thus required to receive specialized training [60]. 
Despite these difficulties, the figures are more positive with regards to specialized 
training.  The percentage of employees with security-related responsibilities who 
received specialized training has steadily risen since FY 2005, and FY 2007 documented 
an impressive specialized training rate of 90 percent [68].  This indicates that the training 
environment is far from barren. However, until the DoD and other challenged 
departments develop solutions to their training issues, the actual percentage of personnel 
who have received the proper training cannot be accurately ascertained.  
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5. Personnel Security  
An important consideration of personnel security is the assurance that personnel 
filling designated positions have been properly screened prior to assuming duties that 
may expose them to sensitive information.  In the DoD, this screening often takes the 
form of a security clearance, which is generally used to determine the level of 
information an individual may have access to.  There have been sizable problems with 
the DoD’s personnel security clearance program in recent years, of a magnitude sufficient 
for GAO to judge the issue as a high risk area [65].  These problems can adversely impact 
the personnel security that surrounds DoD information systems, including control 
systems, either by placing uncleared personnel in the proximity of sensitive information, 
or by forcing cleared but unqualified personnel to assume positions of trust they may not 
be prepared for. 
The DoD’s problems were first noted by GAO in 2005 and have continued to the 
present day with minimal correction.  The most significant difficulty lies with the lengthy 
amount of time required to grant a clearance.  In January and February 2006, clearance 
processing time was an average of 286 days for initial clearances and 419 days for 
clearance updates [70].  By contrast, the end-to-end processing of initial top-secret 
clearances that was reported in August 2007 took an average of 276 days, while renewal 
of top-secret clearances required 335 days—an improvement, but still far in excess of the 
goal of 120 days [65].  These delays are exacerbated by the lack of full reciprocity 
between government agencies regarding the granting of clearances, resulting in 
duplicative investigations and adjudications among agencies.  This lack of reciprocity is 
the result of agencies’ concerns that other agencies may have conducted inadequate 
investigations during the clearance process. This implies that there have been significant 
issues in the past that certainly puts sensitive information at risk.  Yet another problem 
was the DoD’s chronically inaccurate projections of expected clearance requests, which 
negatively impacted man-hour planning and cost expectancies.  All of these challenges 
illustrate a lack of assurance in the DoD’s personnel security program, which has an 
obvious attendant effect on the security of information systems in general and control 
systems in particular.  
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6. Transition to Wireless Networks  
A recent technological trend is the incorporation of wireless networks in 
shipboard control system networks.  Although there are installation and cost benefits 
associated with wireless networks, these networks are still subject to the same security 
risks that are associated with conventional wired networks, as well as problems that are 
specific to the wireless networking environmental.  Since wireless networks broadcast 
information via radio waves that propagate between 150 feet to 1,500 feet, signal leakage 
can result in information being exploited by attackers more easily than in a conventional 
wired network [71].  Wireless network vulnerabilities can be mitigated by the 
development of policies that define requirements and establish security controls; by the 
use of wireless security tools such as encryption, authentication, virtual private networks 
(VPNs), and firewalls; by the implementation of comprehensive wireless network 
security monitoring programs; and by fully training personnel on appropriate wireless 
networking security policies.  
However, the federal government has faced significant problems in meeting the 
challenges inherent in wireless networking.  Many agencies have not developed policies 
addressing wireless networks, and of those agencies that did have policies, many of them 
did not include an acceptable use policy.  Over half of the agencies surveyed by GAO in 
FY 2005 did not have configuration requirements for wireless networks, and the 
configuration requirements of the other agencies often lacked key elements such as the 
use of and settings for security tools such as encryption, authentication, VPNs, and 
firewalls; proper placement and strength of wireless access points to minimize signal 
leakage; and the physical protection of wireless-enabled devices [71].  Even those 
agencies with proper configuration requirements likely had problems executing them—in 
addition to the federal government’s aforementioned problems with authentication, 
federal agencies also face significant challenges with encryption and VPNs that range 
from improper configuration, inadequate training, and incomplete policies [72].  Most of 
the major agencies did not establish comprehensive wireless network monitoring 
programs for detecting signal leakage, and 75 percent of the agencies surveyed did not 
have any training programs on wireless security or the policies.  GAO testing of the 
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wireless network security of six federal agencies identified significant weaknesses related 
to signal leakage, configuration, and unauthorized devices [71].  Fortunately, all is not 
lost regarding federal wireless networks, since the Defense Information Systems Agency 
has published Security Technical Implementation Guides to be used in hardening 
wireless networks.  However, properly securing wireless networks should continue to be 
an area of attention, since failure to do so would pose a serious risk to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the information contained on federal information systems.   
B. ASSESSMENT OF SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEMS 
DoD information systems share, at least in some degree, the flaws exhibited in the 
federal information system as a whole.  It can thus be inferred that the information 
systems of DoD components (such as the Navy) likely suffer from similar problems that 
are symptomatic of federal information systems.  Shipboard control system security will 
now be looked at in a general sense, based upon personal observation on board the U.S.S. 
Paul D. Foster, and from other documentation uncovered by research.   
1. Certification and Accreditation 
In light of the problems previously detailed concerning certification and 
accreditation within the federal government and the DoD, it is perhaps not surprising that 
research for this thesis revealed a paucity of evidence that control systems within the 
DoD are routinely subject to either the DITSCAP or DIACAP.  Interviews with members 
of the U.S. Navy engineering community, indicate that many personnel are not even 
aware that SCADA-like systems are employed on U. S. Navy vessels, despite occupying 
positions that should have made them privy to such information.  Communication with 
information technology professionals attached to the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR), at both the San Diego and Charleston centers, was initiated in the 
hopes that these agencies could provide documentation of the existence of, and 
certification and accreditation of, control systems on board ships.  The personnel at both 
SPAWAR centers were not only unable to find any case of an SSAA submitted for 
shipboard control systems, but were also unable to determine whether these systems 
existed in the first place.  These events are not recounted to imply that C&A is non-
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existent for shipboard control systems—not only is such a claim clearly unsupported but 
is also untrue, since research did manage to unearth one SSAA for a shipboard HM&E 
system.  However, one C&A example does not indicate a trend, and the difficulties in 
finding other examples illustrate that the U.S. Navy C&A process for shipboard control 
systems perhaps suffers from the same lack of cohesion that is evident throughout the 
federal government. 
2. Access Controls 
In some cases, shipboard control systems appear to satisfy some of the guidelines 
for appropriate access control.  The Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS) 
demonstrates this.  For example, user rights are separated based on one of four roles that 
a user is assigned, and these roles are governed by the “least privilege” principle.  A 
normal user may access all standard display and database functions, make manual log 
entries, and create limited bitmap files depicting a graphical representation of a system or 
component.  However, they have no data storage authority and may not alter any status 
pages, configuration files, or system settings.  Supervisors may place user-created files in 
the proper location, review logs and add non-editable comments, and make limited 
configuration alterations.  Administrators can make more sweeping configuration 
changes and assign users specific roles, while CDS editors enjoy root privileges.  All 
accounts are password-controlled and manual entry of an appropriate password is 
necessary to move up to a higher privilege level.  ICAS manuals promote an environment 
of access control by admonishing users to “always leave the workstation in the Normal 
User privilege level to prevent unauthorized users from tampering with the system.” [73]  
Limited integrity of manually-entered data is maintained by a review system, which 
prevents data that has been reviewed from being altered by anyone with a lower privilege 
level, and rendering the data permanent once the data has been deemed to be official by 
the final reviewer.  Limited auditing and accountability is attained by providing time-
stamps of data that has been reviewed.  Control of ICAS information flow has been 
achieved by enabling the system to only receive input from devices that it is directly 
connected to such as: a pre-existing external monitoring network that is interfaced with  
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ICAS; sensors that are installed on machinery and equipment, or manually inserted by a 
human operator directly into the ICAS workstation itself; or hand-held devices that can 
be connected directly to an ICAS workstation.   
However, there are some access control problems as well.  ICAS does not appear 
to have any restrictions on the composition or length of user-generated passwords, 
meaning that passwords could be dictionary words and thus easily exploitable.  The ICAS 
installed on the U.S.S. Paul D. Foster appeared to require no password entry at all for the 
developer to access, indicating that the capability may exist within the system to bypass 
the password requirement entirely based on the configuration of the system.  There is no 
information to indicate if ICAS passwords are stored in the clear or are encrypted.  
Although the ICAS manuals do make an attempt to promote good security awareness by 
warning users to execute their duties at the lowest possible privilege level, they also 
promote poor password practices by encouraging users to write down their passwords and 
store them in a safe place [37]. Information flow has also expanded beyond the 
restrictions originally placed on ICAS.   
While two ICAS topologies—either directly connected to the ship’s enterprise 
LAN or with access to the ship’s LAN via a network switch—are intended to allow read-
only observation of the data being monitored at a particular ICAS workstation, there is 
the possibility that ICAS data can be exposed to personnel who do not go through the 
same screening process of authorized users.  Additionally, these administrative 
workstations may be kept in spaces that do not have the same physical access controls as 
the rest of the HM&E network.  The incorporation of wireless networks within shipboard 
control systems, as embodied by the ICAS wireless vision illustrated in Figure 13, is yet 
another access control concern, especially given the aforementioned wireless security 
issues that are rampant within the federal government,.   
Shipboard control system access control is an issue beyond ICAS.  Vulnerability 
testing conducted against the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln HM&E network revealed 
numerous security problems.  External vulnerability scans exposed eleven discrepancies 
related to the Microsoft Windows operating system, two discrepancies with Hirschman 
Industrial Ethernet switches, four programmable logic controller flaws, and three 
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discrepancies with an Alcatel Omni switch.  In addition, a review of the internal security 
configuration of Microsoft Windows host revealed seventeen flaws, including 
administrator account set to automatic logon; unrestricted registry access; no password 
required for user logon, lack of auditing; non-enforcement of strong passwords; and the 
caching of logon credentials [74].  Although many of these vulnerabilities were mitigated 
by the closed nature of the HM&E network, the capability of opening this network to the 
enterprise LAN (as allowed by ICAS) makes these vulnerabilities potentially exploitable 
by an attacker. 
 
Figure 13.   ICAS Incorporation of Wireless Networks (From [75]). 
In addition, the ICAS logical boundary is growing.  Previous versions of ICAS 
transferred information about ship systems to shore facilities via File Transfer Protocol 
(FTP), where analysts manually prepared written reports that were then sent back to the 
ships.  However, newer versions of ICAS incorporate a remote monitoring capability that 
allows automatic downloading of ship data to a central server at Naval Surface Forces 
and Ship Systems Engineering Station (SSES) in Philadelphia, which automatically 
analyzes the data and generates the ship’s performance appraisal report.  It took sixteen 
days to get performance feedback to the ships using the old system; the new system gets 
appraisal reports back to the ship within twenty-four hours, allowing ship personnel to 
receive maintenance recommendations before warning conditions can degrade into 
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catastrophic failures [76].  Automated Common Diagrams (ACD) currently does not 
transmit information off the ship, but personnel intimately involved with this system 
envision that future iterations will be able to directly broadcast information to battlefield 
commanders, in order to provide an accurate picture of the battle-space by reporting on 
the material condition of assigned units, enabling leaders to allocate resources 
accordingly [34].  These technological innovations definitely have numerous operational 
benefits, but they also unquestionably place ship system data more vulnerable to 
exploitation.  
3. Physical and Environmental Protection 
Despite the demanding environment that Navy ships routinely operate in, 
shipboard control systems are offered physical protection that is well in excess of a 
normal SCADA system.  Since the geographical area of shipboard control systems is 
completely self-contained within the hull, and the ship itself is built to withstand physical 
damage, these control systems are reasonably well defended against the physical threat 
posed by a hostile outsider.  When they are pier-side at U.S.-controlled ports both within 
and outside the continental United States, Navy vessels are typically located at facilities 
that possess perimeter walls, continually guarded entry gates, and a mobile security force 
that regularly patrols the facility [74].  Vessels that are operating in foreign ports will 
employ extra security measures, such as anchoring ashore or posting extra guards pier-
side, as a means of mitigating the threat posed from their proximity to unsecured 
facilities.  Regardless of location, several security checkpoints must be passed in order to 
gain proximity to a pier-side vessel, to include roving vehicular and foot patrols on the 
pier, small craft patrols in the water, and stationary guards both on the pier and at the 
entry of the ship.  Personnel manning these patrols are typically armed with firearms.  
Additional static defenses include defensive screens deployed in the water to prevent 
unobserved approach and fences partitioning off the adjacent dock space.  Access to the 
facility requires an appropriately authorized identification, and access to the ship is 




come on board and who have been authorized by higher authority.  While underway, the 
ship’s mobility offers even tighter protection against the outsider threat, since access to 
the ship is obviously even more restricted.   
In addition to the aforementioned staunch outsider physical protection, Navy 
control systems also have reasonable physical protection against the insider threat.  Many 
shipboard compartments are controlled on an as-needed basis, and are accessible only to 
those personnel whose jobs legitimately require them to be granted access.  These spaces 
include engineering, damage control, and computer network spaces, which is where the 
majority of the HM&E system would reside.  Access to these spaces usually requires a 
key for a physical lock or the combination to a spin-dial or cyber lock, and many of these 
spaces are continually manned when the ship is underway.  Sensitive compartments 
typically possess a list of authorized personnel, and guests to those compartments are 
usually escorted at all times.  Additionally, despite the problems inherent within the DoD 
personal security clearance program, personnel that require access to these spaces for the 
performance of their jobs are often subjected to some form of screening process that often 
results in the granting of an interim or permanent formal security clearance, and are held 
to an established standard of personal reliability.  These spaces are typically manned by 
authorized personnel around the clock while the vessel is underway, and secured after 
normal business hours when the vessel is in port.   
Not only are Navy control systems afforded considerable physical protection 
against both outsider and insider threats, they are also typically operated in an 
inadequately-configured physical environment.  Although many control system 
components are inescapably installed in places of extreme physical duress in order to 
directly manipulate the machinery they monitor, sensitive components of the network—
such as servers, monitors, and workstations—are maintained in climate-controlled spaces 
where the air temperature and humidity are carefully regulated within specific tolerances.  
These components are often used in conjunction with an Uninterrupted Power Source 
(UPS) to protect against fluctuations in shipboard power, and can additionally be 
configured to operate off of shore power when pier-side.  Navy shipboard spaces also  
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typically contain emergency firefighting equipment readily at hand as well as a large pool 
of personnel trained in emergency damage control, so the control systems vulnerability to 
fire is mitigated. 
Naval vessels clearly provide significant physical and environmental protection to 
their control systems, but the very nature of their function can also place their systems at 
greater risk.  Since naval vessels spend significant amounts of time in potentially hostile 
waters, the threat of physical attack is always present, and this provides a far greater 
potential for physical damage than what a CI control system might face.  Logically, this 
potential for physical damage can, if translated to the reality of a combat situation, 
introduce control systems to the environmental hazard of fire, flooding, and exposure to 
toxic gasses.  However, when contemplating security of control systems within the 
context of the overall function and mission of the vessel itself, the physical and 
environmental security enjoyed by shipboard control systems are about as good as one 
could expect.  
4. State of Navy’s HM&E Program 
Yet another challenge to assessing the security of shipboard SCADA systems is 
the lack of a coherent structure in Navy HM&E.  Equipment and machinery 
configurations vary among ship classes and even among ships of the same class, making 
a methodical and overarching security assessment approach impossible.  Many ships use 
similar nomenclatures (such as MCS) to describe HM&E components that are actually 
fairly dissimilar to each other and which may incorporate different sensors, networking 
architecture and hardware.  Each class ship maintains an HM&E system that 
encompasses several interfaced sensing and monitoring systems as well as various 
software applications, and these components can change from ship to ship.  Many of 
these components offer similar functionality to the components used on other vessels, 
making them difficult to assess adequately.  In addition, the sheer volume of HM&E 
components adds a further level of complexity to this problem.  According to FY 2002 
data, the Navy supports almost 150,000 unique HM&E components, with almost 19 
percent of this equipment installed as a one-of-a-kind occurrence within the fleet [77].  
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The magnitude of HM&E components, coupled with the lack of a single HM&E model, 
makes it nearly impossible to make any concrete architecture recommendations.   
Naval maintenance and procurement procedures contribute to this disjointed 
effort.  Specific offices and individuals with the DoN exert control over their particular 
piece of the pie (such as ACD or ICAS), but there appears to be no single entity that 
oversees all HM&E systems Navy-wide.  This leads to institutional tunnel vision, where 
there is a depth of knowledge about the individual HM&E components, but precious little 
understanding about the interaction of these components and how they coordinate to form 
a complete HM&E system.  Interviews with members of the Navy’s engineering 
community tend to support this observation; individuals were well-versed in the 
particular system they worked with, but demonstrated little comprehension of how that 
system related to the overall picture, and there were instances where the information they 
provided were later disproved by independent research of other sources.   
Coherent information about the Navy shipboard HM&E effort is difficult to come 
by.  Exhaustive Internet searches revealed high-level material about individual 
components, which was necessary to gain a basic understanding, but this information was 
wholly unsuitable for conducting an exacting analysis.  Personalized contacts provided 
operating manuals and other useful sources that allowed a closer examination of the 
systems, but these sources were still lacking the required technical detail, and the 
piecemeal extraction of such details from the contacts was a laborious process.  In many 
cases the contacts either could not, or would not, reveal the desired information.  This 
problem is exacerbated by the proprietary nature of the applications involved   
The multiple problems of control system vulnerability, both in civilian industry 
and within the military, depicts an infrastructure whose security foundation is shaky at 
best, at a time when the potential threats to that infrastructure seem to be multiplying.  
Adding yet another reason for concern is the fact that the majority of control system 
components are manufactured in foreign countries, providing a potential opportunity for 
hostile insertion of exploits specifically designed to take advantage of a well-documented 
weakness.  As of this writing, there has not been a single magic bullet designed to bring 
the security problem to a manageable level, and the complexity of the problem is such 
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that this cookie-cutter solution may never be discovered.  However, there have been some 
attempts to systematically address this issue, and a general examination of some of these 
methods for correcting, or at least mitigating, the vulnerabilities of control systems will 














VII. IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Despite the obvious need to harden control systems, the critical infrastructure 
industries appear to have made little progress in addressing the vulnerabilities of their 
systems.  There has been enormous attention paid to ensuring that control systems 
operate in a reliable and optimum manner under normal circumstances, but there has not 
been a comparative effort made to determine how those control systems respond to 
“extreme events, contingencies, massive or cascading failures, or malicious attacks.” [78]  
Evidence of the lack of progress in control system security is demonstrated by comparing 
past vulnerability assessments with more recent evaluations.  In 1997, the National 
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) Information Assurance 
Task Force conducted a cyber risk assessment of the electric power industry.  The results 
of this assessment are comparatively displayed with the results of similar 2002 
assessments conducted by the the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
in Table 5. 
Table 5. Power Grid Vulnerabilities (After [78]). 
Documented SCADA Vulnerability 1997 NSTAC 2002 IEEE
Weak passwords used yes yes
Default passwords not changed yes yes
Passwords posted visibly yes yes
Shared logins yes yes
Inconsistent or non-existent warning banners yes yes
Personnel unaware of hacking threat yes yes
Unsecured modem access yes yes
IT network interconnectivity yes yes
Non-existent or inadequate intrusion detection yes yes
Non-existent security policy yes yes
Internet connectivity non-existant yes
Wireless networks non-existant yes
Commercialization of utility telecommunications non-existant yes  
  100
These results clearly show that the security problem for control systems is increasing 
rather than diminishing.  All of the vulnerabilities found in 1997 were rediscovered in 
2002, and additional vulnerabilities, which are the result of emerging technology and 
enterprise practices, have emerged as well [78]. 
Although many, if not most, critical infrastructure industries do not appear to be 
improving their defensive posture, this is not to say that the subject has been stagnant.  
Computer security professionals have been focusing considerable attention on the matter, 
and their efforts have produced some promising possibilities.  The various peculiarities, 
and unique challenges, of control systems may make a completely secure system 
impossible to achieve.  However, the research that has been done has yielded guidance 
and innovations whose implementation could make the security problem more 
manageable. 
The proper approach is to initiate a defense-in-depth strategy.  This is a 
combination of technical and non-technical defenses that are designed to provide 
overlapping, layered protection against hostile intrusions into the system.  Technical 
defenses are those security solutions that can be implemented in computer hardware 
and/or software, whereas non-technical defenses are security measures that are 
implemented independent of the hardware or software that is used, such as security 
policies and personnel screening requirements.  The concept is to ensure that security is 
not focused solely in one area, but is instead applied across many different avenues, with 
the various components providing support to the others.  This eliminates weak spots and 
improves the overall security of the system.  A strategy for improving the security of 
control systems is presented in the following sections. 
A. EVALUATION AND CERTIFICATION OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
There are many technologies that are useful in reducing the vulnerabilities of a 
system or a network.  Research is currently underway to determine if, and how, these 
technologies may be adapted to the particular environment of a control system, and some 
of these will be discussed later.  However, these solutions are merely one aspect of 
system protection, and do not by themselves constitute adequate protection.  For 
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example, firewalls are used to regulate traffic flow into and out of a system, and intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) are used to detect unauthorized intrusions into a system, but 
these products cannot completely overcome inherent weaknesses in the system itself.   
The solution to this problem is to have a system where security is “baked-in”  and 
not “brushed-on”—in other words, where security is not added as an afterthought, but is 
included as part of the design and developmental process.  Evaluation and certification of 
the control system is one means of ensuring this.  Security in an IT system can be defined 
as the degree to which the information in the system is protected from unauthorized 
disclosure, modification, or loss of use by countering threats to that information arising 
from human or systems-generated activities, malicious or otherwise [79].  In order to 
make a claim about the capability of a system to protect the information it contains, there 
must be some way to express the level of security that system, and there must be some 
way for system users to be confident that the system offers the correct level of protection.  
This process is known as evaluation and certification, and the International Common 
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, also known simply as the 
Common Criteria (CC), is one way to implement this process.     
1. Common Criteria (CC) 
Recognized as Standard 15408 of the International Standards Organization (ISO), 
the CC was designed as a means of defining, expressing, and verifying the security 
requirements of an IT product or system.  It defines 7 different numbered classifications 
of security assurance, known as Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL), each providing a 
particular level of confidence that the system or product meets its security objectives, 
with increasingly stringent testing and verification.  Common Criteria ensures that 
computer security specification, implementation and evaluation has been rigorously 
performed following a standardized methodology.   
The CC allows developers to construct their product and prepare it for third-party 
evaluation by defining the security requirements of the product.  It also assists evaluators 
by describing a set of general actions that must be conducted, and the security functions 
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that must be tested, while performing the evaluation.  Consumers can then use these 
evaluations to determine if a product or system meets their specific security needs.   
The product that is examined by the CC can be the entirety of an IT product, a 
part of an IT product, or even a collection of IT products.  Examples of a product include 
a software application, and operating system, a database application, a LAN, or 
combinations of these.  In other words, it is “a collection of software, firmware and/or 
hardware accompanied by guidance.” [80] 
Since products can often be established in many different configurations, each of 
which has unique operating characteristics, a CC evaluation is only good for a specific 
configuration, which is known as the Target of Evaluation (TOE).  Evaluation is an 
assessment conducted against defined criteria and is used to validate claims made against 
the TOE.  Simplistically, the CC does this by means of either a Protection Profile (PP) or 
a Security Target (ST).   
The PP is an implementation-independent set of security requirements for a broad 
category of TOEs.  It is typically a statement of common security needs defined by a user 
community, a regulatory entity, or a group of developers, and is used to serve as a 
template for a Security Target.  It is therefore typically used as part of a requirement 
specification for a specific consumer or group of consumers, or as part of a regulation 
from a specific regulatory entity, who will only allow a specific type of IT to be used if it 
meets the PP.  It can also be used to define a baseline determined by a group of IT 
developers, who then agree that all IT that they produce of this type will meet this 
baseline.  The PP can then be used by vendors to create STs to meet security 
requirements and have their products evaluated by a third party.  It is not meant to be 
either a detailed or complete specification, and unlike the ST, it is not intended to refer to 
a single product [80]. 
The ST is an implementation-specific set of security requirements for a specific 
TOE, often using a Protection Profile as a template.  Before the product is evaluated, the 
ST serves as a means of identifying what precisely is to be evaluated, and defines the 
scope of the evaluation and the specific security objectives of the TOE.  Once the 
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evaluation is completed, the ST identifies what has been evaluated, and describes the 
exact security properties in such a way that consumers can have a clear understanding of 
what the TOE offers.  It is not intended to be either a detailed or complete specification 
[80]. 
After a product has been evaluated, it can then undergo the process of 
certification.  Certification is the independent inspection of the evaluation results which 
can then lead to a certificate or approval, thereby ensuring greater consistency in the 
application of various security criteria [80].  
2. Application of the Common Criteria to Control Systems 
Because it is designed to provide a rigorous assurance that a product meets 
specific security objectives, work has been done to apply the CC to the development of 
secure control systems.  This effort was prompted by the ISO TC 57 Ad Hoc Working 
Group 6 initial report on data and communication security, released in September 1999.  
This report focused the utility industry to move away from a threat-based security 
approach and towards a consequence perspective for security assessment and asset 
identification, and also directed the utilization of Common Criteria protection profiles to 
develop a SCADA security standard [45].  Some of the protection profiles that have been 
developed as a result of this are discussed below 
a. Tele-Control Application Service Element2 Protocol 
In 2000, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) released a protection profile 
for the Tele-control Application Service Element.2 (TASE.2) protocol.  Also known as 
the Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP), TASE.2 is widely used to 
exchange information between SCADA control centers.  Because ICCP is used by utility 
industries around the world, and because the security of this protocol is fundamental to 
the security of communications and control within the SCADA network, there is a high 
priority to establish a secure standard for it.  This SNL report represents the first PP for a 
SCADA protocol and is the first SCADA security specification based on industry 
standards [45]. 
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The TASE.2 PP establishes the security environment of the TOE by 
making assumptions about the security environment and describing security policy 
issues.  Security threats are identified, and security objectives that map to the threats are 
established.  The PP then describes security functional requirements that will address the 
needs described by the security objectives [81]. 
b. ICS System Protection Profile 
Decisive Analysis has released a System Protection Profile (SPP) for 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS).  An SPP is designed to be a protection profile that 
captures the common subset of security requirements that are applicable to all ICS 
applications, and, unlike an ordinary PP, can include factors (such as security training and 
risk assessment) that are beyond the control of a vendor but which are still essential for a 
secure environment.  The ICS SPP “includes requirements for operating policies and 
procedures, requirements for information technology based system components, 
requirements for interfaces and interoperability between system components, and 
requirements for the physical environment and protection of the system.” [82]  It can be 
used as the basis for preparing a System Security Target (SST) for a specific ICS, or as 
the basis for a more detailed SPP for a sub-class of ICS such as a SCADA.  This concept 
is illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.   Relationship between SPP-ICS and other potential SPPs and STTs (From [82]). 
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The ICS SPP establishes the security environment by stating security 
usage assumptions, describing security threats and vulnerabilities, listing assets within the 
scope of the SPP, and detailing organizational security policies.  The SPP then identifies 
risk categories and maps the risk categories to the appropriate threats, vulnerabilities, and 
assets.  The security objectives and functional security requirements are then described.  
Security assurance requirements are then discussed in order to confirm that the system 
achieves an acceptable residual level of risk.  These organizational sections of the ICS 











































Figure 15.   SPP-ICS Structure (From [82]). 
Decisive Analysis has also released a SPP that is specifically designed for 
critical infrastructure control systems, using the ICS SPP as a starting point for this 
document.  Organizationally and structurally, it is almost identical to the ICS SPP, with 
the main difference being that its written goal is to provide a written high-level set of 
security requirements for a generic critical infrastructure ICS [83]. 
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c. ICS Control Station Protection Profile 
(3) Digital Bond has developed its own SCADA Protection Profile.  
This PP is designed to provide a set of functional requirements for an ICS control station, 
including the control servers, historical servers (to maintain historical data), HMI, and the 
associated network.  The scope of the PP can include back-up control stations and may 
include control stations that are stationed at remote sites, but it specifically excludes 
RTUs, PLCs, and other field devices.  It also excludes communications to and from these 
field devices as well.  The PP boundary is shown below. 
 
Figure 16.   Cyber Security TOE and Security Perimeters for Control Center PP (From [83]). 
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There are a variety of reasons the Control Center PP excludes field devices 
from its scope.  First of all, most of the solutions to control system vulnerabilities appear 
to be part of the control center, so it makes sense to focus attention on this portion of the 
system.  Furthermore, many vendors have developed control centers that implement 
industry standard security protocols, and the shortest path to getting a Common Criteria 
certified product in the near future may be by drafting a PP for an area that has already 
made great security strides.  Field devices are still highly proprietary and it may be 
several years before their security issues are addressed, and as a result they are treated as 
untrusted subjects by the Control Center PP.  However, Digital Bond hopes that when 
standards for field devices are developed and a Field Device PP is drafted, this could lead 
to a completely certified ICS [84]. 
The organization of the Control Center PP is similar to the protection 
profiles previously discussed.  The security environment is explored by describing 
security assumptions and threats.  Security objectives are then explained, and security 
functional requirements are documented.  The PP then maps the security objectives to the 
threats the objectives are designed to counter.  The objectives are then mapped to the 
security functions, and a reverse mapping of the security functions to the objectives is 
also provided. 
3. Alternatives to the Common Criteria 
The Common Criteria has come under fire from representatives in the security 
and academic fields.  The CC process has been accused of being prohibitively expensive 
and provides no guarantee that the customer is getting a product with improved security.  
The lower EALs, where most products are evaluated, only require evaluation of the 
development process and documentation, rather than the software itself, due in large part 
to the preponderance of proprietary code that the CC is applied to.  This failure to 
mandate code reviews prevents an examiner from searching for programming bugs and 
results in a closed evaluation system that cannot be replicated by different laboratories.  
In addition, the Common Criteria focuses on the product design and documentation but 
does not examine the product in its operating environment, and can give the buyer 
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confidence in the specification, but not the implementation [85].  Furthermore, the 
evaluation process is cumbersome and time-consuming, resulting in many products being 
evaluated as they near obsolescence, and forcing the customer to decide between 
choosing an out-of-date product with a valid security evaluation, or a newer product that 
has not been evaluated. 
Because of these shortfalls, assurance alternatives that may be more time-
efficient, less costly, or comprised of different evaluation methodologies, may be pursued 
in place of the Common Criteria.  These alternatives may follow the same product-based 
paradigm as the Common Criteria, such is the CESG Claims Tested Mark (CCTM), 
which targets the lower CC EALs and is designed to provide a cost-effective assurance 
scheme with a reasonable timeliness factor.  However, a developmental assurance model 
might be utilized instead.  Examples of this sort of model include the System Security 
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) and the Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI) both of which attempt to provide assurance by making a judgment of 
the maturity of the process involved in performing the security activity, rather than 
judging how the activity is accomplished. 
Regardless of the method, it is important to subject a control system to some sort 
of evaluation and certification process.  Regardless of the flaws of this process, it can 
allow for the declaration of how well the product meets specifically articulated security 
requirements, as well as some form of impartial validation of this claim.  This is 
important to providing a degree of assurance that the risk to the system is reduced. 
B. INCORPORATION OF CYBER SECURITY STANDARDS 
Various elements and components of the critical infrastructure industry are in the 
process of developing guidelines and security standards for use within their respective 
infrastructure.  The incorporation of these cyber security standards is an important step in 
improving the security of these different infrastructures, and can accomplish the dual 
purpose of heightening awareness of control system security vulnerabilities, and 
providing a more stringent defense against intrusions.  A comparative analysis of these 
security standards reveals a wide range of security issues that are addressed, as well as 
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varying degrees of detail.  Some provide fairly broad-brush guidance on a wide range of 
security subjects, while others offer more specific direction, but all of them can be useful 
for the particular industry in question. 
1. ISO/IEC 17799  
The International Standards Organization/International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC) 17799, also known as “Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management,” is a high-level, detailed, general purpose security standard.  It is organized 
into ten sections, covering such topics as business planning; access control; system 
development and maintenance; physical, personnel, and environmental security; security 
organization and policy; and computer and network management.  It was not written 
specifically for control systems, but many critical infrastructure industries use it as a 
starting point when developing their own security standards and it serves as a good basic 
building block for constructing a security standard and tailoring it to a particular 
environment. 
2. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
In response to Presidential Decision Directive 63, the U.S. Department of Energy 
designated the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) as the coordinator 
for the Electricity Sector of the nation’s critical energy infrastructure.  This designation 
makes NERC responsible for identifying weaknesses in the electrical power industry, 
devising ways to reduce these vulnerabilities, construct a system that identifies attacks 
and allows warnings of attacks to be disseminated, and assist in reconstituting minimum 
electrical services in the aftermath of an attack [86].  As the watchdog for the electrical 
sector, NERC has issued several documents to fulfill its responsibilities in this area, two 
of which are discussed below. 
a. NERC Security Guidelines for the Electrical Sector 
NERC published these guidelines in 2002 as a means to support the 
electrical industry’s attempts to re-evaluate existing plans and procedures currently in 
place to deal with attacks against this critical infrastructure component.  The guidelines 
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are advisory in nature and are intended to apply only to critical operating assets, which 
each company being free to make their own determination as to those facilities and 
functions that are actually critical.  This document describes nine different security 
guidelines, including vulnerability and risk assessment, threat response capability, 
physical and cyber security, and the protection of potentially sensitive information. 
b. NERC/CIP  
In August 2003, NERC issued a document known as NERC 1200, which 
was intended to be a temporary standard that was designed to establish minimum-security 
standards for the electrical industry, in order to lower the risk of critical asset 
compromise.  This temporary standard was in effect while a permanent standard was 
being written.  The first draft of this permanent standard was released in September 2004, 
with subsequent drafts being released in January 2005 and May 2005.  The current 
incarnation of this document is known as the North American Electric Reliability 
Counsel Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC/CIP).  NERC/CIP details eight 
different standards, each of which describes a particular security area.  These standards 
are listed below: 
(1) Critical assets 
(2) Security management controls 
(3) Personnel and training 
(4) Electronic security 
(5) Physical security 
(6) Systems security management 
(7)  Incident reporting and response planning 
(8) Recovery plans for critical cyber assets 
The NERC/CIP serves the same basic purpose of the NERC Security 
Guidelines for the Electrical Sector—to provide some measure of cyber security to 
reduce the vulnerabilities of the electrical industry from attack.  However, it is far more 
detailed and far more directive in nature.  Each of the eight standards within the 
NERC/CIP describes compliance requirements that must be met in order for that 
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particular section to be satisfied, and each section standard explicitly states measures that 
must be taken that will be used to determine compliance.  Critics of the NERC/CIP 
believe that the standards are not rigorous enough and, hence, will lead to ambiguous 
implementations that do not reach their full security potential, but the very lack of rigor 
could make for a more rapid consensus among the various electrical companies, as well 
as a far easier implementation process, and compliance with this standard should, on 
balance, provide a considerably improved security posture than is currently the case [87].  
3. American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 1164 
The API represents 400 members involved in the nation’s oil and natural gas 
industry.  In an effort to address the security considerations of this component of the 
critical infrastructure, it released API Standard 1164.  API 1164 targets small to medium-
sized companies, and is intended to improve the security of pipeline SCADA systems by 
describing how to identify and analyze SCADA vulnerabilities, providing a list of 
practices to harden the core architecture, and highlighting examples of the best current 
practices in the industry [88].  
API 1164 is simplistic in nature, and thus easier to implement than a more precise 
standard would be.  It addresses such topics as access control, communications, 
information distribution, physical security, network design, and security management.  
The standard includes two helpful appendices that provide a significant amount of detail 
to the overall document.  Appendix A is a security checklist designed to be used as a 
guide when reviewing the security of SCADA systems, while Appendix B is a sample 
control system security plan.  Although the standard lacks technical rigor, it serves as a 
useful starting point for improving the security of a petroleum or natural gas utility. 
4. American Gas Association (AGA) Report Number 12 
The AGA represents 192 utility companies that deliver roughly 83 percent of all 
delivered natural gas to homes businesses, and industries.  In concert with the Gas 
Technology Institute, and in coordination with representatives of the gas, water, and 
electrical industries, as well as manufacturers, SCADA operators, and government 
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agencies, the AGA has produced AGA Report Number 12.  AGA 12 was conceived as a 
four-part series of documents that focus on securing the communications of SCADA 
systems, with the goal of providing communications that are capable of being 
authenticated by valid users and can provide a high-assurance of being unaltered by 
potential attackers [88]. 
The most recent draft of the AGA-12, Part 1, is organized into five sections and 
several appendices.  Section 1 is an overview of the standard.  Section 2 describes 
SCADA system vulnerabilities and possible means of compromise as well as cost 
impacts of implementing the standard.  Section 3 provides guidance on how to define 
security goals, understand vulnerabilities and threats, and determine the best course of 
action.  Section 4 lists various system compliance requirements, cryptographic 
performance requirements, cryptographic system design goals, and cryptographic module 
components.  Section 5 serves as a technical reference.  The detailed annexes include 
substantial background information, covering such topics as SCADA fundamentals, 
cryptography fundamentals, security practice fundamentals, and challenges of applying 
cryptography to SCADA communications.  
AGA planned to issue additional documents in AGA-12 series, including 
standards for SCADA embedded system cryptography and protection of IP-based 
SCADA networks.  However, these other reports were terminated due to lack of funding, 
and no public drafts of these reports have been discovered.  However, it is hoped that the 
work done on this report can pave the way for the eventual development of a standard 
will significantly enhance the overall security of SCADA communications in general.  
5. Chemical Industry Data Exchange (CIDX) 
The chemical industry, like most other components of the critical infrastructure, is 
addressing the security of the SCADA systems under its control.  The Chemical Industry 
Data Exchange (CIDX) is the standards body that has been engaged to develop security 
practices and guidelines within the chemical industry, and has published a report titled 
“Guidance for Addressing Cybersecurity in the Chemical Sector” in support of that 
mission.  This standard details nineteen key elements that are critical to the protection of 
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the chemical infrastructure, including access control; risk management and implantation; 
incident planning and response; and organizational, physical, personal, and 
environmental security.  The elements are described in terms of how they are applicable 
to cyber security and how to employ it.  The guidance document is similar to the 
NERC/CIP in that it is a high-level standard that does not impose rigid, specific 
restrictions, but whose application will still have a measurable positive affect on the 
security posture of its target industry [89]. 
6. Department of Energy 21 Steps 
The U.S Department of Energy, in conjunction with the President’s Critical 
Infrastructure Board, released a SCADA security guidance document entitled “21 Steps 
to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks.”  It is designed to briefly outline 
recommended steps that provide a common-sense approach to increasing control system 
security across all industries.  Steps 1 through 11 describe specific actions that can be 
undertaken to improve the security of the SCADA system itself, such as the identification 
and hardening of all connections to the SCADA network; performing physical security 
surveys, incident monitoring, and technical audits; and implementing the inherent 
security features that are provided by device and system vendors.  Steps 12 through 21, 
on the other hand, focus on the essential underlying security management policies and 
processes; such as clearly identifying cyber security roles, responsibilities, and 
requirements; establishing effective risk-management, configuration management, and 
response recovery plans that are reviewed on a periodic basis; and  ensuring that minimal 
security expectations and security policies are written and disseminated to all personnel.  
Although this is not a security standard per se, it serves as a good high-level path that can 
serve as a blueprint for an overall improved security position [90]. 
7. NIST Special Publication 800-53 Annex I 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recognizes that 
control systems have unique considerations when compared to normal information 
systems and thus require specialized security attention, even though the inclusion of 
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commercially-used software and hardware has narrowed that divide somewhat.  NIST 
Special Publication 800-53 outlines recommended security controls for federal 
information systems, and Appendix I focuses specifically on control systems.  This 
Appendix provides tailoring guidance, security control enhancements, supplements to the 
security control baselines, and general supplemental guidance that can all be applied to 
improving the security of control systems [67]. 
8. SCADA and Control Systems Procurement Project 
Because critical infrastructure security has gained heightened awareness in recent 
years, a multi-agency initiative was spawned to improve the nation’s control systems 
cyber security posture.  This joint private and public sector initiative was assembled by 
the Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division, Idaho National 
Laboratory, the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) of New York State, and the 
SANS Institute.  The project, which is populated by 242 international public and private 
sector entities, is designed to allow “private and public asset owners and regulators to 
come together and adopt procurement language that will help ensure that security is 
integrated into control systems.” [91] 
Adhering to industry standards and following established industry guidelines can 
improve the security of a control system.  These measures allow measurable criteria to be 
created that can provide the blueprint to more secure systems throughout the industry , 
thereby shepherding control system development towards a more secure pattern.   
C. ADDRESSING CONTROL SYSTEM NETWORK PROBLEMS 
Many of the security problems inherent in control systems are due to issues 
involving the transfer of information to and from master control stations to remote 
stations.  These problems include interconnectivity of the control system network to other 
networks, transmission of control system information via shared communications 
channels, control system message restrictions that hamper corrective measures such as 




standardized communications protocols that are ill suited to a secure control system 
network.  Performing the following steps will go a long way towards reducing the 
vulnerabilities of control system networks and will greatly improve the overall security of 
the system.  
1. Harden the Control System Networks 
In this age of computer network growth, many critical infrastructure entities are 
using common TCP-IP protocols as the communications standards for their control 
systems.  Because these protocols are the backbone for Internet communications, many of 
these entities have connected their SCADA networks to their enterprise LANs.  While 
this allows for improved executive efficiency and heightened dissemination of control 
system information, it also drastically increases the vulnerability of control system 
networks to potential threats.  Business LANs are commonly connected to the Internet, 
and exploitation of the enterprise LAN by an attacker could lead to a similar compromise 
of the control system network.  An additional danger is the likelihood for backdoors into 
the system by contractor personnel, which can be easily exploited by malicious intruders. 
There are several steps that can be taken to improve the defense posture of the 
control system network.  The network must be thoroughly mapped in such a way that all 
elements of the network, and all possible access points into the system, can be identified.  
Unnecessary access points and backdoors should be eliminated, and the control system 
network should be isolated as much as possible from other networks.  Control system 
messages should, in no case, ever share the same network paths as other computer traffic.  
Remote access into the network should be severely restricted, and should employ 
effective authentication techniques, such as strong passwords and individual user 
accounts.  Finally, the remote elements of the network should have some measure of 
physical protection against unauthorized access, and should employ some measure of 
strong authentication (such as a password and a token, for example) to resist the entrance 
of malicious individuals who manage to gain physical control of the remote device. 
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It is important to ensure some measure of partition between control system 
network and the corporate network.  The easiest method of doing this is to make the two 
systems complete distinct and separate.  This will provide significant assurance that only 
authorized control system users are accessing the control system network.  However, it 
may not be practical to implement this solution, so the following section will address the 
reality of co-mingling the corporate and control system networks, and ways to mitigate 
the dangers inherent in this situation.    
2. Make Effective Use of Perimeter Security Tools 
An important aspect of securing the network, which was implied in the previous 
section, but which will be specifically discussed here, is the establishment of perimeter 
security tools.  Businesses will, in many cases, be reluctant to lose the convenience 
afforded by interconnecting the control system network with the enterprise LAN, and it 
may not be possible to eliminate all vendor access into the SCADA system.  It is 
therefore important that the business LAN, as wells the control system network itself, 
makes effective use of appropriate security perimeter tools. 
a. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
Intrusion detection systems are designed to detect unauthorized access into 
the computer network.  An IDS is either host-based or network-based.  A host-based IDS 
(HIDS) is resident in a computer host and analyzes activity within that host, matching 
patterns of behavior with pre-loaded “signatures”— characteristics that match a hacking 
exploit—that match suspicious activity.  A network-based IDS (NIDS) does essentially 
the same thing, except that it performs this activity for an entire network rather than a 
single machine.  IDSs are commonly used in conjunction with other security tools 
(explained below) to form the defensive perimeter of the system. 
b. Firewalls 
A firewall is a mechanism that is used to monitor the traffic that flows 
into, through, and out of a computer network.  It accomplishes this task by comparing the 
traffic packets against guidelines that embody a specific security policy, and only passing 
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traffic that meets the appropriate criteria.  Firewalls can either be completely separate 
hardware components, a completely host-based software application, or a combination 
hardware/software mechanism.  Network firewalls are typically of the hardware or 
hardware/software variety, and these are the devices most appropriate for use on a control 
system network, although host-based mechanisms can also be included. 
Firewalls can perform additional functions in addition to the basic function 
of controlling traffic routing.  Firewalls can act as a first-level IDS by logging those 
packets that are denied access, reporting unusual problems with the traffic, or by 
recognizing potentially troublesome packets.  Some firewalls can also act as a front-line 
anti-virus mechanism, by recognizing traffic packets with virus characteristics and 
blocking this traffic from entering the network.  Firewalls can also provide authentication 
services, VPN gateway services, and network address translation services [92]. 
The goal of the firewall is to minimize unauthorized access of traffic onto 
the control system network, and there are general guidelines that need to be followed, and 
which the firewall needs to enforce, in order to realize this objective.  First, there should 
be no direct connections from the Internet to the control system network, and vice versa.  
This is to prevent inbound traffic from congesting the network (and in extreme cases, 
initiating DoS attacks) and to prevent the same issue from occurring with outbound 
traffic.  Second, there should restricted access from the enterprise network to the control 
system network.  Both networks should be physically and logically isolated.  Yet another 
guideline is to support authorized remote access, in the event that support is absolutely 
required, needs to be done in a secure fashion.  Finally, there needs to be well-defined 
rules defining the type of traffic allowed on the network.   
There are a variety of firewall architectures that could be deployed on a 
control system network.  The configurations vary in cost, complexity and effectiveness, 
and each configuration has its own particular weaknesses and strengths.  The selection of 
any particular architecture will require some sort of trade-off in terms of scalability, 
manageability, and degree of security provided.  Loosely speaking, these architectures 
can be broken into three general categories: those that achieve separation using non-
firewall devices such as dual-homed workstations, bridges, and routers; those that 
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incorporate a two-zone firewall design that does not utilize a demilitarized zone (DMZ); 
and three-zone firewall designs that do incorporate a DMZ.  Of these categories, the use 
of a DMZ generally provides the best combination of security, scalability, and 
manageability [92]. 
The effectiveness of a firewall depends on the rules that dictate how it 
controls the traffic it monitors.  It is vital that special care is taken to correctly establish 
the rules set of the firewall.  Incorrectly-configured firewalls will not only fail to properly 
shield the system, but will also, merely because the firewall is deployed, give IT 
personnel a false sense of assurance about the protection it provides.  Suggested 
guidelines to follow when configuring a firewall are shown below in Table 6. 
Table 6. Recommended Firewall Configuration Guidelines (After [92]). 
Num Guideline 
1 The base rule set should be Deny All, Permit None. 
2 Connections between control system network and any external network should only 
be enabled on a case-by-case basis, with documented justification regarding why the 
information flow is allowed. 
3 All “permit” rules should be both IP address and TCP/UDP port specific, and 
stateful if appropriate. 
4 All rules shall restrict traffic to specific IP address or range of addresses. 
5 Any non-IP protocol should be dropped, since communication on control system 
networks is typically IP-based. 
6 Prevent traffic from transiting directly from the control system network to the 
enterprise network. All traffic should terminate in the DMZ. 
7 Any protocol allowed between the control system network and DMZ is explicitly 
NOT allowed between the DMZ and enterprise networks (and vice-versa) 
8 All outbound traffic from the control system network to the enterprise network 
should be source and destination restricted by service and port using static firewall 
rules 
9 Allow outbound packets from the control system or DMZ only if those packets have 
a correct source IP address assigned to the control system or DMZ devices; 
10 Control system devices should not be allowed to access the Internet.  control system 
networks shall not be directly connected to the Internet, even if protected via a 
firewall. 
11 All firewall management traffic be either via a separate, secured management 
network or over an encrypted network with two-factor authentication. Traffic should 




Unfortunately, the protection that firewalls provide control system 
networks is somewhat limited.  Firewalls are designed to deal with Internet protocols, and 
these firewalls have no knowledge of control system-specific protocols and services, and 
the rules set of a firewall offers no protection against an attack against a control system-
specific (and inherently insecure) protocol such as MODBUS.  Therefore, while “the 
current systems are excellent against script-kiddie hackers and other novices that use 
exploits easily available on the Internet; they are not adequate to detect attacks by a 
SCADA cyber terrorist, disgruntled insider, or skilled hacker with knowledge of SCADA 
systems.” [83]  Firewalls that have knowledge of control system processes and protocols 
need to be developed to address this vulnerability. 
c. Combination Strategies 
The security perimeter of a SCADA system is most effective when a 
combination of tools is used.  In order to envision the concept of a security perimeter, 
consider the physical analogy of a secure building.  The building will have locks on the 
doors and windows, and probably a fence around it as well, to prevent illegal entry into 
the premises. Physical monitoring systems, such as cameras and motion detectors, are 
often used to identify breaches and enable a quick response.  The locks, fences, cameras, 
and monitors form the security perimeter for the building [93]. 
Dale Peterson of Digital Bond uses this parallel to define the security 
paradigm of a control system network.  The firewall is designed to prevent unauthorized 
access, fulfilling the same function as the locked windows, doors, and fence.  Intrusion 
detection systems perform the monitoring and detection functions.  Additional tools, such 
as the collection of host log entries and the continued analysis and evaluation of the 
information gathered from NIDS, HIDS, audit logs, and other sources, can assist the IDS 
for maximum effectiveness by revealing important information about activity on the 
system, such as failed and successful intrusion attempts, processes initiated by the 
intruder, or escalation of privileges, and so on.  This can all help determine if an attack 
has occurred or is in progress, and initiate a rapid response to it.   
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Figure 17.   Cyber security monitoring (From [93]). 
As is seen in Figure 17, firewalls form the outer perimeter of the network 
by restricting traffic to and from the control system network and the enterprise LAN, and 
their audit logs can be analyzed to detect access attempts into the control system network 
via the enterprise LAN.  Network Intrusion Detection Systems are stationed in the control 
system LAN as well as within a DMZ that commonly contains systems such as web 
servers and historical servers that have a legitimate need to be accessed from the 
enterprise LAN.  Monitoring of all the logs is conducted to identify security events and 
accurately classify the occurrence of an attack, as well as the severity of an attack once it 
is identified [93].  This configuration provides a layered defense perimeter against an 
attack against the system.  Some examples of the benefits of this configuration are 
illustrated in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Benefits of Defense in Depth (After [93]). 
Description of Attack Results of Attack Benefit of Defense Tools 
An attack is launched 
against the CONTROL 
SYSTEM network via the 
enterprise LAN 
Attack is stopped by 
an effective firewall 
with a well-
constricted rules set 
Monitoring of firewall logs can serve as an 
early-warning of a possible attack and can 
either identify a disgruntled insider or a 
vulnerability that is exploited by a hacker from 
the outside. 
An attack from the 
enterprise LAN gets by 
the firewall and is targeted 
for the DMZ 
Attack will be 
detected by the 
firewall logs, the 
NIDS, and the logs of 
the targeted DMZ 
machine. 
Analysis of this information would confirm the 
existence of the attack, as well as revealing 
whether or not the attack was successful. 
An attack is launched 
against the CONTROL 
SYSTEM network itself 
Attack will be 
identified by the 
NIDS 
Examination of the audit logs of the stations 
within the CONTROL SYSTEM network 
could aid in the determination of the success or 
failure of an attack 
Disgruntled insiders and 
outside hackers that gain 
access into the enterprise 
LAN may perform a 
network scan to identify 
vulnerabilities 
NIDS and firewall 
audit logs can detect 
the scanning attempts. 
NIDS and firewall audit logs can possibly be 
used to prevent the attack 
3. Protect Transmitted Control System Communications 
A major problem with control system communications is that they are extremely 
susceptible to exploitation.  Many control systems use shared channels to transmit their 
data, and this information is commonly passed in plain text, thereby affording an attacker 
not only ease of collection of control system data, but ease of interpretation as well.  In 
addition, while most control system protocols utilize some form of Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC) to detect errors caused by noise, there is no known control system protocol 
that ensures integrity against a malicious entity [94].  Common assumptions about control 
system communications, as well as the truth about the vulnerability that the assumption 
masks, are listed in Table 8.  Examination of this information shows that not only is the 
security of control system message traffic at considerable risk, but that there is also an 
apparent lack of concern about these inherent vulnerabilities.  Protecting control system 




Table 8. Realities of the vulnerabilities (After [95]). 
ASSUMPTION REALITY
We use leased lines, so nobody has access to 
our communications.
It’s easy to tap these lines. The web site 
www.tscm.com/outsideplant.html shows many 
examples.
We use dial-up phone lines, but nobody 
knows the phone numbers.
A tap on outgoing lines or detailed billing records 
quickly reveals every phone number dialed by the 
master. "War dialer" software is available on the 
Internet to automatically dial banks of numbers and 
identify those that are answered by a modem.
We use dial-back modems so that 
unauthorized users cannot gain access.
Once the line is tapped, dial-back is easily defeated. 
Other known methods do not require tapping the line.
Our systems are protected by passwords Methods of stealing passwords are widely known. The 
easiest is to simply eavesdrop when the password is 
sent, in the clear, over the communications link. 
Dictionary "guessing" attacks are also common. 
Sharing passwords and/or never changing them is a 
common and dangerous practice.
We use frequency hopping spread spectrum 
radio, the same as the military for secure 
communications
There are simple methods to decode frequency-
hopping sequences. The Wireless LAN Association 
specifically recommends using encryption on all 
networks, including spread spectrum. That’s what the 
military uses - encryption.
We use a proprietary protocol so an 
eavesdropper couldn’t understand our 
SCADA messages.
Even proprietary protocols are more widely known 
than many realize. Vendors, vendors’ consultants, 
your current and former employees, current and 
former employees of other companies using the same 
SCADA protocol will know the details. Manuals and 
software tools for analyzing protocols can be 
downloaded from the Internet.  
a. Cryptography 
Despite the obvious desirability of securing control system 
communications, there are many challenges to accomplishing this task.  Most control 
system field devices, such as RTUs, are designed for relatively specialized functions and 
do not have the computational power necessary to handle most public encryption 
protocols.  In addition, control system messages are generally very small and are 
transmitted at relatively slow speeds, and often have instantaneous response 
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requirements; therefore the bandwidth requirements of most encryption protocols greatly 
exceed the bandwidth availability on most control system networks, and the latency that 
encryption could introduce into the message traffic could be prohibitive. 
However, in spite of these obstacles, the evident necessity of secure 
control system communications has led the AGA to prepare a series of reports that 
provides recommendations for protecting those communications.  AGA Report 12 
provides an extensive study on the encryption of control system communications and its 
goal is to introduce a standard of cryptographic protection.  This standard is to take the 
form of cryptographic modules that is immediately inserted in between a component of 
the control system network (such as a master station or a remote substation) and its 
means of transmitting and receiving data (such as a modem).  Plaintext from the 
transmitted control system component will enter into the plaintext port of the 
cryptographic module and an enciphered version will be released from the ciphertext, 
where it will then be transmitted across the communications line.  The process will be 
repeated, in reverse, at the receiving end.  Since control system messages are simple and 
often repetitive, confidentiality is not a prime consideration, whereas integrity is 
absolutely vital.  An encryption protocol for control system “must prevent an adversary 
from constructing unauthentic messages, modifying messages that are in transit, 
reordering messages, replaying old messages, or destroying messages without detection.” 
[94]  An obvious method of accomplishing this, the introduction of a message 
authentication code at the end of the message, would require the entire received message 
to be buffered by the cryptographic module so that its authenticity could be checked prior 
to passing the message through its plaintext port, and would introduce significant 
undesired latency into the system.  Therefore, Cisco Systems and the Gas Technology 
Institute have collaborated on the authorship of a protocol that could address these 
problems.   
The mechanism works as follows.  Receipt of a plaintext message causes a 
transmitting cryptographic module to immediately begin sending an encrypted message 
header that includes a sequence number identifying the message.  The message is then 
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sent in short blocks that are buffered and encrypted, with the final transmission being the 
message authentication code.  Rather than buffer the entire message before checking for 
authentication, the receiving cryptographic module first checks a sequence number to 
ensure that it is correctly incremented from the last sequence received.  This is the first 
part of the integrity check.  If this sequence number is incorrect, the rest of the message is 
ignored.  If the sequence number is correct, the cryptographic module buffers a cyber 
block, decrypts it, and then transmits it as plaintext at the same time it is still receiving 
the rest of the encrypted message. This protocol introduces minimum latency, since it 
adds a total of 32 characters if 128-bit encryption is used, regardless of message length. 
The slow speed of the communications channel means that an adversary can make only a 
limited amount of trials before his attempt is detected.   
This protocol involves utilizing a cascade cyber that is composed of two 
block ciphers.  Encrypting the plaintext is done using a counter mode (CTR) that depends 
on the message sequence number and the position of this particular block within the 
message, and this result is re-encrypted using electronic codebook mode (ECB).  This is 
designed to provide strong message integrity since “forging and alteration are prevented 
by ensuring that an unauthentic ciphertext has a low probability of decrypting to a control 
system message containing a valid CRC. Reordering and replay are prevented by 
ensuring that an alteration of the sequence number will likewise result in a low 
probability that the ciphertext decrypts to a control system message containing a valid 
CRC.” [94]  This technique does not protect the system from DoS attacks—and it makes 
the assumption that master station as a trusted entity—but it appears to be a promising 
possibility of protecting the integrity of control system messages.   
b. Secure Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
A secure VPN is a means of protecting information that is transmitted over 
a public network that utilizes insecure protocols.  In theoretical terms, the VPN creates a 
cryptographic “tunnel” through which the data travels, and this tunnel protects the data 
from the insecure medium through which the data actually passes.  VPNs are often 
secured using IPSec (for protecting OSI level 3) or SSL (for protecting OSI levels above 
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level 3).  Since the majority of control system communications are beginning to utilize 
TCP/IP protocols, either IPSec or SSL could be utilized to provide protection for the 
communications.  However, both of these protocols present some problems.  SSL and 
IPSec utilize both utilize public keys to establish a session key, and public key encryption 
may introduce unacceptable latency in a SCADA system.  Additionally, if one considers 
that the primary purpose of securing control system communications is to ensure integrity 
of the message traffic, both SSL and IPSec are probably far more robust than necessary, 
since confidentiality is one of the major focuses of both these protocols.  However, it is 
not inconceivable that paired-down versions of these could provide adequate security to 
control system communications, especially if the problem of latency is not a serious one, 
and implementation of VPNs that utilize these protocols is far superior to continuing to 
send messages in the clear, with no protection whatsoever.     
4. Reduce the Vulnerability of Wireless Links 
The use of wireless communications in SCADA systems is increasing, and this 
poses significant security problems.  Wireless communications are extremely vulnerable 
to collection by hostile individuals, and the very nature of the 802.11 protocol makes it a 
relatively simple matter for an attacker to launch a DoS attack simply by flooding an 
access point with message requests.  Encryption for wireless access points, known as 
Wireless Encryption Protocol (WEP), has been demonstrated to have known 
vulnerabilities, particularly in its earlier incarnations. The latest IEE standard for wireless 
security, 802.11i, addresses the weaknesses of WEP but may not be suitable for control 
system due to its complexity, lack of accommodation for older deployed equipment, and 
interoperability concerns [96].  Companies that insist upon utilizing wireless 
communications on their control system networks should combine some version of WEP 
with another form of protection, such as a VPN, to ensure the security of their system. 
D. IMPROVING SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
Most control systems have horrible security administration practices.  Those 
systems that do implement some form of security administration often do not utilize 
effective administration that is specific for SCADA systems.  Without a strong security 
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administration system, systematic security is impossible to achieve, because the security 
effort is disorganized, undirected, and is not fostered in a security-aware environment.  
Implementation of a strong security administration program, as outlined in brief in the 
following sections, will lay the foundation of a conscious, determined security effort 
designed to successfully reduce the system’s vulnerabilities and protect the system 
against malicious activity. 
1. Control System Security Policy 
The cornerstone of any effective security administration effort is the 
establishment of a strong security policy.  The security policy provides a clear, 
management-level picture of the organization’s security vision, and provides the direction 
needed to focus the security effort. Overarching business objectives are the pillars upon 
which a security policy rests.  Lack of a coherent security policy leads to a chaotic, 
ungoverned system that will inevitably have vulnerabilities and makes it impossible to 
sustain self-perpetuating security.  Creation of a strong policy will then be used to define 
the particular practices to be used within the control system environment [97].  
Control systems perform specialized functions and are governed by restrictions 
and idiosyncrasies that are far different from a standard IT network.  For example, data 
sensitivity of a control system could be far different from that of an ordinary network.  
Control systems usually perform with a high-degree of time criticality of its performance.  
Yet another difference is that control systems may not be able to tolerate significant 
downtime, precluding the application of security patches.  Accordingly, the policy for a 
control system should be specifically designed for that system and should be a 
completely separate document that a general security policy.   
Sandia National Laboratories has developed a trademarked security policy 
framework that is designed to assist control system users in developing their own specific 
policy.  The policy should describe the purpose and scope of the policy, the control 
system organization, the control system information architecture, categorization and 
ownership of control system data, and security risk management.  The framework 
describes nine security targets and provides specific elements of the targets that the 
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policy authors will then detail as appropriate for their own particular system and 
environment.  A graphical depiction of the control system policy framework is shown 
below in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18.   Control System policy framework (From [97]). 
It is vitally important to write effective policies that articulate proper user 
practices, and to promulgate these policies to the personnel who utilize the system.  Poor 
user behavior has become such a security concern that it is included in the 2007 SANS 
Top Twenty, which lists the current top twenty computer vulnerabilities as determined by 
the SANS Institute.  Examples of this type of behavior include the connection of 
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unauthorized or infected devices to a network, downloading unauthorized software, and 
granting excessive user rights on a network.  It may also include the inter-mingling of 
functional roles, such as giving control system administrative personnel the capability of 
checking email and browsing the Internet via the control system network.  Clearly 
defining proper user activities, and ensuring that personnel understand what behavior is 
proscribed, is a necessary requirement to improving the security of any control system.   
2. Procedures, Plans, and Training 
The security policy is only the broad-brush base upon which a security program 
rests.  A policy is a high-level document that provides guidance and direction.  
Implementation of that policy requires a greater level of specificity.  This detail is 
provided by procedures and plans.  Procedures and plans are based on the directives of 
the security policy and “must be predicated upon elements of the policy to be coherent 
and effective.” [44]  Simply put, policy explains what must be done, while procedures 
and plans explain how it is to be done. 
Of course, all the documentation in the world is useless unless the right personnel 
are familiar with their contents, and, more importantly, know how to utilize them.  This is 
where training comes in.  Regular security training offers two main benefits: it provides 
structured instruction in the appropriate application of plans and procedures, and it 
creates a security-conscious atmosphere that enforces good security practices by reducing 
complacency. 
3. Security Auditing 
Good security administration is not something that can be applied on a one-time 
basis.  A control system network, just like any other IT network, is a constantly evolving 
organism, and the policy and procedures that govern that organism has to be similarly 
fluid.  A security policy must be constantly audited and reviewed in order to ensure that it 
accurately reflects the actual security requirements of the control system, and plans and 
procedures must be periodically examined to ensure that they accurately embody the 
principles of the policy.    
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4. System and Network Security Administration 
Security administration does not end with the drafting of policies and procedures.  
An important part of security administration is the administration of the system itself, and 
most control systems are simply substandard in this regard.  Poor system administration 
can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities that can allow malicious attackers free access into 
the network, and it is very important that these vulnerabilities are eliminated. 
There are a variety of steps that a control system administrator can take to 
improve the security of the system.  Perhaps the easiest of these is the issuance of 
individual user accounts to only those personnel whose responsibilities require them to 
have access into the system, with strong passwords that need to be changed periodically.  
Many control systems utilize shared accounts that are used by a variety of personnel, and 
are often protected with weak passwords that are in place indefinitely.  This practice 
makes the control system vulnerable to password cracking, and promotes an atmosphere 
where it is “all right” to share account passwords, making it more likely that unauthorized 
insiders can gain access to the system.  Indefinitely-maintained passwords also mean that 
personnel who no longer require access—such as recently-terminated personnel who may 
bear a grudge—are still able to access the system.  Individual accounts, issued on a need-
to-know basis, that require password aging and which are removed as necessary, is a 
good way to prevent such unauthorized access.  Password data, as is the case with most 
other control information, is often transmitted in the clear.  This makes them easy prey 
for snoopers who have tapped the communications line.  Therefore, system 
administrators need to take pains to ensure that passwords are offered some form of 
protection prior to transmission, either by encryption or a VPN.  In addition, system 
administrators also need to make sure that user accounts are created in such a way that 
the owners of those accounts do not have access to data that is beyond the sensitivity 
level required for the execution of their duties.  System administrators also need to 
regularly examine network logs in order to have a running picture of what type of activity 
is occurring on their network, so that potential (or even successful) penetrations can be 
detected and responded to.   
 
  130
E. IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF CONTROL SYSTEM PLATFORMS 
Since the control system industry is seeing such a growing transition to open 
computing platforms, special care must be taken to make these platforms as secure as 
possible.  Common operating systems such as Windows and Linux have many well-
publicized vulnerabilities that are easily targeted by malicious personnel.  Security 
personnel must take the necessary steps to seal those vulnerabilities and make their 
machines as resistant to exploitation as possible. 
Many operating systems, and other software applications, are installed on 
machines with default settings applied.  These default settings can make the computer 
very vulnerable.  Software that is installed on control systems should have all 
unnecessary services deactivated and all unnecessary ports closed.  When practical, 
security patches should be applied to the systems in order to automatically resolve known 
vulnerabilities, but this should be done in an extremely cautious manner, since 
installation of these patches can open new security holes and can induce unpredictable 
and unacceptable deviation of behavior in the control system.  System administrators 
need to ensure that all machines require password access, and that this access is 
conducted on an individual basis, at a privilege level that is appropriate for each 
particular user.  Power-on and screensaver passwords need to be enabled for all 
machines, and strong authentication, utilizing some sort of token or biometric device in 
addition to a password, is highly encouraged.  Critical hosts, including remote devices, 
need to be offered physical protection and housed in a relatively secure environment, and 
remote access into each machine needs to be restricted as closely as possible.   
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Because of the many challenges previously discussed, it is impossible to fabricate 
a secure SCADA architecture that can be applied across all platforms.  There is simply 
too much variation between ships, and too large a paucity of coordinated information 
about the systems on those ships, to accomplish this task.  Architectures would have to be 
designed on a ship-by-ship basis, after careful study of the particular configuration of the 
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particular vessel and close cooperation with the entities that control the installation of 
HM&E equipment on that vessel.  Such an undertaking is beyond the capability of this 
thesis. 
The lessons learned from control systems will be extrapolated and applied to the 
security of ship-based, U.S. Navy control systems.  What follows is a list of security 
recommendations based on information gleaned from the research that has been 
conducted for this thesis.  These recommendations may be lacking in specificity but they 
are general enough that they should be able to be by across all Navy ships, and the 
security of those ship’s control systems should be improved as a result.    
1. Implement Certification and Accreditation 
A well-organized, uniform, and concrete C&A effort is crucial for the utilization 
of secure control systems in the Navy.  Both the DITSCAP and DIACAP were developed 
to provide assurance that the system being evaluated possessed a measurable level of 
protection and could operate in a specific environment with an acceptable level of risk.  
Without this assurance, there is no way to determine or define the relative security of a 
system.  Failure to develop and, more importantly, implement an effective C&A process 
invalidates the intent of the DITSCAP and impairs the quantifiable expression of control 
system security. 
A strong C&A effort is especially important when many different systems are 
integrated into the overall control system environment, as is the case on board a ship, 
where the lack of a thorough mapping of the various system interconnections can 
introduce security flaws that may put the system at risk.  The DoD needs to shore up its 
C&A program by developing a program that contains system definitions, implementation 
requirements, and accreditation standards that can be applied across all DoD components, 
and the Navy needs to ensure that this program is applied to all of its shipboard control 
systems.  Otherwise, the security of control systems will be problematic at best. 
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2. Incorporate Effective Access Controls 
An organization cannot hope to maintain an appreciable level of information 
system security unless it is able to protect those systems, and the data contained within 
and traveling through those systems, from unauthorized access.  Proper access controls 
are critical to fulfilling this goal.  Federal information systems have significant shortfalls 
in this area, and preventing these shortfalls from appearing in shipboard control systems 
is an important part of fabricating effective control system security. 
Ship-based information system security managers should ensure that their ship’s 
control systems are protected from all manner of unauthorized access.  Physical access to 
both the ship in general and to the control systems themselves should be vigilantly 
controlled.  Administrative functions should be incorporated to ensure the elimination of 
unnecessary accounts for personnel who have transferred or changed jobs, as well as the 
inclusion of a password policy that requires the creation of strong passwords and 
mandates periodic password changes.  Information flow within the control system 
network should be carefully monitored and the logical boundary of the control system 
should be maintained at all times.  The capability of remote access into the system should 
be continually evaluated and corrected for, and the control system should be segregated 
from the enterprise LAN to the greatest extent possible.  
In addition to protecting control systems against hostile outsiders, it is also 
necessary to provide restrictions to authorized insiders as well.  Personnel management 
procedures should be instituted to ensure that the proper screening of control system 
personnel is rigorously executed and regularly enforced.  It is also important to have clear 
division of duties, permissions, and responsibilities within the members of a ship’s 
information security workforce in order to guard against usurpation of privilege.  The 
authority to perform critical functions on a system, or to manipulate critical data, should 
be stringently restricted, and personnel should be given the appropriate permission level 
commensurate with their duties.  Users should be compelled to observe the principle of 
least privilege at all times, and should be educated in the need to execute tasks at the 
lowest possible privilege level that can accomplish the tasks. 
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3. Development of Comprehensive Security Policies and Procedures 
A well-planned and thoughtfully organized security policy provides the 
foundation for the security of control systems.  This is the starting point for all other 
actions.  Proper expression of the high-level standards that are expected of control system 
security is crucial for the development of lower level procedures that will actually 
illustrate the fulfillment of security requirements.  Conversely, a poorly worded or 
incomplete security policy inevitably leads to flawed procedures and porous security.   
All shipboard control systems should be governed by a security policy that is 
specifically written for the peculiarities of the HM&E system.  Effective security 
measures for control systems embrace different types of security ranging from computer-
based to administration.  Therefore, an effective security policy that outlines HM&E 
security regulations should be similarly wide reaching.  For example, the policy should 
recognize the presence of classified information within the HM&E network, how such 
data is controlled and labeled, and how the flow of such information must be regulated 
when moving between networks of dissimilar classification levels.  Strict configuration 
management of the HM&E network, with limits on who may alter the environment or 
incorporate new software, should also be described in the policy.  Other facets of the 
policy should include personnel security procedures, provisions for cleared civilian 
contractors and uncleared personnel, administrative security procedures such as account 
creation and deletion, and a description of the ship’s physical security. 
The Department of Defense Information Assurance Directive (DoD Directive 
8500.1) lists policy requirements that are designed to promote the confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity of the information contained within information systems.  
Codification of these requirements, as well as the development of effective 
implementation schemes that promote and actualize the requirements, will foster an 
environment of control system security and will not only allow for the expression of 
executive-level security expectations, but will empower personnel by providing a specific 
set of instructions to follow which will enhance control system security.   
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Since security policies for information systems in general do not suffice for 
control systems, the previously-mentioned security policy framework from Sandia 
National Laboratories could be used in conjunction with DoD Directive 8500.1 to form a 
security policy framework that is tailored for control systems and which embraces the 
concepts promulgated by the DoD Information Assurance program.  Guidance on 
drafting a security policy using this methodology is shown in Appendix A. 
4. Securing Control System Platforms 
The implementation of commercial off-the-shelf platforms with shipboard control 
systems creates many security problems.  Personal computers running variants of the 
Windows Operating System seem to be the workstation of choice for many shipboard 
control system components, such as ICAS.  These workstations have the advantage of 
being familiar to the technician, and they offer an intuitive human-to-machine interface 
that allows a novice user to quickly become familiar with the control system software 
application.  However, these benefits are counterbalanced by the inherently insecure 
nature of the platforms.   
Both Windows 2000 and Windows NT have significant security issues.  Both 
platforms have many security vulnerabilities that, if exploited, could result in a variety of 
effects, including escalation of privilege, denial of service, alteration or compromise of 
protected data, and the execution of malicious code.  The method of exploitation may be 
either remote or physical access, depending on the vulnerability, and a user does not 
always need to be an authorized user to affect an attack.  These vulnerabilities are 
exacerbated by the default security settings of these operating systems, which are 
incapable of providing any appreciable measure of security.  Some of these defaults 
include no required password length or complexity, no encrypted storage of passwords, 
lack of any enforced password history, undefined account lockout policy, and disabled 
auditing of events.  These default settings are often completely incompatible with 
accepted security administration practices and, if left unchanged, create numerous 
avenues that enable successful exploitation of the known operating system vulnerabilities 
of the workstation.  A tiny sample of these vulnerabilities is listed below in Table 9.   
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Since Windows is widely used in HM&E networks, the security of these 
platforms needs to be maximized as much as possible.  Workstations need to be outfitted 
with security tools such as firewalls and anti-virus software, and they need to have the 
most recent security patches installed.  Services that will not be used should be 
deactivated on each workstation to prevent it from being utilized by an attacker as part of 
an exploit.  Basic security administration principles, such as strong password 
enforcement and mandatory password aging, should be implemented on each machine.  
Appendix B provides a more complete security checklist for which should be effective 
for both Windows 2000 and Windows NT, and which will contribute to the security of 
shipboard control systems and their networks.    
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Table 9. Some Windows 2000 and Windows NT Vulnerabilities (After [93, 94]). 
WINDOWS 2000 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Desktop Separation Vulnerability 
Could allow a malicious user to gain additional privileges on a 
machine that they could log onto at the keyboard. 
Local Security Policy Corruption 
Vulnerability 
Could allow a malicious user to disrupt normal operation of an 
affected machine, and potentially of an entire network.  If a 
workstation or member server were attacked via this vulnerability, 
it would effectively remove the machine from the domain; if a 
domain controller were attacked, it could no longer process domain 
logon requests. 
Malformed RPC Packet Vulnerability 
If a malicious user transmits a malformed Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) client packet to a Windows 2000-based computer, the RPC 
Server service on the host computer may stop responding 
Network DDE Agent Request 
Vulnerability 
Could, under certain conditions, allow an attacker to gain complete 
control over an affected machine. 
WINDOWS NT 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Windows NT Privilege Elevation Attack 
A program called SecHole (Sechole.exe) is available on the 
Internet that exploits a privilege elevation vulnerability in the 
Windows NT operating system. The program performs a 
sophisticated set of steps to allow a non-administrative user who is 
logged on locally (at the console of a system) to gain debug-level 
access on a system process. 
Named Pipes Over RPC Issue 
A vulnerability exists in the way Windows NT 4.0 handles named 
pipes over the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) services. An attacker 
could create a denial of service situation on a Windows NT 4.0 
system by opening multiple named pipe connections to RPC 
services and sending random data. 
Authentication Processing Error in 
Windows NT 4.0 SP4 
A logic error exists in Service Pack 4 for Windows NT 4.0 that 
could, under certain conditions, allow a user to log on interactively 
and connect to network shares using a blank password. 
Windows NT Screen Saver Vulnerability 
Could allow a user to gain administrative privileges on a computer 
by running a malicious screen saver program. 
Remote Registry Access Authentication 
Vulnerability 
If a request to access the registry is malformed in a specific 
fashion, it could be misinterpreted by the remote registry server, 
causing it to fail. Because the Remote Registry server is contained 
within the winlogon.exe system process on Windows NT 4.0, a 
failure in that process would cause the entire system to fail. 
5. Standardizing HM&E Equipment 
The lack of a coherent Navy control system structure is a considerable roadblock 
to securing these systems.  The effort needed to simply find information about control 
systems was daunting, and much of the information seemed to be either contradictory or 
out-of-date, requiring further investigation.  The immense quantity of HM&E 
components within the Navy inventory illustrates an HM&E system that gives the 
appearance of being disorganized and cluttered.  Careful consideration should be given to 
tidying the system up. 
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The Navy’s HM&E system should be standardized as much as possible.  It is 
apparent that equipment and machinery variations among ship classes add a considerable 
factor of complexity to any attempt of standardization.  However, there are still many 
steps that can be taken to simplify the picture.  For example, vesting management of all 
types of HM&E, for all classes of vessels, with a central management facility would 
encourage the elimination of duplicative or unnecessary systems, and would stimulate 
development of systems that incorporated the best of multiple systems.  A standardized 
HMI architecture, expanded to as large a target set as possible, would reduce confusion 
among security administrators and provide more coherent guidance on securing the 
control system network.  Reduction of HM&E components would further lower the 
complexity of the problem by limiting the number of variables that could be added to the 
security picture.   
Despite the reluctance of the critical infrastructure industries to apply massive 
corrective measures to the insecurities of their systems, the strategy outlined in this 
section illustrates that there has been significant developmental work done on the subject.  
Although much work remains to be done in this area, the incorporation of the Common 
Criteria in control system design, the development of different control system standards, 
and the correction of typical network, architectural, and policy weaknesses is a good 
beginning for improving the security of control systems in general.  The security of 
shipboard security control systems will be greatly enhanced by following these general 
recommendations, as well as implementing the more specific measures focusing on 
shipboard systems themselves. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Control systems are unquestionably essential to the well-being of the nation.  
They are present in the industries and activities that form the very foundations of our 
lives.  By protecting these systems from harm, we safeguard the pillars of our society.  
Unfortunately, although this protection is of unparalleled importance, nobody has 
mustered a defensive effort commensurate with criticality of the task.   
Critical infrastructure control systems possess considerable vulnerabilities and 
face widespread potential threats.  Recent trends in computer attacks ---including the 
automation and sophistication of attack tools, the rapid discovery of vulnerabilities, the 
increasing permeability of firewalls, and the rising asymmetric threat --- and a spate of 
attacks against the critical infrastructure bring the severity of this problem into sharp 
focus.  Control systems across the board typically suffer from significant network-related 
challenges, countless platform vulnerabilities, administration flaws, and the growing 
preponderance of control system information.     
Shipboard control systems are remarkably similar to the control systems found 
within the national infrastructure.  They exert considerable influence on the proper 
functioning of the vessel, just as national control systems exert an analogous influence on 
the functioning of the nation.  They are also faced with similar threats, and face similar 
vulnerabilities, and have had similar challenges dealing with these issues.  Fortunately, 
they can be addressed with similar solutions to these problems. 
There are a number of measures that can be taken to address the control system 
security problem.  One of these measures is the implementation of strict evaluation and 
certification of these systems, including the implementation of the DIACAP for 
shipboard control systems.  The development, incorporation, and adherence of cyber 




correcting the security problem.  Additional measures include correcting control system 
network problems, improving control system security administration, and enhancing the 
security of control system platforms. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to demonstrate the importance of shipboard control system 
security, to render a judgment about shipboard control system security, and to provide 
some recommendations to improve that security.  During this process, a sample control 
system security policy framework and a checklist to secure control system Windows 
platforms were developed.  While this is a good start to addressing the control system 
problem, much more work needs to be done in this field.  Corporations within the 
national critical infrastructure industry need to take the cyber threat to control systems 
seriously, and implement measures to combat this threat.  The federal government, and 
the Navy in particular, needs to examine its own control systems as well and overcome 
the challenges that have this far led to the insecurity of these systems. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
There are other opportunities for thesis work that can be performed in this area.  
These include: 
1. The careful examination of control system security for a single ship, including 
penetration testing, in order to develop a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and a 
detailed, vessel-specific plan for correcting any vulnerabilities that are discovered. 
2. Assembling a team of personnel to examine all the ships of a particular ship 
class in the same manner as above.  Such an approach would illustrate equipment 
variation, differences in security implementation, and breadth of security vulnerabilities 
between vessels of the same class.  The results of this project, which would indicate how 
control system security varies among similar ships, could also prove illuminating 
regardless of the results. 
3. The comparison of different control system architectures and software 
applications, in order to determine functionality overlap and assess relative security. 
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APPENDIX A —GUIDANCE FOR A SHIPBOARD CONTROL 
SYSTEM SECURITY POLICY 
The security policy of a shipboard control system defines the rules governing the 
protection of data, services, and resources in the HM&E network.  A true security policy 
should be tailored for the specific vessel and control system architecture found on that 
particular ship.  Therefore, the information contained within this appendix is meant to 
serve only as a framework for building a shipboard control system security policy, to be 
molded as necessary depending upon the specific environment encountered.  It is not 
meant to be definitive in nature.   
The formulation of a shipboard control system security policy must meet two 
major criteria.  It must be compliant with the standards of both the Department of 
Defense and the Department of the Navy for information assurance, and it must be 
designed specifically for control systems.  Since there is no DoD or DoN policy 
governing the establishment of security policies for control systems, outside sources must 
be evaluated and utilized.  A control system security policy framework can be combined 
with general DoD security requirements to create a policy that is not only compliant with 
all applicable policy, but which is also tailored specifically for this particular class of 
problem.  This is the approach taken in this appendix.  The security policy framework 
that is articulated here uses a security policy framework devised by Sandia National 
laboratories and incorporates it within requirements that were extrapolated from the 
Department of Defense Information Assurance Directive (DoD Directive 8500.1). 
A. DERIVE AND CATEGORIZE DOD REQUIREMENTS 
The first step in this process is to articulate the policy requirements that are to be 
enforced within the security policy.  When devising a security policy, one must consider 
the elements that must be incorporated within it.  Since the Navy is part of the 
Department of Defense, it must be governed by applicable DoD instructions.  Hence, 
DoD Directive 8500.1 was used as the source for deriving security requirements.  The 
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requirements articulated in this directive were closely examined, unnecessary 
requirements were eliminated, and those remained were modified to fit within the 
framework of shipboard control systems. 
The DoD mandates the promotion of three major objective information assurance 
conditions as part of its overall information assurance effort.  These conditions are 
achieved via the application of safeguards or the regulation of specific activities, and 
should be considered the pillars of the security policy for any U.S. Navy information 
system, and by extension, of any U.S. Navy control system.  Therefore, the next step is 
was to categorize all the requirements within these three broad subjects, assigning each 
requirement a policy identification number within one of the three IA conditions. 
Confidentiality is one of these IA conditions.  It is a measure of assurance that 
information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities or processes.  Table 10 illustrates 
some confidentiality expressions that might be found in a shipboard control system 
policy.  







CON-1 Access to shipboard control systems shall be based on need-to-know and 
granted in accordance with applicable laws and policies 
Paragraph 4.8 
CON-2 An appropriate security clearance and non-disclosure agreement are 
required for access to classified information 
Paragraph 4.8 
CON-3 The minimum requirement for access to the information system 
components of shipboard control systems shall be a properly administered 
and protected individual identifier and password 
Paragraph 4.8.1 
CON-4 The use of PKI certificates and biometrics for positive authentication shall 
be in accordance with published DoD policy and procedures. 
Paragraph 4.8.2 
CON-5 Authorized users who are contractors, DoD direct or indirect hire foreign 
national employees, or foreign representatives shall always have their 
affiliation displayed as part of their e-mail addresses. 
Paragraph 4.10 
CON-6 Access to Navy-owned, -operated or -controlled web sites containing 
official shipboard control system information shall be granted according to 
reference (o) and need-to-know rules established by the information owner 
Paragraph 4.11.1 
CON-7 Shipboard control systems shall regulate remote access and access to the 
ship’s HM&E network by employing positive technical controls such as 
proxy services and demilitarized zones (DMZ), or through systems that 




Integrity is the second objective information assurance condition.  It is that aspect 
of an information system that reflects the logical correctness and reliability of the 
operating system.  It also is an expression of the logical completeness of hardware and 
software-implemented protection mechanisms, as well as the consistency of the data 
structures [98].  Integrity may be more narrowly defined as protection against 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information, and some possible integrity-
related expressions are shown in Table 11. 







IN-1 IA requirements shall be identified and included in the design, acquisition, 
installation, operation, upgrade, or replacement of all U. S. Navy 
shipboard control systems 
Paragraph 4.1 
IN-2 All shipboard control systems shall maintain an appropriate level of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and availability 
that reflect a balance among the importance and sensitivity of the 
information and information assets; documented threats and vulnerabilities 
the trustworthiness of the users and interconnecting systems; the impact of 
impairment or destruction to the information system; and cost 
effectiveness 
Paragraph 4.2 
IN-3 Information assurance shall be a visible element of all investment 
portfolios, incorporating Department of Defense (DoD) -owned or -
controlled shipboard control systems to include outsourced business 
processes supported by private sector control systems and outsourced 
information technologies; and shall be reviewed and managed relative to 
contributions to mission outcomes and strategic goals and objectives 
Paragraph 4.3 
IN-4 All shipboard control systems shall be certified and accredited Paragraph 4.13 
IN-5 Interconnections between shipboard control systems with information 
systems of different security domains shall be employed only to meet 
compelling operational requirements.  Secure configurations of approved 
IA and IA-enabled IT products, uniform risk criteria, trained systems 
security personnel, and strict configuration control shall be employed.   
Paragraph 4.14.3 
IN-6 All personnel authorized access to shipboard control systems shall be 
adequately trained in accordance with DoD and DoN policies and 
requirements and certified as required in order to perform the tasks 
associated with their IA responsibilities 
Paragraph 4.19 
IN-7 Individuals shall be notified of their privacy rights and security 
responsibilities, in accordance with U. S. Navy General Counsel-approved 
processes, when attempting to access shipboard control systems 
Paragraph 4.23 
 
Availability is the third objective information assurance condition.  When 
considered within the context of security, availability is generally defined as the 
capability for authorized users to have timely, reliable access to data and information 
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services.  Every security policy must address the aspect of availability in some degree.  
Some possible availability-related elements of a shipboard control system security policy 
are listed in Table 12. 
Table 12. Availability Security Policy Expressions (After [99]). 
Policy 
ID Availability Policy Expressions 
DoD Directive 8500.1 
Source  
AV-1 Interoperability and integration of shipboard control system IA solutions 
shall be achieved through adherence to an architecture that will enable the 
evolution to network centric warfare.   This combination produces layers 
of technical and non-technical solutions that: provide appropriate levels of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and availability; 
defend the perimeters of enclaves; provide appropriate degrees of 
protection to all enclaves and computing environments; and make 
appropriate use of supporting IA infrastructures, to include robust key 
management and incident detection and response. 
Paragraph 4.4 
AV-2 The ship shall organize, plan, assess, train for, and conduct the defense of 
shipboard computer networks (including control systems) as integrated 
computer network defense (CND) operations that are coordinated across 
multiple disciplines 
Paragraph 4.5 
AV-3 Information assurance readiness shall be monitored, reported and 
evaluated as a distinguishable element of mission readiness  
Paragraph 4.6 
AV-4 The information system components of all U.S. Navy control systems shall 
be assigned a mission assurance category that is directly associated with 
the importance of the information they contain relative to the achievement 
of DoD goals and objectives, particularly the warfighters' combat mission. 
Requirements for availability and integrity are associated with the mission 
assurance category, while requirements for confidentiality are associated 
with the information classification or sensitivity and need-to-know 
Paragraph 4.7 
AV-5 All interconnections of shipboard control systems shall be managed to 
continuously minimize community risk by ensuring that the assurance of 
one system is not undermined by vulnerabilities of interconnected systems 
Paragraph 4.14 
AV-6 All shipboard control systems shall comply with DoD ports and protocols 
guidance and management processes, as established 
Paragraph 4.15 
AV-7 All IA or IA-enabled IT hardware, firmware, and software components or 
products incorporated into shipboard control systems must be satisfactorily 
evaluated and validated either prior to purchase or as a condition of 
purchase 
Paragraph 4.17 
AV-8 All IA and IA-enabled IT products incorporated into shipboard control 
systems shall be configured in accordance with security configuration 
guidelines approved by the Department of Defense and the Department of 
the Navy (DoN) 
Paragraph 4.18 
AV-9 Public domain software products and other software products with limited 
or no warranty, such as those known as shareware of freeware, shall only 
be used in shipboard control systems to meet compelling operational 
requirements.  Such products shall be thoroughly assessed for risk and 
accepted for use by the responsible DAA 
Paragraph 4.19 
AV-10 Identified shipboard control system vulnerabilities shall be evaluated for 




B. MAP REQUIREMENTS TO SECURITY POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Determining the security requirements was not sufficient to construct a security 
policy.  The requirements from DoD Directive 8500.1 were applicable to all DoD 
information systems, not just control systems.  Deriving requirements from that directive 
was a good starting point, but now these requirements had to be applied in a document 
that was tailored for the unique considerations of a control system security policy.  This 
was where the Sandia model came into play. 
Depicted graphically previously in Figure 18, the Sandia Laboratories control 
system security policy is designed to provide a control-system specific security policy 
that will “ensure that all the specialized features, needs, and implementation 
idiosyncrasies of the… system are adequately covered.” [98]  It describes the control 
system’s operation, its relationship to other systems and operations, the boundaries of the 
system, data categorization, and risk management.  It also lists nine major security 
sections that address various portions of the security policy.  These sections are data 
security, platform security, communications security, personnel security, configuration 
management, auditing, applications, physical security, and manual operations. The plan is 
designed to be scalable and adaptable to the requirements of the organization.  It is by no 
means an authoritative diagram of control system security, but should be general enough 
to provide system administration personnel a general idea of how to proceed.   
This step in developing the security policy entailed taking the requirements that 
were derived from DoD Directive 8500.1, and labeled according to their satisfaction of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and incorporating them within the Sandia 
framework.  This was accomplished by mapping the requirements to the nine different 
security sections and their subsections.  It is important to note that the requirements are 
actually a subset of the content of a security policy, so not all the pieces of the policy will 
be able to be mapped to the requirements.  Virtually all of the requirements, however, 
should be able to be mapped to the policy.  The following sections go into this in more 
detail by examining the sections of the security policy as taken directly from the Sandia 
framework. 
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1. Data Security Policy 
The data security policy determines the treatment of defined data categories.  
Different data categories may have distinct requirements for protection, which should be 
specified in this policy. All forms of data (be they paper, digital, video, etc.) must be 
protected commensurate with their criticality to the system. Data marking and need-to-
know controls are important considerations [97]. 
Table 13. Data Security Policy Expressions (After [97]). 








This policy will define all of the details concerning what data must be 
backed up, how often, and where the backups will be stored. The 
retention schedule for the backups will also be identified. If there are 
classes of devices which will be exempt from backup requirements, 




Data must be protected during its complete lifecycle, including 
creation, storage, and destruction. Destruction is as important as 
creation and storage, and it is often an adversary's easiest means of 




Malicious code can cause irreparable harm to any computer system by 
either stealing or destroying data. Controls must be set forth which 





2. Platform Security Policy 
Platform security will identify required secure configuration defaults and will 
specify account creation and termination procedures.  Separate definitions for a secure 
configuration will be detailed for clients, servers, and end devices (RTU/PLC/IED). 
Important concepts such as virus checking, intrusion detection, access control, and 
encryption must be addressed [97]. 
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Table 14. Platform Security Policy Expressions (After [97]). 
Category Policy Expressions 
DoD Directive 8500.1 
Policy Expressions 
Satisfied (if Applicable) 
Client Rules governing secure client specification 
CON-1, CON-2, CON-3, 
CON-4 CON-6, AV-3,  
AV-6, AV-7, AV-8, AV-9, 
AV-10 
Server Rules governing secure server specification 
CON-1, CON-2, CON-3, 
CON-4 CON-6, AV-3,  
AV-6, AV-7, AV-8, AV-9, 
AV-10 
RTU/PLC/IED Rules governing secure RTU/PLC/IED specification 
CON-1, CON-2, CON-3, 
CON-4 CON-6, AV-3 
3. Communications Security Policy 
Communication security identifies the paths that data will take through a network, 
details protection mechanisms for different network segments, identifies security zones, 
and specifies external connection permissions [97]. 
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Table 15. Communications Security Policy Expressions (After [97]). 







This section defines how to communicate within the wired portions 
of the automation network, including all parts of its LAN or WAN 
segments. Cryptographic requirements are specified based on data 
categorizations.  AV-5, AV-6, IN-5 
Wireless 
Wireless connections to a network will need to have special 
consideration due to the broadcast nature of the medium. This 
section should designate what type(s) of data may traverse the 
wireless network, and how connections to the network will be 
established. Also, the acceptable configurations for wireless 
connections to the wired network are specified. Schedules and 
responsibilities for wireless coverage assessments will be here. AV-5, AV-6, IN-5 
Perimeter 
This policy specifies how data is input and output from the control 
system with other networks. The types of controls needed and the 
location of these controls will be identified. Security zones will be 
specified which will help to determine the cryptographic controls 
needed. AV-5, AV-6, IN-5 
Remote Access 
Here is defined if and how users can connect to the automation 
system from remote locations. Remote access is often a 
requirement in geographically large installations to effectively 
maintain the system. Vendors also use remote access for off-site 
maintenance and product upgrades. This policy details how to 
request access, who approves the access, and any time restrictions 






This section specifies if, when, and how outsiders will access 
information and equipment on the automation network. This policy 
details how to request access, who approves the access, and any 
time restrictions for the access.  The monitoring and logging 
requirements will be stipulated, as well as prohibited actions. If 





4. Personnel Security Policy 
Workers on the automation network will have different functions and security 
needs compared to others on the conventional IT network. This policy will express the 
job requirements and hiring policy for control system staff.  It will also differentiate the 
different functions and security requirements for control system personnel, as compared 
to personnel who maintain the conventional enterprise LAN.  These requirements may 
include citizenship and educational requirements, qualifications, background 
investigations, and clearance needs [97]. 
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Table 16. Personnel Security Policy Expressions (After [97]). 







This policy defines what users can and cannot do with equipment 
and network resources. Due to the criticality of the control system, 
personal use should not be allowed on this equipment. Software on 
the control system network should be control-system-specific.  Any 
access to other networks, network monitoring, and a statement 
detailing what the SCADA system entails must be stated here. A 
'rules of behavior' document should be created which every employ 





The account and password policy will describe proper care of 
passwords and accounts including storage, creation, and sharing. 
Some policies will give minimum requirements concerning the 
format for passwords, while other will simply state that the current 
best practice must be used. Any shared passwords (for example 
admin passwords on equipment) will have special protections 





Account creation and destruction policies will explain how users 
may use their accounts, and who is responsible for creating and 
removing accounts. Account creation must be individual for 
accountability purposes and based on job function. Any additional 




Staff must be familiar with the security needs of the system and 
understand why the security controls are in place. When staff 
understands why they do something, they are less likely to 
circumvent the protections.  This policy will list what training is 
required, the frequency of training, and who must be trained. If 
specialized training is required for certain staff positions, those 
requirements must be listed here. Contractors should receive 
training commensurate with permanent staff training.  IN-6 
 
5. Configuration Management 
The configuration management policy ensures the implementation of a 
sustainable configuration management process. The policy will list the necessary 
documentation and processes needed to achieve a sustainable security system. This 
documentation will express details regarding the revision process, timelines for security 




Table 17. Configuration Management Policy Expressions (After [97]). 
Category Policy Expressions 





Maintenance Specific plans for security policy maintenance IN-1, IN-2, IN-3 
Security Plan 
and Guidance Specific plans for security plan and guidance IN-1, IN-2, IN-3 
Configuration 
Accounting Specific plans for configuration accounting IN-3 
6. Applications Policy 
The application policy ensures the proper configuration and use of all 
applications.  It ensures that application use is commensurate with the security needs of 
the automation system, and will cover the details of program-level access control, 
application training, and test and development requirements [97].  
Table 18. Applications Policy Expressions (After [97]). 









Control-system-specific applications will at times have requirements 
for administrator access. These applications may also allow data 
separation, separate user logins, and password protections. This 
section will focus only on those applications which are written to 





Support applications such as office software, databases, and logging 
will need to have a different set of security guidelines. The 
applications usually do not interface directly with control system 
equipment and automation functions, but may reside on the same 




7. Audit Policy 
The audit policy defines the scope of auditing and assessment activities. Audits 
will determine if the protections which are detailed in policy, security plans, and 
implementation guides are being correctly put into practice on the system. Assessments 
ensure that the protections on the system are adequate for the information and 
functionality.  Personnel who are responsible for scheduling and reviewing audits must 
be identified, and auditing schedules are outlined [97]. 
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Table 19. Audit Policy Expressions (After [97]). 








Both internal and external audits have an important place in a 
comprehensive risk management program. This section will give 
the details of each type of audit as well as identifying the internal 
organization responsible for performing or contracting for the 
required audits. AV-1, AV-3 
Accreditation 
If an organization must be accredited, this section of the policy will 
give the details of the responsible parties, timelines, and 
participating entities. IN-4 
Incident 
Reporting 
The individuals who are responsible in the event of an incident will 
be identified here. If there is a chain of reporting that must be 
followed, those details must be captured here. The protection level 
of the incident details are defined so the results and reports will be 
protected at the appropriate level. An incident response procedure 
must be developed to address issues of evidence preservation, 
investigation authority, reporting requirements, etc. AV-1, AV-2, AV-3 
Logging 
This policy will define the logging requirements such as what will 
be logged, storage requirements, and revision requirements. AV-1, AV-3 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Intrusion detection is an important tool for detection of anomalous 
behavior. Control system operations will require specific policies 
regarding its requirements and limitations for IDS. AV-8 
Assessments 
The assessment portion of this policy will specify the responsible 
parties, timelines, and data protection for assessments performed. N/A 
8. Physical Security Policy 
The physical security policy documents how control system equipment is 
protected from physical damage, unauthorized access, or destruction. Access to any 
equipment by visitors and personnel must be controlled and monitored [97]. 
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Table 20. Physical Security Policy Expressions (After [97]). 






Physical asset disposal is critical.  Physical equipment must be 
sanitized before it can be released from the control of the system. 
This policy will express the guidelines and requirements for users 
who have physical assets that are no longer necessary. Important 
concepts are sanitization, tracking, and disposal technology.  IN-2 
Asset Protection Statement of protection guidelines CON-1, CON-2 
9. Manual Operations Policy 
Due to the critical nature of HM&E systems, control system functions must still 
be performed even in the event of system failure. The manual operations policy will 
articulate procedures to implement this activity, and will include: manual backup 
procedures, chain of command, periodic inspection, training in manual operations, tests 
and drills on manual operation procedures, and a disaster recovery policy [97]. 
Table 21. Manual Operations Policy Expressions (After [97]). 







Functions that must be performed in the event of a failure 
of the automated capability of the system. N/A 
 
Once this mapping is complete, the control system administrator has an outline to 
follow that incorporates DoD-level IA requirements within a policy template that is 
designed specifically for control systems.  The next, and final, step is to write the actual 
policy.  This is done in accordance with the specific systems employed, as well as the 
particular HM&E environment, and must be tailored for each the particular ship.   
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APPENDIX B —SECURITY CHECKLIST 
 
WINDOWS SETTINGS CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST 
BACKGROUND AND PREPARATION 
Steps Details and/or recommendations 
Read any applicable security 
policies for your organization 
Determines how to implement security in accordance with 
requirements 
Review your user education and 
training plans  
Ensure users will receive proper security training 
Ensure users will receive proper 
security training 
Decide what services may be enabled and which may be 
deactivated 
INITIAL CONFIGURATION AND SET-UP 
Steps Details and/or recommendations 
Ensure that all disk partitions are 
formatted with NTFS 
NFTS offers access controls and protections that aren’t 
available with other file system 
Remove floppy and/or CD-ROM drives to prevent 
booting from them 
Set BIOS restrictions to boot sources, if supported 
Enable hardware boot protection 
Physical lock on floppy drive 
Remove or unbind unnecessary 
protocols 
Prevents denial-of-service attacks against the protocol and 
safeguards against protocol-specific exploits 
Remove additional operating 
systems 
Also applicable to unneeded subsystems  
Install latest Service Pack and 
post-Service Pack hotfixes 
Ensures machine is equipped with latest security updates  
Disable unnecessary services Eliminate vulnerability to service-specific exploit 
ACCOUNT POLICIES 
Steps Details and/or recommendations 
Ensure the Administrator account has a strong password 
Rename the account using a non-obvious name 
Set up a decoy “Administrator” account with no privileges 
Enable account lockout on the actual Administrator 
account 
Properly Establish Administrator 
Account 
If part of a network is administered by a domain 
Administrator, disable the local machine’s Administrator 
account 
Set a limit on how often 
passwords may be re-used.   
Enforce password 
history 
Recommend 24 passwords 
remembered 
Minimum password age is 
length of time users must keep a 
password before they can 
change it.   
Establish Password Policies 
Establish minimum 
password age 
Recommended minimum age is 
2 days 
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ACCOUNT POLICIES (cont.) 
Steps Details and/or recommendations 
WINDOWS SETTINGS CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST 
Length of time users can keep 
their passwords before they 
have to change it. 
Establish maximum 
password age 
Recommended maximum age is 
between 42 days and 90 days 
Set the minimum number 
characters required for user 
passwords 
Set minimum 
password length  
Recommended minimum 
length:  8 characters 




Requires the use of complex 
(strong) passwords.  This means 
the password has sufficient 
length, is alphanumeric in 
structure with a mixture of 
upper and lower case letters, 
and uses at least one special 
character 
Locks account for a specified 
period of time.  
Account Lockout 
Duration 
Recommend at least 30 minutes 
Set the number of bad login 




Recommend 3 attempts 
Set how long the lockout 
threshold is maintained before 
being reset 




Recommend 30 minutes 
AUDIT POLICIES 
Set Audit Policies To… More Detailed Description 
Audit Account Logon Events  
 
Audit account logon/logoff events from another computer 
in which this computer is used to validate the account. 
Audit Account Management Audit account management activities 
Audit Directory Service Access Audit access to an Active Directory object that has its 
own system access control list specified 
Audit Logon Events Audit local or network logon/logoff events to this 
computer.  
Audit Object Access Audit access to an object--for example, a file, folder, 
registry key, or printer, which has its own system access 
control list specified. 
Audit Policy Change Audit a change to user rights assignment policies, audit 
policies, or trust policies. 
Audit Privilege Use Audit each instance of a user exercising a user right 
Audit Process Tracking Audit when a user restarts or shuts down the computer or 
when an event occurs that affects either the system 
security or the security log. 
Audit System Events Audit detailed tracking information for events. 
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WINDOWS SETTINGS CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST 
ASSIGNMENT OF USER ACCESS RIGHTS 
Description of User Right Details and/or recommendations 
Determines which users are allowed to connect over the network 
to the computer. 
Access this computer from network 
Assign to: Authenticated users who need remote access to the 
workstation 
Allow a process to authenticate as a user and thus gain access to 
the same resources as a user 
Act as part of the operating system 
Assign to: No one 
Allows a user to add a computer to a specific domain. 
Add workstations to domain Assign to: Administrators 
Allows the user to circumvent file and directory permissions to 
backup the system.  Back up files and directories 
Assign to: Trusted users 
Allows the user to pass through folders to which the user 
otherwise has no access. Bypass traverse checking 
Assign to: Assign to:  Trusted users 
Allows the user to set the time for the internal clock of the 
computer Change the system time 
Assign to:  No one 
Allows the user to create and change the size of a pagefile. 
Create a pagefile Assign to: Trusted users 
Allows a process to create an access token. 
Create a pagefile Assign to: No one 
Allow a process to create a directory object in the Windows 
object manager. 
Create a token object  
Assign to:  No one 
Allows the user to attach a debugger to any process Create permanent shared objects  
Assign to: No one 
Allows a user to shut down a computer from a remote location 
on the network. 
Debug programs  
Assign to: Trusted users 
Allows a process to generate entries in the security log. Force shutdown from a remote 
system  Assign to: No one 
Allows a process that has Write Property access to another 
process to increase the processor quota that is assigned to the 
other process. 
Generate security audits  
Assign to: Administrators 
Allows a process that has Write Property access to another 
process to increase the scheduling priority that is assigned to the 
other process. 
Increase quotas  
Assign to: Administrators 
Allows a user to install and uninstall Plug and Play device 
drivers. 
 
Increase scheduling priority  
Assign to:  Administrators 
Load and unload device drivers Assign to: Administrators 
Allows a process to keep data in physical memory, which 
prevents the system from paging data to virtual memory. 
Lock pages in memory  
Assign to: No one 
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WINDOWS SETTINGS CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST 
ASSIGNMENT OF USER ACCESS RIGHTS (cont.) 
Description of User Right Details and/or recommendations 
Allows a user to log on by using a batch-queue facility. Log on as a batch job  
Assign to: Trusted users 
Allows a security principal to log on as a service. Log on as a service  
Assign to: Trusted users 
Allows a user to log on locally at the computer's 
keyboard. 
Log on locally  
Assign to: Trusted users 
Allows a user to specify object access auditing options for 
individual resources such as files, Active Directory 
objects, and Registry keys. 
Manage auditing and security log  
Assign to:  Administrators 
Allows modification of system environment variables 
either by a process through an API or by a user through 
the System Properties applet. 
Modify firmware environment 
values 
Assign to: Administrators 
Allows a user to run Microsoft Windows NT and 
Windows 2000 performance monitoring tools to monitor 
the performance of non-system processes. 
Profile single process  
Assign to: Administrators 
Allows a user to run Microsoft Windows NT and 
Windows 2000 performance monitoring tools to monitor 
the performance of system processes. 
Profile system performance  
Assign to: Administrators 
Allows a parent process to replace the access token that is 
associated with a child process. 
Replace a process level token  
Assign to:  No one 
Allows a user to circumvent file and directory 
permissions when restoring backed-up files and 
directories and to set any valid security principal as the 
owner of an object. 
Assign to: Administrators and Trusted Users 
Assign to:  Authenticated users 
Restore files and directories  
Assign to: Administrators 
SECURITY OPTIONS (cont.) 
Options  Details and/or recommendations 
Additional Restrictions for 
Anonymous Connections  
Do not allow enumeration of SAM accounts and shares 
Allow Server Operators to 
Schedule Tasks Disabled  
Disable this option 
Allow System to be Shut Down 
Without Logon Without Having 
to Log On  
Disable this option 
Allowed to Eject Removable 
NTFS Media  
Only Administrators should be able to do this. 
Amount of Idle Time Required 
Before Disconnecting a Session  Maintain default of 15 minutes 
Audit the Access of Global 
System Objects  
Enabled this option, but only when there is a strict audit 
management process in place. 
  157
WINDOWS SETTINGS CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST 
SECURITY OPTIONS (cont.) 
Options Details and/or recommendations 
Audit the Use of Backup and 
Restore Privilege  
Enable this option, but only when there is a strict audit 
management process in place. 
Automatically Log Off Users When 
Logon Time Expires  
Enable this option. 
Automatically Log Off Users When 
Logon Time Expires  
Enable this option. 
Clear Virtual Memory Pagefile 
When System Shuts Down  
Enable this option. 
Digitally Sign Client 
Communications (Always)  
Disable this option. 
Digitally Sign Client 
Communications (When Possible)  
Enable this option. 
Digitally Sign Server 
Communications (Always)  
Disable this option. 
Digitally Sign Server 
Communications (When Possible)  
Enable this option. 
Disable CTRL+ALT+ DEL 
Requirement for Logon  
Enable this option. 
Do Not Display Last User Name in 
Logon Screen  
Enable this option. 
LAN Manager Authentication Level  Only enable LanManager Version 2 
Message Text for Users Attempting 
to Log On  
Set a warning banner as per local policy requirements. 
Message Title for Users Attempting 
to Log On  
Set a warning banner as per local policy requirements. 
Number of Previous Logons to 
Cache (In Case Domain Controller 
is not Available)  
Cache should be set to 0 logons. 
Prevent Users from Installing Print 
Drivers  
Enable this option. 
Prompt User to Change Password 
Before Expiration 
Recommended 14 days 
Recovery Console: Allow 
Automatic Administrative Logon  
Disable this option. 
Recovery Console: Allow Floppy 
Copy and Access to all Drives and 
all Folders  
Disable this option. 
Rename Administrator Account  Change and safeguard the recorded account name. 
Rename Guest Account  Change and safeguard the recorded account name. 
Restrict CD-ROM Access to Locally 
Logged-On User Only  
Enable this option. 
Restrict CD-ROM Access to Locally 
Logged-On User Only  
Enable this option. 
Restrict Floppy Access to 
Locally Logged-On User Only  






WINDOWS SETTINGS CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST 
SECURITY OPTIONS (cont.) 
Options Details and/or recommendations 
Secure Channel: Digitally Encrypt 
or Sign Secure Channel Data 
(Always)  
Disable this option. 
Secure Channel: Digitally Encrypt 
or Sign Secure Channel Data (When 
Possible)  
Enable this option. 
Secure Channel: Digitally Sign 
Secure Channel Data (When 
Possible)  
Enable this option. 
Secure Channel: Require Strong 
(Windows 2000 or later) Session 
Key  
Disable this option. 
Send Unencrypted Password to 
Connect to Third-Party SMB 
Servers  
Disable this option. 
Shut Down System Immediately if 
Unable to Log Security Audits  
Disable this option., since ship’s systems are affected 
Strengthen Default Permissions for 
Global System Objects (e.g., 
Symbolic Links)  
Enable this option. 
Unsigned Driver Installation 
Behavior  
Set to Warn but allow installation. 
Unsigned Non-Driver Installation 
Behavior  
Set to Warn but allow installation. 
SETTINGS FOR EVENT LOGS 
Steps Details and/or recommendations 
Maximum Application Log Size  512 kilobytes. 
Maximum Security Log Size Depends on the amount of expected activity, the amount of 
available disk space, and the frequency with which the logs will 
be manually reviewed, archived, and cleared. 
Maximum System Log Size 512 kilobytes. 
Restrict Guest Access to Application 
Log , Security Log, and System Log 
Enable this option. 
Retain Application Log, Security 
Log, and System Log 
Recommend at least 7 days. 
Shut Down the Computer When the 
Security Audit Log is Full  
Do not enable. 
ADDITIONAL SECURITY SETTINGS 
Disable DirectDraw. 
Disable Unnecessary Devices. 
Protect kernel Object Attributes.  
Restrict Null Session Access. 




WINDOWS SETTINGS CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST 
ADDITIONAL SECURITY SETTINGS (cont.) 
Prevent Interference of the Session Lock from Application Generated Input.  
Generate an Audit Event when the Audit Log Reaches a Percent Full Threshold. 
Harden the TCP/IP Stack Against Denial of Service Attacks. 
Make Screensaver Password Protection Immediate. 
Disable LMHash Creation. 
Disable Autorun. 
Generate Administrative Alert when the Audit Log is Full.. 
Back up the Administrator's Encryption Certificate  
Enable Automatic Screen Lock Protection. 
Update the System Emergency Repair Disk . 
Make sure the Guest account is disabled. 
Restrict the use of LanManager authentication. 
Secure base objects. 
Protect files and directories. 
Protect the Registry. 
Apply appropriate Registry ACLs. 
Restrict access to public Local Security Authority (LSA) information. 
Restrict untrusted users' ability to plant Trojan horse programs. 
Disable caching of logon information. 
Set the paging file to be cleared at system shutdown. 
Restrict floppy drive and CD-ROM drive access to the interactive user only. 
Modify user rights membership. 
Change the Scheduler service's security context. 
Hide the name of the last logged-in user. 
Update the system Emergency Repair Disk. 
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